Moldovan elections have once more
put the country on our mental maps - for a moment. The country
deserves to stay there for a while longer. There is indeed reason to
fear that Mr. Putin will now help put it higher on Europe's security
agenda, as Judy Dempsey suggested today in the Moscow
Times (December 4, 2014). In other words, as we shall see, the
election results of November 30 reflect more than a passing cleavage
between East and West.
The background is this. Part of
Moldova has been a de-facto Russian exclave since 1991, when the
Soviet Union died and the Post-Cold War Russian Federation was born.
The Republic of Moldova arose along with it. In hindsight its modern
history might look like a plan conceived by Mr. Putin, only he wasn't
there at the time. A combination of chance and foresight allowed
ex-soviet loyalists in Moldova, with open and clandestine support
from Russia, to retain a military foothold there on the pretext of
guarding a soviet-era munitions depot and armaments factory.
Already before Moldova's
independence was fully established, the region along the east bank of
the Dniester river declared its secession from Moldova and after a
short and bloody war managed to solidify its claim. Transnistria has
since been run by old soviet army veterans and emigré politicos in
the rebel capital Tiraspol, although no other UN member has ever
recognized them. To calm the simmering conflict, the OSCE authorized
a peace-keeping force to be stationed in the breakaway republic.
Somehow this mission ended up consisting only of Russian military
personnel. Russia does not need to invade Moldova. It is already
there.
Moldova's divided condition is a
nearly perfect example of what a relentless campaign of
politico-military meddling and influence-mongering by Russia can
produce - and apparently is producing in many other places between
the EU and Russia.*
But, to be fair, there is also a
strong element of pro-Russian feeling even in the population on the
western side. This can be seen in the simultaneous victory of a
pro-Russian Socialist party (21%), and the likely majority coalition
of three pro-EU parties (jointly 45%, yielding a slim majority in the
parliament). The Communists (18%) are not unequivocally pro-Russian,
but have for some years declared in favor of closer relations to the
EU. The present outcome, divided as it is, is nevertheless not new,
it is similar to most previous parliamentary elections in Moldova in
which blocs have been hovering around a 50/50 split, with the Communist Party previously in a dominating role it has since lost. Presidential elections, indirect through the parliament, were effectively stalemated for nearly three years from 2009 by political infighting and procedural issues.
Two additional problems add to
Moldova's woes: endemic corruption, and near-total dependence on gas
from Russia. When gas prices are disputed with Russia, the supply is shut off - always in winter, of course. A combination of these two problems
recently showed up when Moldova opened a new gas pipeline from
Romania to add an alternative, non-Russian source of energy supply:
There was no gas in the pipeline. Surprise!**
In formal terms the Republic of
Moldova is an independent state, member of the United Nations, the
OSCE and the WTO. Moldova signed an association agreement with the
European Union in 2014. The question of candidacy for accession to
the EU is not yet on the table, however, and Russia has issued a
warning against such a move - in itself indicative of the kind of
unashamed pressure the Kremlin applies to presumably independent
countries.
Informally, Moldova's political
status is therefore a bit ambiguous. The EU, on the other hand, has a
considerable presence via bilateral agreements to provide assistance
to the reconstruction of key sectors of Moldova's public
administration.
Among the multifarious pieces and
fragments of the old Soviet Union, Moldova fits a broader pattern:
footholds, or toeholds, for Kremlin remote control or influence.
Partly on legal grounds, partly on military grounds, partly based on
popular affinities. Kaliningrad, annexed in 1944, was perhaps the
first of this kind; the annexation of Crimea the most recent. Despite
the formalities, Moldova was in reality never released from Russian
ties since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Endless talks in
various formats, involving at different times the EU, the OSCE,
Russia and Ukraine, have tried to untangle the security knot of the
armaments depots and the political knot of the divided affections of
the population. In the process Moldova's Chisinau government has
entered numerous agreements with the breakaway government, many
brokered by Russia and Ukraine. These agreements have subsequently
tied its hands.***
Only the EU has the potential to
drag the country out of Putin's clutches. After the elections the
Commission issued a conditionally supportive statement on December 1,
2014 (excerpt):
"... A new impetus to key
reforms will be crucial for the Republic of Moldova´s political
association and economic integration with the EU. The EU will remain
a reliable partner supporting the Republic of Moldova´s reform
endeavours and working towards unleashing the full benefits of the
Association Agreement in the interest of all its citizens, wherever
they live."
It also said:
"The EU remains committed to
work with the future government towards a comprehensive, peaceful
settlement of the Transnistrian conflict based on the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special
status for Transnistria. ..."
The issues are recognized, and
the slow, patient route towards a solution agreed to by all is
pointed out. In Moldova, the EU vs Russia is pedagogy competing with
the power of money and weapons.
The big question for the EU is
whether the 28 members really want to put the resources and serious
effort into it that the problem requires. When it comes to spheres of
influence, Putin is serious. In Brussels, spheres of influence are
known only as ancient history.
*Judy Dempsey, "The Western
Balkans are Becoming Russia's New Playground", November 24,
2014,
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57301&reloadFlag=1.
**"Empty Pipeline Shows
Difficulty Of Breaking Moldova's Gazprom Addiction." By Liliana
Barbarosie and Robert Coalson. RFE-RL September 29, 2014.
*** For more on this, see:
"Executive Summary: Moldova’s Transnistrian Conflict."
Prepared by Olav F. Knudsen, Swedish Institute of International
Affairs (SIIA) with assistance from Andris Spruds, Latvian Institute
of International Affairs and Barbara Kunz, SIIA.
http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/Articles/friends-of-belarus/moldova_exec_summ.pdf
