Globalizing Tyrannies

Globalization is a system based on mutual trust, on granting and receiving mutual benefits, and refraining from violence. Its weakness is that trust can be breached and benefits enjoyed unilaterally without serious consequences, at least until someone else reacts. Low-level violence can be used to good advantage by those ready to bend or break the rules. Two powerful countries are now engaged in an unashamed exploitation abroad of the freedoms offered by globalization, while themselves denying others similar freedoms on their own territories.

The rise of authoritarian China and the recuperation of an aggressive Russia are prominent facts of the present world. The rise of China was widely anticipated, the Russian restoration less so, but both changes have been facilitated and vastly accelerated by globalization. Globalization has long been criticized by the political Center-Left. It is high time its drawbacks were recognized by the Center- Right as well.

One thing I learned from my early studies of international political economy (on international shipping, and foreign direct investment) was that most national governments at that time (post-WWII) were being used - or let themselves be used - as vehicles to promote particular interests, in competition with other economic interests within their own country, and competing with the interests championed by other national governments. The national interests of a country at that time were (to put it a bit crudely) whatever particular interests managed to hijack the government's support. And I am not talking primarily about the socialist countries of that period, or third world countries - rather, OECD countries, western industrialized countries. Of course, these governments did not primarily act in the markets as if they were companies themselves (although that also happened), but they struggled continuously to shape and reshape the rules of international markets in favor of their own chosen industries. The interests of the general public were not often mentioned. At the time I found this to be a shocking bit of evidence against the ruling norms of the "free world", supposedly the guardians of free markets and fair competition.

Having moved on from the naive views of my youth, I believe the world of global economic relations is very much the same interest-ridden complexity today, only the basic rules have changed, making it much more difficult (provided they play by the rules) for national governments to protect against foreign competition. With the lowering of national barriers and the rise of the electronic worldwide network, vast new fields of social, economic, religious and political activity have opened up. The actors have changed as well, with national governments less prominent, and international organizations and NGOs greatly expanded in functions and influence. Multinational (transnational) corporations have grown as expected since the 1970s, but have not achieved world dominance. Power is, to some extent, shared. There are multiple actors, multiple power centers, multiple possibilities. Globalization has in large part become the definition of the world scene.

Given my skeptical view of national governments as economic actors, I initially welcomed this great transition. Later I have, like others, come to doubt the wisdom of promoting such enormous change. The most obvious reason, launched by critics early on, was that globalization brings unmanageable side effects while reducing the possibility of putting on the brakes. Free movement, unfettered transnational transactions, is the main leverage for achieving globalized effects. It is also the cause of most of the trouble. It has allowed unprecedented agglomerations of money and power where there should be none - in vicious criminal networks, operating drug trafficking and human trafficking, in authoritarian regimes abusing the globalized freedoms for anti-democratic purposes, in the corruption undermining many apparently democratic governments. The undermining of governments around the world has also been facilitated by the untrammeled trade in small arms. Fanatical religion has spread and multiplied their support via global communication networks.

Ideally, the coexistence of different cultures and conflicting ideas should be at the core of globalization. A freely transacting world must come to terms with the continuing presence of widely diverse cultures. For this to happen, either one (western), secular culture must become universally accepted as a functional economic and political overlay to genuine, deep subcultures, or a truly tolerant multicultural civilization must come into being that can allow political and economic activities to proceed undisturbed. Until the failure of the "Arab spring" we could still believe in the beneficial potential of the unlimited spread of ideas - good ideas. It turned out we did not all agree on what were the good ideas. Multiculturalism became impossible when violence to "non-believers" was sanctioned by religious groups.

Of all these side effects, the undermining of liberal democracy and the unleashing of unabashed authoritarianism is nevertheless in my view the most serious.

In two highly readable, recent articles Michael Ignatieff points out the surprising and threatening breakthrough for authoritarianism around the world, and especially what he calls authoritarian capitalism, excelling in China and Russia, giving the lie to the old "truth" that democratic capitalism is the only workable system (see New York Review of Books, July 10 and September 25, 2014). The assertive power of these two dictatorships and the way their power is exercised - freely, brazenly - is also new, and scary. Secret illegal action is covered up with blatant lies. When violent crackdowns or other oppressive action have to be made in plain view, excuses are no longer made. Power is its own justification. And as Ignatieff also points out, it is corrupt power, a sophisticated system infused and maintained with money from secret, illicit sources.

Aggressive authoritarianism exploits globalization. This has been further facilitated by the widespread reduction of arms in the western world. The post-cold war era was the world of the "peace dividend", even in spite of the Yugoslav, Afghan and Iraqi wars. European military forces were significantly reduced. Since 1991 the response capacity of Russia's western neighbors to armed provocations has been built down to near zero, on the expectation that Russia would now be a friendly country with no reason to pick quarrels with its neighbors. It was thought a safe gamble at the time. Not today.

Recent aggressive action by Russia, and not merely in Ukraine, is quite serious. Russia is probing borders and repeatedly provoking incidents between its military aircraft and naval units and the legitimate civilian activities of other countries in their space or in international waters, from the Baltic and Barents Seas to the Bering Strait. Sweden presently finds itself in a bind over unexpected Russian submarine activity in the approaches to Stockholm. Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states have been challenged numerous times during the past year by Russian air force units.

In similar activities China has been harassing its neighbors to the south for decades in the waters of the South China Sea, which it ludicrously claims in its entirety, contrary to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (to which China is a party - see my blog on the South China Sea, June 30, 2011). The South China Sea, sectors of which are legitimately claimed by the littoral states, also is the main shipping route for trade between China, the Middle East and Europe. To keep that traffic lane free and open is obviously a vital Chinese interest, as it is a vital interest of the other littoral states and the international community at large. But having a vital interest does not allow China to arrogate the whole sea to itself.

In sum, playing at geopolitics has become simpler as borders have become porous and global transaction rules have been standardized. Given the unavoidable presence in the future of these and other similarly unscrupulous actors, a measured retreat from the current wide open version of globalization to something more reliant on nation-state actors would seem to be necessary. Ironically, in the internet world this is clearly something both China and Russia have long been seeking, in order better to control their own populations and keep foreigners out of their home space. Their provocations are bound to be temporary, but the broader effects are likely to be a less globalized world and a bigger role for closed, large markets (USA, China, EU, India). The present xenophobia of Russia will hopefully subside, but in the meantime we shall have to suffer the "gangsterous" types while waiting for wiser Russian voices to break through. They exist, I know.

The New Russia - to the Dniestr?

Ukraine - Europe's first taste of blood in 15 years, but the first in 70 years to also bring a whiff of hitlerian tactics, as Putin smuggles incognito soldiers into Ukraine and boasts of his ability to wipe out European capitals at will. We have seen ground war, indiscriminate slaughter, a civilian airliner downed with 300 passengers dead and local populations caught up in war-gamers' mayhem. But don't complain: Collateral damage has to be suffered for the higher ends of local "sovereignty". Further west, in European capitals, there is secret relief that so far the conflict remains mostly within the Slavic family.

Security is divisible, in case you thought otherwise, and despite the 1990 CSCE declaration of Paris ("Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is intrinsically linked to that of every other.") Of course, Russia and Ukraine were not there, in Paris. The USSR was. And the Europeans and North Americans, little knowing what was about to happen in Yugoslavia, the latter also present in Paris. Divisibility, yes, of states. Here is much of the problem we are facing in Europe today. Scotland's decision to remain in the UK was a healthy sign, an example for Spain's Catalonia to follow. The cracks in the present state construction are readily visible.

Looking back, it was only a year after that Paris declaration that the Soviet Union was chopped up, divided into its multiple constituent parts. Ukraine became independent, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan, Georgia ... And Russia. At that unique moment a wisely conceived multilateral treaty could have created a modern, democratic multistate union with a solid central core. No such thing happened. Instead, the Commonwealth of Independent States was created to replace the Soviet Union, substituting the uncertainties of free choice in politically immature republics for the familiar dictation of Moscow. Cooperation was initiated in many policy areas between CIS members, but Ukraine kept defense to itself. To Moscow - where politicians still thought of themselves as the Center - the new system was slow, cumbersome and unpredictable. So, if you think the idea of reuniting the empire was a Putin invention, think again.

As far back as 1990, many observers thought it only logical that the Soviet Union had to collapse - "what goes up must come down"! - while others among us had the additional thought (and expressed it, to the annoyance of some): "What goes down must come up". In other words: To political leaders and their aspiring successors in the superpower that was the USSR, the horror of watching it tumble like a house of cards must in itself have created a strong motivation to rebuild it, in all its former glory. Now - in 2014 - we have seen that begin to happen - or something along those lines. Still, the basic assumption of the "post-cold war" settlement was that the new Russia would be content to be "new", and would fit within the strictures of the CSCE/OSCE.

Signs of trouble came early on. One was when Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev in December 1992 gave a scary speech that sounded exactly like the old Soviet line (it was soon retracted, but - he said - meant as a warning of the dangers represented by the Russian opposition he was facing at home). Other signs followed. I discover notes from a discussion with Russian colleagues at the Carnegie Moscow Center in 1997, the year of opening talks for NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe, and of the Russia-NATO Founding Act cementing the future collaboration between the two sides. Again the question was, would Russia really fit within the framework of such a "new normal"? There were both hawkish and dovish voices to be heard, but all thought the chances for a durable friendly coexistence were slight. A key problem was seen to be the emotionality of the issues to Russia. The Baltic states were, of course, at the center of the attention. Compare that to Ukraine today: "The Baltics cannot be members of a military alliance which is closed to Russia." One called the idea of an expansion of NATO a "preplanned crisis". "When the expansion of NATO is a fact, all other Russian-Western relations will deteriorate to a cold peace, maybe even a cold war." Nevertheless, later on Russia saw both the Visegrad states and the Baltic states join NATO and kept its cool (mostly). With Ukraine, there will be no such patience.

The Russian project is empire. By now there is nothing new in saying so. But there is a need for those of us on the responding side to make that a policy assumption, not just something that can be waved aside. We Europeans need to have a reasoned and united approach. So far it has been evasive and reluctant. Sanctions, yes, but not too strict. Russia celebrates our dithering by pushing the limits - military aircraft intrusions abound, border controls become difficult, etc.

Worse, some think a Russian empire restored is the Russians' right. What they had in 1917 then becomes the norm. Such views are common in Germany. And who knows? My crude guess is that the end of this conflict for the foreseeable future will be a negotiated agreement between Russia and Ukraine that acknowledges the "legitimate transfer" of Crimea to Russia, that outlines a future "union" of the two countries with a joint defense organization, and that pledges an arms-length distance in the relations of Ukraine to Western organizations. Moldova and its Transnistrian district will have to be handled in a separate agreement. All told, a power-package deal masked as a fair agreement between equals. Tell me whether that is right or wrong.

If Putin has a bit of statesmanship in him that he has not shown so far, he still has a chance of constructing that multistate agreement I described above - but not at gunpoint.

Confidence-Building: Oops, There Goes Another Basic Principle!

Recent developments between Russia and the West not only undermine a set of values previously thought to have been shared by the two sides. (See my blog on Russia last March.) It is now increasingly clear that confidence-building - the chief principle supporting conflict management between the Soviet Union and the West since the early 1960s - is no longer effective between the two sides. The notion of confidence-building was not very familiar in strategic military thinking when it made its appearance, and it has only gained widespread adherence in Europe. Asian political leaders find it illogical.

The main assumption is that the two sides confronting each other in an international conflict basically want peace, but have to overcome the problem that they have no trust in each other. Distrust between national (ethnic) groups is often historically based and therefore deeply engrained. Accordingly, the opposing parties need help to alleviate their lack of trust, to build confidence.

Notice how different this is from the most common competing idea, namely that in serious conflict there is only one winner. The winner takes all. The loser is obliterated. In this conception, trust is warranted only in one's own side. You must not trust the other side. You must be alert and suspicious. Just think of all the action movies and thrillers that start from this principle.

Confidence-building is an uncertain alternative, though ethically preferable. According to confidence-building, we can only resolve conflict by helping the parties to break out of the pattern of distrust. Suspicion can be dealt with by ensuring full mutuality in dealings, by openness and transparency. To allay suspicion, there is the proof of experience. Let the parties try in small ways at first, then let them decide what to do based on what they have experienced. If they were cheated, they can pull out. If small steps prove successful, more important ones can follow.

These ideas were essential to the negotiations that led to the main arms control agreements of the Cold War, starting in the 1960s. When even arms statistics were kept secret by the Soviet side, the US side suggested using US data instead, even for Soviet weapons. The Soviets accepted this as an experiment. Ultimately this led to agreement, and subsequently to a long series of other agreements. Probably the most prominent of these were the INF Treaty (intermediate range nuclear forces) and the CFE Treaty (conventional forces in Europe). Unfortunately, they are no longer the cornerstones they used to be in European security. One (the CFE) has been suspended by Russia several years ago. The other is currently being questioned by the development of new Russian missiles.

Russia is not the only one to blame here. The US suspended the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) Treaty under President George W. Bush in 2001 in order to develop a more modern anti-missile shield, thus also breaking the confidence built over the old agreement. In various arms control matters, Russian leaders claim to have experienced that their concerns have not been fairly dealt with. Doubtless, part of this has to do with the fact that Russians are culturally less trusting than many Westerners. Still, it might have paid off for us all if NATO had been more attuned to the prickly Russians. Trust needs to be nurtured. Clearly, Russian leaders, and Mr. Putin not least, are more at ease with the certainties of suspicion, than with the uncertainties of trust.

At present, confidence-building is in bad shape. The OSCE, once Russia's favored club, is no longer respected by Russia. The Ukraine crisis demonstrates what is missing without the CFE Treaty.* Israel and the Palestinians seem to prefer the fighting and the blind killing to the confidence-building option once offered in the Oslo accords.

Perhaps the way confidence-building has been construed in the West has taken the "building" part of the concept a little too seriously. What we should discover is the need for confidence-maintenance and confidence-nurturing, instead of being satisfied to have completed a "building". The job is never finished.

*See the article by Elisabeth Brocking in The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/remember-the-cfe-treaty-10203

Russia and the Sphere of Influence - Back from its Shallow Grave

One of the axioms of the brave new world that emerged as the Berlin Wall fell was supposedly the end of power politics, at least among industrialized nations. No more of the old, tainted notion of spheres of influence. Instead there would be endless opportunities for cooperation. Win-win was the slogan of the 1990s. Well, one place where win-win was a hard sell was in Moscow. Win-lose was a well-established concept in that part of the world, and what need was there for anything to replace it?

So we discover, belatedly, that the Russians do not consider themselves bound by broadly agreed international rules and that they will certainly not abide by Western rules of conduct, whether in diplomacy or in military procedure short of war. Actually, the Kosovo War in 1999 had already demonstrated this, but by most observers it was set aside as exceptional. Now we see it is not. This split over basic rules of conduct is the procedural side of the Western conflict with Russia. It is evident in the lack of progress in the post-Crimean talks between Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Kerry.

Then there is the substantive side. Consider the Russian preference for spheres of influence.

In 1997, anticipating and seeking to preempt a Finnish and Swedish move to join NATO, Russia made an under-the-table proposal to make the Baltic Sea region into a "non-bloc zone", encapsulating even the three Baltic states. The states in the area were to promise they would abstain from joining alliances. A flurry of low-key "preventive" diplomacy followed, led by Finland and Sweden, to put the proposal aside. And fortunately, the world never heard of that non-bloc zone again.

Until now, that is. On March 17, the day after the tainted Crimean referendum, the Russian Federation set forth a proposal for the future of Ukraine, covering both its internal affairs and its foreign relations. On the latter, it was said, “'[Ukraine’s] sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral military-political status will be guaranteed by Russia, the EU and the US, supported by a UN Security Council resolution'. The document appeared to make clear that Russia’s main 'red line' was future Nato membership for Ukraine..." (Financial Times, March 17, 2014) We see the same underlying fear here, on the part of Russia, as that which triggered their invasion of Georgia in 2008. Any proposed guaranteed neutrality for Ukraine must be up to Ukrainians themselves to consider, not for others to discuss over their heads.

Am I not too hasty in saying the assumptions of post-cold war east west relations are no longer valid?

One way to examine that is to object to this degree of generalization, and point out that the circumstances preceding the Crimea annexation were special. Ukraine had descended into a chaos in the streets of Kiev and other cities, lasting for months, and barely ending when the Ukrainian president Yanukovich fled to Russia. That led the Russian speaking majority population of Crimea to call for a transfer of their region to Russia, to which Russia for historical and other reasons could not but respond positively. Moreover, the historical loss of former Russian-controlled territory here and elsewhere was an accident; the dissolution of the Soviet Union was “... the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century”, according to Mr. Putin, and so we should have understanding for their loss and support the return of what is rightfully theirs. By some accounts, not just old Soviet but also old Russian imperial territory. Such as Ukraine, of course, but also Moldova, Georgia, Finland and the Baltic states.

Not everyone is ready to believe that Putin's ambitions are this great. On the other hand, nor is everybody ready to accept the argument about the worthiness of Russian imperial restoration.

The other answer on East-West relations is that Russia will take, by stealth or by force, what they want and cannot get by diplomacy. This fits a recognizable pattern. Pristina Airport in 1999 was a perfect example of the Russian mode of operation. They did it for their friends, the Serbs, of course. They were crystal clear about who their friends were; others were treated like enemies, even in a negotiated partnership operation under UN auspices. The Georgian invasion in 2008 was another example.

NATO must now resume its prior, more vigilant attitude and its better prepared military posture towards Russia. Good that NATO has just selected as its new Secretary General Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, the former Prime Minister of Norway, this country being the only original NATO member with a direct border to Russia and a healthy sceptical attitude to that eastern neighbour ever since 1991. A revised military posture does not mean itching for a shooting war, but being better prepared in posturing and holding. There is a lot of chess in this, and the Russians love that game.

The Russian behavior pattern is to a considerable extent opportunistic. They are robbers by opportunity. If you have something you want to keep, you have to hold it securely, and with strength.

Given what we now know, I question the wisdom of the Ottowa Convention on land mines. Passive means of defense, adequately protected, are workable. Finland and the Baltic states would be in a much better position with land mines on their border with Russia.

Some would put all their trust in the Americans. Look how President Obama is being hounded for his pusillanimous stance over Ukraine. I doubt there was anything much he could have done, short of going to war. Posturing without readiness to fight is only dangerous. I'm afraid US backup of NATO allies via the article V guarantee is less firm than often believed. Let us not get to the point of testing it.

Finally, of course, there is the EU's dependency on Russian natural gas. The EU was warned so many times. (Check out the writings of Vladimir Socor.) But, apparently, they thought, how convenient to have it all from one source. My lament is merely, why are we Europeans endowed with such geopolitical brilliance at the Parliamentary level?

Am I alarmist on Russia? Of course. Just as I've been a couple of times before. In 1980 over Afghanistan. In 1992 over Soviet fragmentation. My Norwegian colleagues shook their heads. Some will again.

Ukraine and Crimea - Not Primarily an International Crisis

Somehow the future of Crimea has suddenly become an urgent issue we are expected to consider, as if it were the previously hidden heart of Ukraine's problems, as if the rights of Mr. Putin and the Russian nation have been offended by some major misdeed against Crimea's Russian-speaking population. As if Ukrainians are collectively guilty of Crimean atrocities, justifying a Russian intervention. No, neither Ukraine nor Crimea is primarily at the center of an international crisis.

The real problem is the long-lasting, and increasing, misgovernment and mismanagement of Ukraine, dating back two decades or more, but reaching a crescendo this winter. For a big industrialized country to sink so deep in economic woes, there is more than just a bit of ignorance and misfortune behind it all. A country in which the shadow economy is estimated at 50% or more of GDP, where a whole social layer of smart movers - mid-level and higher "managers" - are organized in networks that skim the profits of most sectors of the economy. A parliament filled with collaborators of those shadow-economy chieftains, and a government skimming the skimmers. The corruption networks have been known for years and are well described by the Economist in a recent issue.

 The only surprise is that large numbers of ordinary Ukrainians ultimately find the strength to protest outdoors for months on end - in wintertime, no less. Actually, their behavior fits the old J-curve hypothesis about revolutions, how people revolt when, after gradually experiencing improved conditions, they suddenly see their hopes quashed by some dramatic event. That fits the story of Ukraine's negotiations for EU association during most of 2013, only to call it off when the agreement was ready to be signed. And no wonder they were skeptical about the new government as well when Mr. Yanukovich later fled the country.

Basically, of course, Ukraine is dependent on economic relations both with Russia and with Europe. To Russia, Ukraine is probably more a strategic than an economic asset. To the EU, probably neither. Just a key relay station for Russian gas pipelines to the west, which the EU has - indolently and carelessly - allowed itself to become dependent on.

So, whether Crimea is right or wrong to suddenly demand secession from Ukraine, and a reunion with Russia, this is simply a red herring. Indeed, one can easily sympathize with a demand for a referendum from a population that has several times been shifted like a package between Russia and Ukraine, without anybody asking those involved what they thought about it. Except, why has this demand been raised just now, when the problems of Ukraine are acute, but have nothing to do with Crimea? This is sheer manipulation, and who the manipulator is, is obvious.

But Ukraine cannot escape its cohabitation with Russia. Managing its own internal affairs better is Ukraine's only solution. At this stage, losing Crimea - one way or the other - is likely to be the price they will have to pay for getting through it all. It will be their punishment for allowing themselves to continue after 2004 living in such political and economic disorder. The betrayal of the Orange Revolution says it all.

In international strategic terms, Ukraine's only significance is being the missing piece in Russia's games with its imaginary enemies. Of course, that makes it also of considerable interest to the West. But let no one fool you to feel sorry for Ukraine. 

Russia's Moment

With the Sochi Olympics successfully out of the way, President Vladimir Putin's main worry may likely be Ukraine. And at this particular moment, on Sunday, February 23, 2014, Ukraine is without leadership. The President has disappeared, there is no police, just the Parliament and its Speaker, appointed temporarily to assume presidential authority. Masses are still gathered in the streets of Kiev, still suspicious of any claim to authority, even from Yulia Timoshenko, former prime minister and unsuccessful presidential candidate, just released from prison on their demand.


So what has this confusion got to do with Russia? Not much more than Russia's power position in the world. With Ukraine part of Russia for centuries, Russia was powerful. Without it, so much less. When the Soviet Union fell apart, and Ukraine found itself independent, the expectation was they would soon find their way together again. That did not happen. And without Ukraine, Russia sees itself as so much less than in their former united position. Ukraine, the cradle of Russia.


Estonian politicians I interviewed before their country was accepted to join NATO still said Russia was no threat to them - "not as long as Ukraine stays independent". Other Baltic leaders echoed this view. Without Ukraine, Russia is perhaps a great power, sort of. United with Ukraine, Russia will once more be a superpower. Or so they think.


Leaders of other leading powers think so, too. US policy on Ukraine has been consistently supportive, no matter what. EU policy has been lined up in a similar effort. Both see a tottering giant and struggle to keep it from collapse. Keeping Ukraine afloat is as much about keeping Russia weak as about securing Ukraine's freedom.


If Ukrainians can sort out their troubles and disagreements, chances are they will be okay. But those troubles are not likely to disappear quickly; they have been on display for years and have much to do with the divided nature of their country's identity, but also much to do with a rather chaos-prone political culture. United they stood in the Orange Revolution of 2004, divided they were, nevertheless, soon thereafter when their leaders fell out. United they have been standing in Freedom Square, Maidan, for months until their oppressor fell. Can they stand up to the vacuum that follows?


Russia's possibilities are legion. Deposed president Yanukovich will seek their backing. With Ukraine without leadership, military or manipulative steps need not be drastic to tip the scales once more in the other direction. Watch Russia during the coming weeks! And watch the game between the great powers as well.

Catalonian Games

(This post is no longer relevant, since the Congress of Deputies in Madrid voted a resounding No to the Catalonian proposal on April 8, 2014. I leave it here nevertheless, for whatever interest the details of the proposal might have.)

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 explicitly declares the country is indivisible. That constitution was adopted in a referendum in which more than 80% voted yes, and Catalonians voted more than 90% yes. Times do change.

When I last wrote on Catalonia, its President Artur Mas had just declared that he would not do anything illegal in his quest for independence. Not long after that the Catalonian government made public its proposed questions for a referendum on independence, and announced that it would be held on the 9th of November 2014. The government in Madrid, however, made clear in no uncertain terms there would be no referendum. 

Then, in mid-January 2014, came the next rebellious step from Catalonia. The Parlament in Barcelona decided by a nearly two-thirds majority to ask the Spanish Congress for permission to hold a referendum. 

This request by the Catalonian Parlement has been widely interpreted as a plea to be allowed to vote on independence. But this is not what the proposal says. Anyone who reads the Spanish text will see that it is much more intricately worded than that. The request is framed within a constitutional provision (article 150.2) that enables delegation of extraordinary power to an autonomous community such as Catalonia to undertake exceptional measures for a limited time, in this case a referendum. In the proposal the word "independence" is not mentioned. The stated objective is to allow Catalonians to express their views in a consultative referendum on "the collective political future of Catalonia, taking as its point of departure terms to be agreed with the Government (of Spain)". 

Obviously, independence is not mentioned because it is prohibited by the Spanish Constitution. But then why ask permission for a referendum anyway? I can see a couple of reasons why. 

1. It is the civilized thing to do, what Europe would expect, and what Scotland already did in a similar situation. To refuse to allow a simple advisory expression of popular opinion will be very poorly received outside Spain, and the political battle over Catalonia's future has in large part become a contest over images in international media. Madrid would come out looking exceedingly bad if they refuse.

2. If the request is accepted - along with some kind of (miraculously) negotiated agreement - Catalonia and Madrid might actually come to terms in a way that saves face on both sides, provided the question to be voted upon does not refer to "independence". It is fairly certain that while a Catalonian vote could exceed 50% yes to something phrased akin to independence, it is unlikely to offer a political platform for secession. 

Regardless of all the rhetoric, secession even after a 60% yes vote would be a political non-starter, a project doomed to failure - with Catalonia left outside the EU and with Spain subsequently vetoing its application to become a member of the Union. In my judgment therefore, Artur Mas is already in a dead-end street. A referendum result of about 50% would let him bow out gracefully, and Catalonia could continue in its role as an intransigent region of Spain.

3. It is also possible that the request is simply a political trap, designed specifically to be rejected by Mr. Rajoy. Like practically everyone else, he may brush aside the objection that independence is not mentioned, because (as one can imagine him saying) "everyone knows what the Catalonians want, and this is how they have planned to wangle it out of us". So he and his party will deny the request with his absolute majority in the Congress of Deputies. From the perspective of the independence supporters in Barcelona, such an outcome would be just what they want, and to them politically, utterly insignificant. They would move ahead with their referendum in any case, and the whole thing would simply be a great publicity victory for Catalonia abroad.

But this last possibility will not change the political realities that come after a vote in favor of Catalonian independence. Either Mas gets off the bus at that point, and all will be reasonably well for the great majority of Catalonians - even those who saw their dream crushed. 

Or Artur Mas will charge ahead with an independent Catalonia into the great unknown, with or (if he is fortunate) without Spanish troops at his heels. 

Losers, Parliamentary Democracy and European Fascism

Possibly the most divisive of issues in modern democracy is what to do about the poor and those apparently unable to help themselves. The basic tenet of a modern Western economy is that people are expected to sustain themselves by working. Some people obviously cannot work due to physical disabilities, and so clearly must be supported by a social safety net. Others are unable to secure work for whatever reason. This is the open-ended category of social losers. Still, the original welfare state had a fairly strict definition of who was worthy of support.

The parties that built the welfare state, the Liberals, Socialists and Social Democrats, have always been the champions of losers, but the fulfillment of the welfare state in its original design in the 1960s left these parties suddenly with less of a cause. For a while they survived as the parties of technocrats, the managers of the welfare state, but this was not enough. To stop a slow decline over the past generation or two these parties have persuaded most of the rest of the political spectrum in Europe to expand the definition of those entitled to social support, so that no loser, of whatever kind, is let down. Even nominally conservative parties have been persuaded to join this bandwagon. This change coincided with the great influx of immigration from non-European cultures. The old leftist adage that «it is society's obligation to support those who cannot support themselves» was now applied to a changing kind of society where a large portion of the social support recipients were illiteral immigrants.

Nevertheless, there are always sceptics who ask, who are the losers? Excessively liberal and ill-defined categories of social benefit recipients can create considerable social friction. In some cases these categories appear to be more or less based on a self-declared status. Ordinary citizens react to this state of affairs with anything ranging from mild irritation to political opposition to violent demonstrations. The danger to democracy is that government leaders are not easily able to judge the strength of the reactions, leaving them to simmer over a long time. Here is dangerously fertile ground, not merely for populism, but for fascism.

Fascism feeds on lingering discontent, because such unresolved conditions can lead increasing numbers of people to the conclusion that parliamentary democracy cannot solve society's problems, and that more drastic policies are therefore needed. This is what happened when fascism first emerged in Europe. Today fascist movements are again growing in many parts of Europe, and many analysts are asking themselves why. In my view the answer is near at hand. Many European governments have been calling on their citizens to sacrifice their economic interests for the greater good of their nation, at the same time that little or no improvement seems to come out of it. Just as in the 1920s and 1930s, perceived outsiders (not Jews this time, but gypsies/Roma people, illegal immigrants, drug addicts and “drifters”) are blamed for the bad times, and the government is blamed for coddling them. The situation is superficially similar, yet starkly different in Western and Eastern Europe. In the East, from Greece to Romania to Ukraine and Russia, the problems are unlikely to be solved by simple measures. In Western Europe, however, my view is that if governments could pay some more attention to their citizenry, the danger of fascism can be reduced.

I am fully aware of treading on dangerous ground here, but the issue cannot be shoved under the rug. The Norwegian mass murderer of 2011 tried to justify his actions by pointing to ineffectual immigration policies. While this argument is both disgraceful and disgusting given the context and the many victims, we need to recognize that ordinary citizens in European countries are calling for a tougher policy line on social benefits, crime and cultural issues. Their calls should not go unheeded simply by appealing to our generosity and our disgust of fascism.

¡

EU Immigration Policy: Look Who's Coming to Dinner

Asylum seekers are crowding Europe's borders in escalating and unprecedented numbers. Conflict in Syria and turbulence in  North Africa are the main immediate driving forces, but as we shall see, there are broader forces at work. Vast numbers of people require help. Can Europe provide for them all? Are those arriving also those most in need of help? What should Europeans sacrifice to accommodate the arrivals? Sweden's pensioners have now seen one of their two hot meals per day taken away from them as part of the effort to handle the cost of the influx of immigrants. A banal example, perhaps, but also a stark illustration. 

World poverty is supposedly declining. I find it hard to believe, given the increasing waves of atrocious events that take place in the world around us every day. Though I am not a religious person, I see endless self-gratification - in high places and low, endless greed, and endless grasping for power. So what's new? Check Gregoire de Tours or the decline of the Roman Republic. The most obvious news is that I am getting old, and the world is changing very fast.

The world changes in myriad ways, of course, but the changes need to be recognized above all in their grand - global - patterns. The adage used to be “think globally, act locally” - and maybe it still is. But my first point is that the message from the local level these days is getting garbled – locally. Global thinking is messed up by cultural barriers, increasingly impenetrable. Local action can only have global effects if it can be repeated all around the globe. Now we have to recognize that the “globally thinking” Egyptians who started the Egyptian revolution were only a small minority. The rest of their compatriots are not looking for global values, but for their own parochial ones to be installed. The same is true of the “creationists” of the United States, to take another example, showing how widespread the regression of basic knowledge actually is by now.

Moreover, the West is slowly realizing that its values, enshrined in great declarations of the United Nations (in particular, Human Rights, the Rights of Children, the Rights of Women), are not only being ignored, but actively opposed. Local action has a better foundation if locally anchored. Parochialism wins out. And the parochial is all over the news.

Current affairs used to be about understanding the general through the particular, the news. Of course, we can still make sense of our own local world and what is happening there. But the larger condition the human race is in can less than before be grasped by our paying attention to events of the day, or what happens in particular places. If we want to gain some deeper level of understanding we must therefore try to grasp things on a grander scale, the way we do when we link the ravages of the weather to climate change (with the disaster of the Philippines, November 2013 fresh in our minds as the most compelling current example). Curiously, we are quick to see the connection when it comes to nature, but less so when it has to do with people.

This is my second point. Runaway self-gratification – acts which have become legion and to most of us utterly abhorrent (mass rapes, violent mass demonstrations with killings, religious massacres), needs to be recognized as linked to broader underlying causes: rapid population growth, poverty, illiteracy, information flooding stripped of context. Some of these violent events are said to be justified as a form of retribution for acts of oppression, but the determined vanguard action of masked individuals in many of them shows how easy it is for vandals with a different agenda to take over and redirect a protest. Organized crime infiltrates and profits from these events wherever possible.

Since the 1980s, there has not been much talk about world population growth as a problem. Nevertheless, it is predominantly the effects of this overarching problem we are living with today. It may be too close to us to recognize, but the chief underlying causes that I can see of our present chaotic world is the combined population growth and economic stagnation in parts of the developing world.* Notable also, as a motivating force, is the wide dissemination of electronic images globally, beyond any context understandable to the majority of people exposed to them. Images are captivating and disturbing beyond anything that texts alone can do. Here I believe globalization is a curse as much as it is a blessing.

No wonder a better life in the West – conveyed in electronic images - is seen as THE dream for them to realize. No wonder kind individuals in the West want to help them share that better life; it is "their right". No wonder thousands and thousands of migrants are knocking on Europe's doors, thousands more every year. Unrealistic politicians from all over the EU push well-intentioned immigration policies that are bound to crash against hard realities, just as overloaded migrants' boats founder at the northern shores of the Mediterranean. The available resources are way short.

The profiteering of “helpers” along the way keeps the migrants business at a healthy rate of growth. Organizers of rickety truck transports across the Sahara get richer by the day. Middlemen on the southern Mediterranean shores, peddling rides in boats that should long since have been condemned, see their little fortunes grow. At the end of the line, in Sweden, smart private “consultants” are on hand to help the new arrivals find their way in the jungle of welfare benefits and rules. And believe it or not: the consultants' fees are paid by the generous Swedish government (source: Swedish TV, November 15, 2013).

The migrant clients of this long line of scavengers are not the poorest; they are people who have been able to save up or otherwise mobilize the sizable funds needed to make that long transit to the promised EU-land. Their poorer sisters and brothers have no chance of making the trip.

And the EU and its member states keep pushing their policy of increased immigration. Critics, like myself, are accused of racism and xenophobia.

The solution to the developing world's woes is not to bring all their inhabitants into the Western world. It is certainly not to help their middle class before helping the poorest. The solution is not either to continue the flow of development aid that in Africa has kept corrupt regimes in power – or competing violently for power – since the 1960s.

The solution must be something akin to what Robert Cooper hinted at about a decade ago (http://www.demos.co.uk/files/postmodernstate.pdf?1240939425) when he described the world as divided between a pre-modern, a modern and a postmodern part. The pre-modern world is a collection of failed states. To save them, and us all, one approach he could see was a “new imperialism”, whereby the postmodern Western world conquers the world of warlords and misery. However, he regarded it as unlikely to come about, since bringing order where there is chaos is not very profitable these days.


Robert Cooper is by many regarded as too controversial to touch. Check his analysis. I find it even more convincing today than when I first saw it, since the trends I have described are much more compelling now, and the dangers to the EU of staying on course with immigration without integration are steadily increasing.


Improvement of life in the countries of the migrants' origin is the only way those who need help the most can receive it, and the scavenging industry can be brought to a halt. Those efforts can only be successful if they are handled and fully controlled by the EU member states who bear the cost. The recipient states are unlikely to accept this unless their payoff is considerable (more corruption?). The EU and its member states are unlikely to be so venturesome. We need a recognized EU “immigration crisis” on a much greater scale than the current moderate unpleasantness before even a debate of the requirements for change can get started.

I have little illusion that we shall ever get there.

*Text changed from previous reference to "population explosion", see comments below.

Populism (part II): The United States

In my previous blog I focused on populism in Scandinavia – which also, by the way, is characteristic of how populism works in several countries further south. This time I want to consider US populism.

American populism is a well-known historical fact, in particular from the beginning of the previous century. Populist movements are also quite active in the US today (“Occupy Wall Street”, for example, or the Tea Party). But is the term “populism” recognizable the way it is used in Scandinavia and Northwestern Europe, as a pejorative term, to shame people for “irresponsible” political ideas and behavior? Without really having conducted any closer study of the matter, it seems to me the answer must clearly be no. Why? Because in the US, populism in the European sense is the norm, it is normal politics.

First of all, I believe it can be said that the United States has been structurally “designed”, from the start, all the way back in the late 1700s, to be open to challenges from below. This is not populism defined by what it says, but by how it works.

The British political scientist Margaret Canovan, who has written extensively on populism, notes the initial difficulty faced by anyone approaching the subject because of its indistinct nature. She suggests that we should "... shift our attention from the ideology and policy content of populist movements and concentrate instead on structural considerations. Populism in modern democratic societies is best seen as an appeal to 'the people' against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society.” (*, p. 3.)

In other words, it doesn't matter who is in government or who the populists are (left or right). The point is the opposition raised by populists to the powers that be, those that are "inside the Beltway." In every US election this epithet appears.

This links back to my previous blog about the fear-driven campaigns of established Scandinavian political parties against any political challenge from outside their control, no matter how disorganized. The curious point about the United States in this context is that the powers of government in Washington DC show little or no fear of populism; indeed, the United States has arranged itself constitutionally to be maximally open to popular challenges from below. Let me just point out a few characteristics of the system that embody this quality:

• the US Constitution's design for the House of Representatives, notably its 2-year term – exceptionally short for a major legislature - and single-member districts, qualities which forcefully push the incumbents' attention to the concerns of their constituents;
• the 1^st Amendment to the Constitution, which is probably the strongest instrument protecting freedom of speech existing anywhere in the world;
  
• the 2^nd Amendment protecting the right to organize citizens' militias and hence the citizens' right to bear arms; a veritable implicit “right to revolt”;
  
• the widely shared and strongly held values regarding individual rights and the collective foundation of the constitutional system (“we, the people ...”)
• the deeply inculcated and widespread popular attitudes regarding the people's rights.

All of these structural characteristics function together to make up a political system that takes populist tendencies for granted, and which is unsurprised by novel proposals and “outrageous” ideas steadily being fed into the institutional setup from below. Its size and complexity also mean that very few populist challenges come to anything more than pinpricks against the system, although the Tea Party in recent years has shown that it is possible to wreak havoc with sufficient funding and determination.

In short, this is why the “charge” of “populism” has very little relevance in US public debate, and why at the same time populism in the US is alive and kicking at all hours of the day and night. US grassroots movements are myriad and unstoppably active all over the country.

This is not to say the country is governed by populism, more that it is governed by the “populism” of the North European mindset, the unpredictable and messy kind of politics produced by political actors “out of control” by responsible political parties, and well funded.

In other words, the “noise” emerging every day from the bottom layer of the US political system is vastly greater than in Europe, where political parties always have to be mediators before the tiny squeaks from below can be heard at the top. Indeed, the unpredictable nature of US politics and the steady appearance of ever new 'loonies' on the American political scene is exactly what makes political elites in Northern Europe so nervous about the United States, their major ally. Just imagine one of these characters winning the next presidential election!

With Europe being as much affected by US policies as they are, such fears are far from idle. And they may have something to do with why “populism” is so vehemently opposed whenever it appears in Stockholm or Oslo.

*Margaret Canovan, “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy”, Political Studies (1999), XLVII, 2-16.

Populism and Ostracism

(NOTE: Revised version. The previous version with an unfinished section on US politics has been withdrawn.)

Populism - a name, a category of politics, sometimes used with positive connotations, sometimes neutrally, but mostly pejoratively. Princeton web defines it as “the political doctrine that supports the rights and powers of the common people in their struggle with the privileged elite”. Basically it has to do with allowing “the voice of the people” to be heard – and heeded - in government. It is a call for power to be given to the great masses, a call made by unorthodox politicians driven by a fundamental dislike, or even hatred, of the elites in power. Populists are those who make the call, but not many of them call themselves populist.

In Latin America successful populist politicians like Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, and before them Peron, have become in effect dictators, manipulating their followers into a frenzied kind of support that continues for years. The special character of Latin American societies, with large impoverished masses without education and vast gaps in wealth, makes these countries vulnerable to the rule of demagogues. It can easily occur in other parts of the world where similar conditions obtain. In Europe today we have seen it in Berlusconi's Italy, and in Lukashenko's Belarus. In Asia, Thailand's Thaksin Shinawatra is a clear example. But populism in power has not usually been a Western-industrialized phenomenon.

What concerns me here is not successful populism, but the use of populism in political manipulation, as it is found in Scandinavia. The tendency of this region is that political elites defend their position by ostracizing people and ideas they fear or don't like, using the label “populist”. And this is effective, a banishment from the "good society" as strong as the old Greek method. Many Scandinavians are actually intimidated to refrain from voicing their true views.

Politics in Northern Europe – and in particular in Norway - is tightly fixed to the center. Therefore, when the recent Norwegian elections were won by the conservative right, international media paid much attention to what was called Norwegian right-wing populism, in part because of the mass killer who in 2011 went on a rampage taking over 70 lives in the name of right-wing, quasi-nazi ideas. Inevitably, his actions have been linked by some to the party closest to his deranged ideas, the liberal/right-wing Progress Party, which is currently about to enter the government in coalition with the Conservatives. There is no basis for such a link.

The Progress Party is sharply critical of the dominant social democracy, with high taxes, heavy bureaucracy and a very liberal immigration policy. For 30 years the Progress Party has polled around 15% of the votes, but always been kept out of government coalitions – until now. Clearly, the appeal of the Progress Party among the voters is a threat to the mainstream parties. So the latter have gone for the ostracizing option, the populist bogeyman, to defend their position. 

The populist bogeyman is nothing new in Nordic politics, he has been around for a long time. While in US politics populism has more of a positive ring to it (which actually protects the loonies), in Norway and Sweden when “populism” is used in public discourse it is routinely framed as a threat to public health, or worse, marking dangerously popular ideas, such as tax cuts and other opportunistic causes likely to endanger the Scandinavian welfare state. Many call these parties xenophobic or racist for their critical view of liberal immigration policies. Since 2009 the Norwegian Progress Party for the first time has a Swedish fellow party of similar views, the Sweden Democrats. The media in these two countries have spared no ink in smearing these parties' views, which would hardly be called extremist in other countries. In Denmark, by contrast, critical views of welfare and immigration are much more widely held than in Sweden and Norway.

Consider, in Denmark, the following view of immigration offered by a well-known party: “It will do nobody any good that Denmark receives more foreigners than society can absorb. It will do nobody any good that unemployed immigrants are allowed to walk around without anything to do – and it will do nobody any good that we, out of misunderstood kindness, allow values like freedom, equality and democracy to be undermined.” (Translation: OFK.) Says who? Right-wingers? No, the Danish Socialist People's Party, to the left of the Social Democrats.

In Norway, we find roughly the same view held by the right wing Progress Party: “Norwegian immigration policy must take as its starting point that demands are made on immigrants who come to settle here. Participation in the work force, in language courses, and showing respect for Norwegian law are central elements in a successful policy of integration. Equal treatment of Norwegians and immigrants is decisive for the prevention of conflicts, which means that special arrangements for immigrants must be terminated.” (Trans.: OFK) Racist? Xenophobic? 

Indeed, there is a gap in Nordic political culture between Denmark to the south and its two northerly sisters. While keeping “populist” parties out of the circle of clean-nosed politics has been a common project of all centrist and center-left parties in Norway and Sweden, Denmark is a different story. Here a succession of populist parties have had a strong minority position since the 1970s. The frank Danish manner of speaking is shocking to the refined ears of more northerly politicians, who would never condone a socialist party having an immigration policy like the one just quoted. Hence the slight pariah-stamp on Danish politics as seen from Sweden or Norway, where everybody is supposed to be a social democrat at heart. 

It is perhaps time for the nervous social democrats of the center-left in these countries to recognize that in the forgotten everyday politics behind the scenes, nobody has come from more populist roots than the labor movements. Ultimately, I would hope, Scandinavian political elites can find the courage to admit the legitimacy of all of "the people" - regardless of what opinions they hold.

Catalonian Independence Day: Can Artur Mas be Tamed?*

As a citizen of Norway, a country that won its independence by seceding unilaterally in 1905 (from Sweden), how can I not be rooting for Catalonian independence? The background stories are largely the same. A militarily imposed union. Attempts to make the union work within a democratic framework. Economic grievances. A distinct language. Both Catalonia and Norway have had these experiences. (For more background on Catalonia and independence, see my blogs in October 2012 and May 2013.)


Still, Catalonia and Norway are different. Just for one crucial thing, popular support was vastly stronger in Norway in 1905 than it is in Catalonia today. In Norway the referendum held on the issue of independence was decided by a whopping 99,95% in favor. In Catalonia the most positive result expected would appear to be around 60%, possibly less. To end up with a minority against independence as large as 40% would make the whole project politically a dead duck.


This is not what you heard on Catalonia Day 11 September – la Diada Nacional de Catalunya. A human chain of hundreds of thousands of Catalonian nationalists, holding hands, symbolically linked their hopes and demands for freedom, in an event said to be inspired by the way the Baltic populations marked their demands for freedom from Soviet oppression in 1989.


As someone who spent some time in the Baltics back in those days, I can only say the comparison is vastly overblown and indeed grotesque. The Balts were under totalitarian oppression, not allowed to use their own languages, not allowed freedom of expression, not allowed the ordinary Western democratic freedoms that Catalonia along with the rest of Spain has enjoyed since 1975. 

As if to top it off with a transition from the grotesque to the farcical, Latvia's Prime Minister Dombrovsksis on this occasion makes a statement of Baltic support for the "hypothetical" case of Catalonian independence, and Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs Margallo declares Catalonia has a point and should be treated more leniently. Not exactly Mariano Rajoy's week, as the stolid Prime Minister of Spain was preparing his belated response to the circus.

During the past six months the Catalonian leadership semed to have been brought to its senses by Madrid's low key policy of private persuasion and constitutional pressure, along with the straits of Catalonia's economic hardship. But Artur Mas is not so easily tamed. The President of Catalonia, who rode high a year ago on nationalist sentiment, peaking with an immodest declaration of sovereignty by the Catalonian parliament in January 2013, conceded to private talks with Premier Rajoy in the spring.


Those talks have recently been resumed in the summer of 2013. They initially appeared to have a beneficial effect, when on September 5, President Mas declared that the promised referendum on independence, previously scheduled for 2014 regardless, is now only going to be held if it can be done «legally». If it cannot be held legally, it will be postponed until the next scheduled Catalonian elections of 2016, Mas said, and will then be designated as a plebiscite on independence. 


By the time Independence day came along the following week, Mr. Mas had changed his mind again. Mas now insists he still intends to have the referendum in 2014. 


Prime Minister Rajoy, trying to manage this process from Madrid, has just given his public response in a letter to the Catalonian president on September 14. Dialogue is the only way, he says. No direct comment is given on the desired referendum, though implicitly it is rejected again.

Mr Rajoy is not wrong to insist on respect for the Spanish constitution, but he disregards the urgent need for a long-term overhaul of the constitutional structure of Spain. Catalonia's crisis is a chance to effect a change covering all of Spain's autonomous regions («states»), not just Catalonia. No doubt about it, a constitutional revision in the direction of federalism would be a good thing for a country that already is a de-facto federation. The Socialist Party (PSOE) now has made federalism part of its program. So far Rajoy has refused to let his Partido Popular open up for even a debate on these issues. His most recent letter to Mas indicates he is not about to change his mind. 


We need an end to Rajoy's stasis, and to Mas's slippery shifts, to put us beyond the current fiscal, financial and administrative mess of the Catalonian circus. Had there been a clearcut response in Catalonian public opinion, this case could have been much simpler.

(*Revised September 16 from the first version of September 10.)

Demilitarize Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla!

Why does a NATO ally, the UK, insist on keeping a military base on the territory of another NATO ally, Spain, against the latter's will? And why does Spain insist on doing the same in two locations in its neighboring country Morocco? The visit of a UK naval vessel, the HMS Westminster, in Gibraltar at the height of a diplomatic storm only a week ago recalled ridiculous associations with 19th century gunboat diplomacy.

Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla - tiny, militarized colonial enclaves - all are, in equal measure, historical anomalies that should be done away with - the sooner the better. They serve no purpose other than to aggravate local relations and maintain needless animosities across artificial borders. It is hard not to see all the involved parties in the wrong here. Of course, there is money involved, in particular in the case of Gibraltar.

Also, these supposed geopolitical strong points watch over the Straits of Gibraltar, but the strategic significance of the Straits is not what it used to be. There are no longer any guns in place with the range to cover the passage. The passing merchant ships are hardly fewer or smaller than before, nor are the naval vessels. But securing the freedom of passage there has very little to do with who controls the enclaves. The NATO navies are in command. In such a case the US navy will be in the vanguard jointly with Britain and Spain and NATO allies Portugal and France, among others.

There are parallels which suggest demilitarization. At the approaches to St Petersburg, the Åland Islands have since 1800 successively been under Swedish, Russian and Finnish sovereignty. A strong fort in the islands, Bomarsund, built by Russia in the 1830s, was subsequently destroyed by Britain and France during the Crimean War. In 1856 the islands were demilitarized after Britain and France had defeated Russia in the Crimean War. The islands were once more occupied and remilitarized by Russia in 1916, then again demilitarized after World War I. Today the Åland Islands are demilitarized and have extensive autonomy under Finnish sovereignty, including a favorable special tax status under the EU.

Another parallel is Svalbard, the Norwegian archipelago in the Arctic that the Soviet Union claimed after World War II. Svalbard was at that time already governed by an international treaty (1925) which limited Norwegian sovereignty and demilitarized the islands. The Norwegian government dismissed the Soviet claim in 1947 and normal relations ensued in which the USSR developed a considerable mining activity. When Norway joined NATO in 1949 Svalbard remained outside the deal. During the Cold War the US remained highly suspicious of Soviet intentions in Svalbard - the Soviet manpower there seemed much greater than required by the mining activity. Thus, during the 1980s the US was claimed by some to have been prepared to undertake a preventive attack to throw the Russians out, in which case Norway would just have been left dangling. Be that as it may, the demilitarized status of Svalbard has remained intact and - like Åland - answers many difficult questions before they can be raised.

Hence, demilitarization is a live option that should be examined more realistically in these three cases. Raise it in an ad hoc multilateral forum. Join that move to the introduction of a wide-ranging autonomy in each locality, and sovereignty loses its sensitivity. If a local parliament can run the “country” pretty much as they please, the question of national sovereignty becomes moot.

You don't believe me? Let them try it.

Remember Helmut Kohl, Mr Rajoy?

The former German Chancellor retired from his post as party chairman in 2000. He did so after serious allegations were confirmed in the press in increasing detail that he and his conservative party CDU/CSU had been receiving large amounts of illegal money. The contributions came primarily from sources in German business and industry.

Since he was not in office when the scandal peaked, his exit may appear to have been less onerous than had he been obliged to step down as head of the German Government. Still, Mr Kohl was honorary chairman of his party and was a highly respected politician not only in Germany, but in Europe as a whole. He did the right thing and retired, making way for Angela Merkel to succeed him as party chairman.

Considering the evident facts of your situation, Mr Rajoy, it seems you are in a very similar tight spot and should take Mr. Kohl as your example. Indeed, the alleged facts in your case date exactly from the period when Mr. Kohl was struggling to keep the news hounds at bay. But either you would not, at the time, believe the German stories about the recipient of the Prince of Asturias prize of 1996, or you may simply have thought it would be easier for you to get away with it in the lax atmosphere of Spanish politics.

Well, the Spanish public is not so forgiving any more, as you may perhaps have noticed. Your conservative party's former treasurer, Mr. Barçenas, cannot be left alone carrying the burden of this case. He received the money from the industrialists, duly noted the amounts and how they were subsequently doled out in monthly sums to yourself and other members of the Aznar government of the Partido Popular.

Political corruption may be widespread in Spain, and not only in Spain, but that does not make it okay. Mr. Rajoy, it is time for you to go.

Between Theocracy and Democracy: Egypt in Transition*

Most of us would probably prefer to see their elected leaders sit out their term or being ousted in formally correct ways. That was my first reaction to what happened in Egypt last week. We have also, most of us, at times been governed by useless leaders who should never have been elected. But most industrialized governing systems have survived somehow intact, and so have we, their citizens. A seasoned democracy like, say, France, has not succumbed under its many incompetent presidents. Other countries have had their fair share of the same. That experience is part of what democracy is all about, which makes the opposition to the coup in Egypt easy to understand. 

To me, the intervention seemed hasty. At the same time, it must be recognized that Egypt, to say the least, is not a sturdy democracy. Indeed, as democracies go, Egypt is a momentously fragile case. But that is perhaps also another reason why a coup should be a last resort. What keeps Western critique in the aftermath from being more harsh is, I suspect, the fact that the intervention was (evidently) forewarned to the West and actively sought and supported by respected Egyptian leaders like Mohammad El Baradei. One would have liked to see him chosen under more legitimate circumstances.

Furthermore, if the ousted Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi had had a hum of what he was into from the day he was elected, he might have fared better, maybe even still have been in power. While the challenges would perhaps have been too great for any mortal human, this man came to his office without any outstanding record or relevant experience to build on, whether in politics or administration. Morsi's one outstanding advantage was that he had been elected by more than half the electorate. He clung to that single qualification with such tenacity that it apparently kept him from looking squarely at the problems he had in front of him. He seems not to have listened to advice from outside his own narrow Brotherhood circle. He was deeply mistrustful of the remaining officials from Mubarak's days, and they were many in that huge administration of Egypt's governance - not just military and police, but judges and other educated officials who ran the state and kept it from collapsing - sort of. Even at the very low levels of the administration Morsi appears to have had a hard time getting accepted. They later turned out to be dead set against his rule in any case (see below). While several attempts were made by top opposition people during June to get him to make a move to stabilize the situation, apparently he would not take that route. He was the elected president, and he would decide, on his own.

From the start there had been two huge complexities of widely differing character facing Mr. Morsi - on the one hand the enormous problems of Egyptian daily life (bread, water, electricity etc); on the other, the deep political divisions of the population that had elected him. Only by making some headway on solving the first and at the same time bridge-building to overcome the second, could he have avoided the backlash that came with the military coup / intervention which put him out of office after just a year.

Morsi opted for solving his political survival the only way he saw how - by pandering to the islamist party and its ideological allies that had put him into power. That was a dangerous road to take, because it nourished the natural expectations of his religious brethren. For a democratically elected religious movement it is very tempting to make its victory permanent. A minor constitutional change would see to that. Egypt was not yet a theocracy, but the danger was clearly there. That anticipation, in turn, also triggered the military intervention.

Whoever now takes over faces the same challenges as Mr. Morsi did from his entry in 2012 to his exit a year later. The lack of bread, clean water and predictable government for 80 million people must come before the issues of sharia law. The religious concerns of Egyptians (and Tunisians, Libyans, Syrians, ...) must be set aside, simply put. 

Solving practical issues will be the only way to contain the frustrations repeatedly vented in the religious fury of Egyptians upon the Copts and other minority sects. And it will be the only way to make Egypt and the Middle East a governable part of the wider world of the 21st century.

ADDENDUM

The New York Times this morning (July 10) brought the story of the 'miraculous' recovery of the Egyptian system for delivery of gasoline and electricity, just in time for the opening of Ramadan. Police were suddenly patrolling in the streets after months of being nearly invisible. Suddenly the shortages were gone, overnight.

This is more indicative of a conspiracy against Mr. Morsi while he was still in power, than a demonstration of his incompetence, says one of the Egyptians interviewed by the NYT. I agree. The sudden correction of systemic failures makes the military intervention last week even more obviously a coup, indeed, the culmination of a months-long subversive campaign against the elected leadership. The Egyptian system has shown itself open to a degree of manipulation that is instructive to all of us. It also will bring self-criticism to the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies for their naive belief in a democratic system. So much the worse for the hopes of some degree of democracy in Egypt.

Egyptian governance, for which democracy was a gamble from the start in 2011, is now on its way to making a more fundamental choice: abandoning the Islamic democracy of 2012 as an experiment which could not deliver on basic needs - and angle instead for a pragmatic kind of limited democracy, which delivers the goods, but doesn't respond to the ideological demands of the Islamist part of the population.

Barring a future descent into chaos and civil war of the Syrian kind, and having gone through the experience of the last two years, Egypt now seems much less likely than before to become anything resembling a Western liberal system. What is needed is not a system of the kind that prioritizes political participation, but one that favors the production of real change.

*(Events in Egypts have obviously moved on later, back to another military dictatorship.)