Russia and the Sphere of Influence - Back from its Shallow Grave

One of the axioms of the brave new world that emerged as the Berlin Wall fell was supposedly the end of power politics, at least among industrialized nations. No more of the old, tainted notion of spheres of influence. Instead there would be endless opportunities for cooperation. Win-win was the slogan of the 1990s. Well, one place where win-win was a hard sell was in Moscow. Win-lose was a well-established concept in that part of the world, and what need was there for anything to replace it?

So we discover, belatedly, that the Russians do not consider themselves bound by broadly agreed international rules and that they will certainly not abide by Western rules of conduct, whether in diplomacy or in military procedure short of war. Actually, the Kosovo War in 1999 had already demonstrated this, but by most observers it was set aside as exceptional. Now we see it is not. This split over basic rules of conduct is the procedural side of the Western conflict with Russia. It is evident in the lack of progress in the post-Crimean talks between Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Kerry.

Then there is the substantive side. Consider the Russian preference for spheres of influence.

In 1997, anticipating and seeking to preempt a Finnish and Swedish move to join NATO, Russia made an under-the-table proposal to make the Baltic Sea region into a "non-bloc zone", encapsulating even the three Baltic states. The states in the area were to promise they would abstain from joining alliances. A flurry of low-key "preventive" diplomacy followed, led by Finland and Sweden, to put the proposal aside. And fortunately, the world never heard of that non-bloc zone again.

Until now, that is. On March 17, the day after the tainted Crimean referendum, the Russian Federation set forth a proposal for the future of Ukraine, covering both its internal affairs and its foreign relations. On the latter, it was said, “'[Ukraine’s] sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral military-political status will be guaranteed by Russia, the EU and the US, supported by a UN Security Council resolution'. The document appeared to make clear that Russia’s main 'red line' was future Nato membership for Ukraine..." (Financial Times, March 17, 2014) We see the same underlying fear here, on the part of Russia, as that which triggered their invasion of Georgia in 2008. Any proposed guaranteed neutrality for Ukraine must be up to Ukrainians themselves to consider, not for others to discuss over their heads.

Am I not too hasty in saying the assumptions of post-cold war east west relations are no longer valid?

One way to examine that is to object to this degree of generalization, and point out that the circumstances preceding the Crimea annexation were special. Ukraine had descended into a chaos in the streets of Kiev and other cities, lasting for months, and barely ending when the Ukrainian president Yanukovich fled to Russia. That led the Russian speaking majority population of Crimea to call for a transfer of their region to Russia, to which Russia for historical and other reasons could not but respond positively. Moreover, the historical loss of former Russian-controlled territory here and elsewhere was an accident; the dissolution of the Soviet Union was “... the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century”, according to Mr. Putin, and so we should have understanding for their loss and support the return of what is rightfully theirs. By some accounts, not just old Soviet but also old Russian imperial territory. Such as Ukraine, of course, but also Moldova, Georgia, Finland and the Baltic states.

Not everyone is ready to believe that Putin's ambitions are this great. On the other hand, nor is everybody ready to accept the argument about the worthiness of Russian imperial restoration.

The other answer on East-West relations is that Russia will take, by stealth or by force, what they want and cannot get by diplomacy. This fits a recognizable pattern. Pristina Airport in 1999 was a perfect example of the Russian mode of operation. They did it for their friends, the Serbs, of course. They were crystal clear about who their friends were; others were treated like enemies, even in a negotiated partnership operation under UN auspices. The Georgian invasion in 2008 was another example.

NATO must now resume its prior, more vigilant attitude and its better prepared military posture towards Russia. Good that NATO has just selected as its new Secretary General Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, the former Prime Minister of Norway, this country being the only original NATO member with a direct border to Russia and a healthy sceptical attitude to that eastern neighbour ever since 1991. A revised military posture does not mean itching for a shooting war, but being better prepared in posturing and holding. There is a lot of chess in this, and the Russians love that game.

The Russian behavior pattern is to a considerable extent opportunistic. They are robbers by opportunity. If you have something you want to keep, you have to hold it securely, and with strength.

Given what we now know, I question the wisdom of the Ottowa Convention on land mines. Passive means of defense, adequately protected, are workable. Finland and the Baltic states would be in a much better position with land mines on their border with Russia.

Some would put all their trust in the Americans. Look how President Obama is being hounded for his pusillanimous stance over Ukraine. I doubt there was anything much he could have done, short of going to war. Posturing without readiness to fight is only dangerous. I'm afraid US backup of NATO allies via the article V guarantee is less firm than often believed. Let us not get to the point of testing it.

Finally, of course, there is the EU's dependency on Russian natural gas. The EU was warned so many times. (Check out the writings of Vladimir Socor.) But, apparently, they thought, how convenient to have it all from one source. My lament is merely, why are we Europeans endowed with such geopolitical brilliance at the Parliamentary level?

Am I alarmist on Russia? Of course. Just as I've been a couple of times before. In 1980 over Afghanistan. In 1992 over Soviet fragmentation. My Norwegian colleagues shook their heads. Some will again.

Catalonian Independence Day: Can Artur Mas be Tamed?*

As a citizen of Norway, a country that won its independence by seceding unilaterally in 1905 (from Sweden), how can I not be rooting for Catalonian independence? The background stories are largely the same. A militarily imposed union. Attempts to make the union work within a democratic framework. Economic grievances. A distinct language. Both Catalonia and Norway have had these experiences. (For more background on Catalonia and independence, see my blogs in October 2012 and May 2013.)


Still, Catalonia and Norway are different. Just for one crucial thing, popular support was vastly stronger in Norway in 1905 than it is in Catalonia today. In Norway the referendum held on the issue of independence was decided by a whopping 99,95% in favor. In Catalonia the most positive result expected would appear to be around 60%, possibly less. To end up with a minority against independence as large as 40% would make the whole project politically a dead duck.


This is not what you heard on Catalonia Day 11 September – la Diada Nacional de Catalunya. A human chain of hundreds of thousands of Catalonian nationalists, holding hands, symbolically linked their hopes and demands for freedom, in an event said to be inspired by the way the Baltic populations marked their demands for freedom from Soviet oppression in 1989.


As someone who spent some time in the Baltics back in those days, I can only say the comparison is vastly overblown and indeed grotesque. The Balts were under totalitarian oppression, not allowed to use their own languages, not allowed freedom of expression, not allowed the ordinary Western democratic freedoms that Catalonia along with the rest of Spain has enjoyed since 1975. 

As if to top it off with a transition from the grotesque to the farcical, Latvia's Prime Minister Dombrovsksis on this occasion makes a statement of Baltic support for the "hypothetical" case of Catalonian independence, and Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs Margallo declares Catalonia has a point and should be treated more leniently. Not exactly Mariano Rajoy's week, as the stolid Prime Minister of Spain was preparing his belated response to the circus.

During the past six months the Catalonian leadership semed to have been brought to its senses by Madrid's low key policy of private persuasion and constitutional pressure, along with the straits of Catalonia's economic hardship. But Artur Mas is not so easily tamed. The President of Catalonia, who rode high a year ago on nationalist sentiment, peaking with an immodest declaration of sovereignty by the Catalonian parliament in January 2013, conceded to private talks with Premier Rajoy in the spring.


Those talks have recently been resumed in the summer of 2013. They initially appeared to have a beneficial effect, when on September 5, President Mas declared that the promised referendum on independence, previously scheduled for 2014 regardless, is now only going to be held if it can be done «legally». If it cannot be held legally, it will be postponed until the next scheduled Catalonian elections of 2016, Mas said, and will then be designated as a plebiscite on independence. 


By the time Independence day came along the following week, Mr. Mas had changed his mind again. Mas now insists he still intends to have the referendum in 2014. 


Prime Minister Rajoy, trying to manage this process from Madrid, has just given his public response in a letter to the Catalonian president on September 14. Dialogue is the only way, he says. No direct comment is given on the desired referendum, though implicitly it is rejected again.

Mr Rajoy is not wrong to insist on respect for the Spanish constitution, but he disregards the urgent need for a long-term overhaul of the constitutional structure of Spain. Catalonia's crisis is a chance to effect a change covering all of Spain's autonomous regions («states»), not just Catalonia. No doubt about it, a constitutional revision in the direction of federalism would be a good thing for a country that already is a de-facto federation. The Socialist Party (PSOE) now has made federalism part of its program. So far Rajoy has refused to let his Partido Popular open up for even a debate on these issues. His most recent letter to Mas indicates he is not about to change his mind. 


We need an end to Rajoy's stasis, and to Mas's slippery shifts, to put us beyond the current fiscal, financial and administrative mess of the Catalonian circus. Had there been a clearcut response in Catalonian public opinion, this case could have been much simpler.

(*Revised September 16 from the first version of September 10.)