Moldova: An Old Hot Potato in European Security

Moldovan elections have once more put the country on our mental maps - for a moment. The country deserves to stay there for a while longer. There is indeed reason to fear that Mr. Putin will now help put it higher on Europe's security agenda, as Judy Dempsey suggested today in the Moscow Times (December 4, 2014). In other words, as we shall see, the election results of November 30 reflect more than a passing cleavage between East and West.

The background is this. Part of Moldova has been a de-facto Russian exclave since 1991, when the Soviet Union died and the Post-Cold War Russian Federation was born. The Republic of Moldova arose along with it. In hindsight its modern history might look like a plan conceived by Mr. Putin, only he wasn't there at the time. A combination of chance and foresight allowed ex-soviet loyalists in Moldova, with open and clandestine support from Russia, to retain a military foothold there on the pretext of guarding a soviet-era munitions depot and armaments factory.

Already before Moldova's independence was fully established, the region along the east bank of the Dniester river declared its secession from Moldova and after a short and bloody war managed to solidify its claim. Transnistria has since been run by old soviet army veterans and emigré politicos in the rebel capital Tiraspol, although no other UN member has ever recognized them. To calm the simmering conflict, the OSCE authorized a peace-keeping force to be stationed in the breakaway republic. Somehow this mission ended up consisting only of Russian military personnel. Russia does not need to invade Moldova. It is already there.

Moldova's divided condition is a nearly perfect example of what a relentless campaign of politico-military meddling and influence-mongering by Russia can produce - and apparently is producing in many other places between the EU and Russia.*

But, to be fair, there is also a strong element of pro-Russian feeling even in the population on the western side. This can be seen in the simultaneous victory of a pro-Russian Socialist party (21%), and the likely majority coalition of three pro-EU parties (jointly 45%, yielding a slim majority in the parliament). The Communists (18%) are not unequivocally pro-Russian, but have for some years declared in favor of closer relations to the EU. The present outcome, divided as it is, is nevertheless not new, it is similar to most previous parliamentary elections in Moldova in which blocs have been hovering around a 50/50 split, with the Communist Party previously in a dominating role it has since lost. Presidential elections, indirect through the parliament, were effectively stalemated for nearly three years from 2009 by political infighting and procedural issues.

Two additional problems add to Moldova's woes: endemic corruption, and near-total dependence on gas from Russia. When gas prices are disputed with Russia, the supply is shut off - always in winter, of course. A combination of these two problems recently showed up when Moldova opened a new gas pipeline from Romania to add an alternative, non-Russian source of energy supply: There was no gas in the pipeline. Surprise!**

In formal terms the Republic of Moldova is an independent state, member of the United Nations, the OSCE and the WTO. Moldova signed an association agreement with the European Union in 2014. The question of candidacy for accession to the EU is not yet on the table, however, and Russia has issued a warning against such a move - in itself indicative of the kind of unashamed pressure the Kremlin applies to presumably independent countries.

Informally, Moldova's political status is therefore a bit ambiguous. The EU, on the other hand, has a considerable presence via bilateral agreements to provide assistance to the reconstruction of key sectors of Moldova's public administration.

Among the multifarious pieces and fragments of the old Soviet Union, Moldova fits a broader pattern: footholds, or toeholds, for Kremlin remote control or influence. Partly on legal grounds, partly on military grounds, partly based on popular affinities. Kaliningrad, annexed in 1944, was perhaps the first of this kind; the annexation of Crimea the most recent. Despite the formalities, Moldova was in reality never released from Russian ties since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Endless talks in various formats, involving at different times the EU, the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, have tried to untangle the security knot of the armaments depots and the political knot of the divided affections of the population. In the process Moldova's Chisinau government has entered numerous agreements with the breakaway government, many brokered by Russia and Ukraine. These agreements have subsequently tied its hands.***

Only the EU has the potential to drag the country out of Putin's clutches. After the elections the Commission issued a conditionally supportive statement on December 1, 2014 (excerpt):

"... A new impetus to key reforms will be crucial for the Republic of Moldova´s political association and economic integration with the EU. The EU will remain a reliable partner supporting the Republic of Moldova´s reform endeavours and working towards unleashing the full benefits of the Association Agreement in the interest of all its citizens, wherever they live."

It also said:

"The EU remains committed to work with the future government towards a comprehensive, peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for Transnistria. ..."

The issues are recognized, and the slow, patient route towards a solution agreed to by all is pointed out. In Moldova, the EU vs Russia is pedagogy competing with the power of money and weapons.

The big question for the EU is whether the 28 members really want to put the resources and serious effort into it that the problem requires. When it comes to spheres of influence, Putin is serious. In Brussels, spheres of influence are known only as ancient history.

*Judy Dempsey, "The Western Balkans are Becoming Russia's New Playground", November 24, 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57301&reloadFlag=1.

**"Empty Pipeline Shows Difficulty Of Breaking Moldova's Gazprom Addiction." By Liliana Barbarosie and Robert Coalson. RFE-RL September 29, 2014.

*** For more on this, see: "Executive Summary: Moldova’s Transnistrian Conflict." Prepared by Olav F. Knudsen, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) with assistance from Andris Spruds, Latvian Institute of International Affairs and Barbara Kunz, SIIA.

http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/Articles/friends-of-belarus/moldova_exec_summ.pdf

The New Russia - to the Dniestr?

Ukraine - Europe's first taste of blood in 15 years, but the first in 70 years to also bring a whiff of hitlerian tactics, as Putin smuggles incognito soldiers into Ukraine and boasts of his ability to wipe out European capitals at will. We have seen ground war, indiscriminate slaughter, a civilian airliner downed with 300 passengers dead and local populations caught up in war-gamers' mayhem. But don't complain: Collateral damage has to be suffered for the higher ends of local "sovereignty". Further west, in European capitals, there is secret relief that so far the conflict remains mostly within the Slavic family.

Security is divisible, in case you thought otherwise, and despite the 1990 CSCE declaration of Paris ("Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is intrinsically linked to that of every other.") Of course, Russia and Ukraine were not there, in Paris. The USSR was. And the Europeans and North Americans, little knowing what was about to happen in Yugoslavia, the latter also present in Paris. Divisibility, yes, of states. Here is much of the problem we are facing in Europe today. Scotland's decision to remain in the UK was a healthy sign, an example for Spain's Catalonia to follow. The cracks in the present state construction are readily visible.

Looking back, it was only a year after that Paris declaration that the Soviet Union was chopped up, divided into its multiple constituent parts. Ukraine became independent, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan, Georgia ... And Russia. At that unique moment a wisely conceived multilateral treaty could have created a modern, democratic multistate union with a solid central core. No such thing happened. Instead, the Commonwealth of Independent States was created to replace the Soviet Union, substituting the uncertainties of free choice in politically immature republics for the familiar dictation of Moscow. Cooperation was initiated in many policy areas between CIS members, but Ukraine kept defense to itself. To Moscow - where politicians still thought of themselves as the Center - the new system was slow, cumbersome and unpredictable. So, if you think the idea of reuniting the empire was a Putin invention, think again.

As far back as 1990, many observers thought it only logical that the Soviet Union had to collapse - "what goes up must come down"! - while others among us had the additional thought (and expressed it, to the annoyance of some): "What goes down must come up". In other words: To political leaders and their aspiring successors in the superpower that was the USSR, the horror of watching it tumble like a house of cards must in itself have created a strong motivation to rebuild it, in all its former glory. Now - in 2014 - we have seen that begin to happen - or something along those lines. Still, the basic assumption of the "post-cold war" settlement was that the new Russia would be content to be "new", and would fit within the strictures of the CSCE/OSCE.

Signs of trouble came early on. One was when Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev in December 1992 gave a scary speech that sounded exactly like the old Soviet line (it was soon retracted, but - he said - meant as a warning of the dangers represented by the Russian opposition he was facing at home). Other signs followed. I discover notes from a discussion with Russian colleagues at the Carnegie Moscow Center in 1997, the year of opening talks for NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe, and of the Russia-NATO Founding Act cementing the future collaboration between the two sides. Again the question was, would Russia really fit within the framework of such a "new normal"? There were both hawkish and dovish voices to be heard, but all thought the chances for a durable friendly coexistence were slight. A key problem was seen to be the emotionality of the issues to Russia. The Baltic states were, of course, at the center of the attention. Compare that to Ukraine today: "The Baltics cannot be members of a military alliance which is closed to Russia." One called the idea of an expansion of NATO a "preplanned crisis". "When the expansion of NATO is a fact, all other Russian-Western relations will deteriorate to a cold peace, maybe even a cold war." Nevertheless, later on Russia saw both the Visegrad states and the Baltic states join NATO and kept its cool (mostly). With Ukraine, there will be no such patience.

The Russian project is empire. By now there is nothing new in saying so. But there is a need for those of us on the responding side to make that a policy assumption, not just something that can be waved aside. We Europeans need to have a reasoned and united approach. So far it has been evasive and reluctant. Sanctions, yes, but not too strict. Russia celebrates our dithering by pushing the limits - military aircraft intrusions abound, border controls become difficult, etc.

Worse, some think a Russian empire restored is the Russians' right. What they had in 1917 then becomes the norm. Such views are common in Germany. And who knows? My crude guess is that the end of this conflict for the foreseeable future will be a negotiated agreement between Russia and Ukraine that acknowledges the "legitimate transfer" of Crimea to Russia, that outlines a future "union" of the two countries with a joint defense organization, and that pledges an arms-length distance in the relations of Ukraine to Western organizations. Moldova and its Transnistrian district will have to be handled in a separate agreement. All told, a power-package deal masked as a fair agreement between equals. Tell me whether that is right or wrong.

If Putin has a bit of statesmanship in him that he has not shown so far, he still has a chance of constructing that multistate agreement I described above - but not at gunpoint.

Russia and the Sphere of Influence - Back from its Shallow Grave

One of the axioms of the brave new world that emerged as the Berlin Wall fell was supposedly the end of power politics, at least among industrialized nations. No more of the old, tainted notion of spheres of influence. Instead there would be endless opportunities for cooperation. Win-win was the slogan of the 1990s. Well, one place where win-win was a hard sell was in Moscow. Win-lose was a well-established concept in that part of the world, and what need was there for anything to replace it?

So we discover, belatedly, that the Russians do not consider themselves bound by broadly agreed international rules and that they will certainly not abide by Western rules of conduct, whether in diplomacy or in military procedure short of war. Actually, the Kosovo War in 1999 had already demonstrated this, but by most observers it was set aside as exceptional. Now we see it is not. This split over basic rules of conduct is the procedural side of the Western conflict with Russia. It is evident in the lack of progress in the post-Crimean talks between Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Kerry.

Then there is the substantive side. Consider the Russian preference for spheres of influence.

In 1997, anticipating and seeking to preempt a Finnish and Swedish move to join NATO, Russia made an under-the-table proposal to make the Baltic Sea region into a "non-bloc zone", encapsulating even the three Baltic states. The states in the area were to promise they would abstain from joining alliances. A flurry of low-key "preventive" diplomacy followed, led by Finland and Sweden, to put the proposal aside. And fortunately, the world never heard of that non-bloc zone again.

Until now, that is. On March 17, the day after the tainted Crimean referendum, the Russian Federation set forth a proposal for the future of Ukraine, covering both its internal affairs and its foreign relations. On the latter, it was said, “'[Ukraine’s] sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral military-political status will be guaranteed by Russia, the EU and the US, supported by a UN Security Council resolution'. The document appeared to make clear that Russia’s main 'red line' was future Nato membership for Ukraine..." (Financial Times, March 17, 2014) We see the same underlying fear here, on the part of Russia, as that which triggered their invasion of Georgia in 2008. Any proposed guaranteed neutrality for Ukraine must be up to Ukrainians themselves to consider, not for others to discuss over their heads.

Am I not too hasty in saying the assumptions of post-cold war east west relations are no longer valid?

One way to examine that is to object to this degree of generalization, and point out that the circumstances preceding the Crimea annexation were special. Ukraine had descended into a chaos in the streets of Kiev and other cities, lasting for months, and barely ending when the Ukrainian president Yanukovich fled to Russia. That led the Russian speaking majority population of Crimea to call for a transfer of their region to Russia, to which Russia for historical and other reasons could not but respond positively. Moreover, the historical loss of former Russian-controlled territory here and elsewhere was an accident; the dissolution of the Soviet Union was “... the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century”, according to Mr. Putin, and so we should have understanding for their loss and support the return of what is rightfully theirs. By some accounts, not just old Soviet but also old Russian imperial territory. Such as Ukraine, of course, but also Moldova, Georgia, Finland and the Baltic states.

Not everyone is ready to believe that Putin's ambitions are this great. On the other hand, nor is everybody ready to accept the argument about the worthiness of Russian imperial restoration.

The other answer on East-West relations is that Russia will take, by stealth or by force, what they want and cannot get by diplomacy. This fits a recognizable pattern. Pristina Airport in 1999 was a perfect example of the Russian mode of operation. They did it for their friends, the Serbs, of course. They were crystal clear about who their friends were; others were treated like enemies, even in a negotiated partnership operation under UN auspices. The Georgian invasion in 2008 was another example.

NATO must now resume its prior, more vigilant attitude and its better prepared military posture towards Russia. Good that NATO has just selected as its new Secretary General Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, the former Prime Minister of Norway, this country being the only original NATO member with a direct border to Russia and a healthy sceptical attitude to that eastern neighbour ever since 1991. A revised military posture does not mean itching for a shooting war, but being better prepared in posturing and holding. There is a lot of chess in this, and the Russians love that game.

The Russian behavior pattern is to a considerable extent opportunistic. They are robbers by opportunity. If you have something you want to keep, you have to hold it securely, and with strength.

Given what we now know, I question the wisdom of the Ottowa Convention on land mines. Passive means of defense, adequately protected, are workable. Finland and the Baltic states would be in a much better position with land mines on their border with Russia.

Some would put all their trust in the Americans. Look how President Obama is being hounded for his pusillanimous stance over Ukraine. I doubt there was anything much he could have done, short of going to war. Posturing without readiness to fight is only dangerous. I'm afraid US backup of NATO allies via the article V guarantee is less firm than often believed. Let us not get to the point of testing it.

Finally, of course, there is the EU's dependency on Russian natural gas. The EU was warned so many times. (Check out the writings of Vladimir Socor.) But, apparently, they thought, how convenient to have it all from one source. My lament is merely, why are we Europeans endowed with such geopolitical brilliance at the Parliamentary level?

Am I alarmist on Russia? Of course. Just as I've been a couple of times before. In 1980 over Afghanistan. In 1992 over Soviet fragmentation. My Norwegian colleagues shook their heads. Some will again.