Will China go to war with Vietnam and other regional neighbors over their disputed claims in the South China Sea? There are experts who think that is possible. Co-authors Rory Medcalf and Raoul Heinrichs of the Australian think-tank Lowy Institute argue this in a recently published report (Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific Asia, 2011). Their emphasis on the dangers focuses on the lack of regard in Asia for maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs).
Though violent incidents in this area have been numerous over the years, I would personally doubt they could erupt into more sustained violence. Still, the dangers are legion and they are not being avoided, notably not by the major player on the scene, China. At this time tempers flare once more, as they have done intermittently since the 1980s. Governments of the Southeast and East Asian region – represented by their Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defence - are hotly involved, along with those of the United States. Navies conduct exercises and flagwaving protesters march on the streets of the region's capitals.
The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has made maritime relations between countries and the resolution of disputes much calmer and easier to handle than they used to be (even though the United States after 30 years of the convention's existence has still not ratified it). Nevertheless, there are problem areas where disputes remain unresolved. The South China Sea may well be the most complex of these.
The South China Sea is bordered by Vietnam to the west, the Philippines to the east, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia to the south and China to the north. The eastern and northern parts of the sea are littered with reefs, sandbanks and occasional islands, mainly the Paracels to the northwest and the Spratlys to the southeast. Deposits of oil and other mineral resources have been located in many places. The South China Sea is also an area of active fishing by the littoral nations.
Moreover, a major portion of seaborne trade to and from (not least oil deliveries to) China, Taiwan, Japan and Korea moves through the area, making it both an area of general maritime interest to major maritime nations around the world, and a strategic interest for the countries referred to. By implication, that makes it an area of strategic interest even for other countries, most notably the United States.
Then why is there no movement towards resolving the issues? Because they are exceedingly complex.
Complexity factor 1: China claims sovereignty over all the islands in the South China Sea and the waters around them, for historical reasons. UNCLOS does not admit sovereignty claims on historical grounds. Customary international law, however, allows sovereignty claims for historical reasons under certain conditions (e.g., if the islands have been occupied, and the claims made public). The Chinese historical claims are not unfounded, but also not patently convincing.
Complexity factor 2: Six nations with territorial waters bordering on the South China Sea (Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam) are claimants for sovereignty over specific islands and/or exclusive Economic Zones in it. In addition, Taiwan advances its own claims on behalf of China.
Complexity factor 3: As just suggested, China's interests are claimed by two independent decision-making centres – the People's Republic of China in Beijing and the Republic of China in Taipei (Taiwan), each of which have established their own separate bases or installations in the area, and each of whom makes the claim on slightly different conditions. Taiwan, of course, is regarded as just a renegade province by China.
Complexity factor 4: While the claims of other littoral states are made in conventional terms according to UNCLOS, the Chinese claim is rather unconventional (a) in that China seems to claim the entire area – not just the islands but even the waters between them - exclusively for itself, and (b) also unconventional in that the Chinese do not declare specifically what the boundary of their claim is, but show it on maps represented by a dotted line – in fact, a line made up of nine (sic!) dashes. A normal claim for China would yield merely a slice of EEZ at the northern end.
Complexity factor 5: Islands with a civilian population or economic life of its own give rise to claims for maritime rights, especially the right to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). But islands in the South China Sea are uninhabited and mostly tiny (the largest is less than one square km), and some of the claims made in the area refer to structures built on reefs that are submerged part of the time.
Complexity factor 6: Instead of seeking peaceful settlement of the dispute, China has repeatedly resorted to aggressive moves, and as early as 1992 granted exploration rights to a US oil company in an area as remote as possible from the nearest Chinese point of land (about 1000 miles away). Now several other claimants (Vietnam and Indonesia) have done the same. Vietnam has recently also invited the Indian navy to make regular use of one of their coastal naval facilities. These continuing moves make the situation in the South China Sea disturbingly fluid and complicate further any attempt to start working towards a multilateral settlement.
Complexity factor 7: All the involved parties did succeed in 2002 in agreeing on a “document of conduct” (under the aegis of ASEAN) intended in time to lead to a “code of conduct” for the area. Yet the code of conduct has so far not materialized and the conduct of the parties in the meantime does not seem to be governed by the restraint and will to build confidence called for in the 2002 document. Acts of violence – even if non-lethal – continue to occur. Demonstratively aggressive postures are taken by naval forces, and media reports on all sides are frequently inflammatory.
At this point, tension is high as military exercises are being held by several of the parties. The United States is exercising jointly with the Philippines. China has announced trial runs for its first aircraft carrier in the South China Sea to begin on July 1. While China and Vietnam, as the most intensely engaged opponents, managed to agree to back off from further confrontation for the time being, it is curious that China as the dominant actor of the region is not able to offer a more consistent example of how to go about peacefully resolving a complex dispute.
As one of the parties to UNCLOS China has a clear obligation to take a step back from what it calls its “indisputable claim of sovereignty over the islands and the surrounding waters of the South China Sea”. The course it has chosen is another, pointing toward the simplest solution: that China grabs it all. Intimidation is the name of that game.
