Nordic Democracy: Endangered by Populist Extremism?

In Finland, the recent election victory (relatively speaking: 19%, tied 2^nd place) of the anti-immigration, anti-EU, anti-establishment party “The True Finns” (Sannfinländarna) has detonated a shock-wave rattling the other member countries of the European Union. The shock is real, to the extent that the new Finnish government has to approve the emergency package for Portugal which the True Finns have made a prime target of their EU critique. How could such “bottom dregs” win an election – in yet another European country? Memories go to Jörg Haider's former glory, of which little is heard nowadays, but the trauma of his party's ascendance to the height of Austrian politics and thus also that of the EU, little more than a decade ago, is a continuing nightmare in Brussels. Gradually, of course, it was found that the world did not come to an end, and the whole thing was brushed off understandingly as something one had to expect from Austrians, given their history.

The Nordics, on the other hand, have long prided themselves on being the most democratic countries in the world, and have also been accepted by many others as such. Even with the rightful claims to democratic excellence of the Americans, the Brits, the Frenchmen and the Dutch, the Nordic countries have a head start in many ways - in Iceland they have the world's oldest parliament still working; the Nordic flora of voluntary associations is about as rich as they come; and they have what many consider to be the world's most advanced welfare societies - despite the struggle in recent years to keep that flagship financially afloat. In all of this, the Nordic Social Democratic parties (variously through history also called Labour or Socialist parties), have been the leading political force everywhere.

Enter the so-called right-wing parties, in Denmark since the 1970s (currently Dansk Folkeparti, last election 14%), in Norway, also since the 1970s (Fremskrittspartiet 23%), even recently in Sweden (Sverigedemokraterna 5%). The oldest of these parties began as tax-protest movements, but all of them criticize the immigration from non-Eurpopean countries as excessive and want less interference from the EU in their country's affairs. They even gain support from many former Social-Democratic voters – what shame for the formerly progressive North!

But are they right-wing? And are they all the same? The label “right-wing” has possibly attached itself to them because they have all targeted the dominance of the social democratic labour parties.

Yet when the Finnish election results were recently published, the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet's spokesperson disdainfully rejected any comparison with the Finnish party, saying they had rejected approaches for cooperation. “They want a strong state, but we are a liberalistic party”, he says. And indeed, the True Finns look more like a populistic centrist party.  In a recent analytical article in Svenska Dagbladet, Swedish-Finnish political scientist Ann-Cathrine Jungar lays out an illuminating comparison. She regards all of these parties as “center-extreme” rather than right-wing because they all have socio-economic policies typical of centrist positions. Yet she also points out that the “West-Nordic” (Danish, Norwegian) parties have moved in this direction from an originally more liberalistic, anti-tax position whereas the Finnish and Swedish parties had different origins. The True Finns are successors to an agrarian populist movement, while the Swedish party has roots both in anti-tax movements and neo-fascist movements of the 1990s.

Some take this as a danger signal for Sweden. However, I think Sverigedemokraterna's recent success has shown the party it does better with a more democratic profile. One can nevertheless perceive strands of influence here from nationalistic right-wing parties in Europe, emphasizing the need for a strong state, both in the Finnish and the Swedish party. Personally I would also regard the Norwegian party as mainly a rightist anti-tax, small-government party. Such differences are nuances, but not without significance.

In any case, all of these parties are strongly critical of the immigration policies of the EU and their own countries, regarding both this and the never-ending stream of money to foreign aid as pure waste that should have been channelled to the country's own citizens instead.

Here is where the establishment Social Democrats raise their charges of “fremmedfientlighet” / ”främlingsfientlighet” (xenophobia) and extremism. Controllers of the incumbent political correctness in the Nordic world for half a century, they dislike being challenged on their generosity, and strike back with the labels above and that of “populism” as well. To some it might sound a bit peculiar to hear Social Democrats derogating something that is “of the people”, but that is perhaps because they are quick to label as “populist” whatever grass-roots phenomenon they cannot themselves control.

The label xenophobic is part of Nordic party politics. In my view, it is a misnomer. Most of these voters have no particular dislike of foreigners; what they do object to is the government lavishing “social support” funds on immigrants who in most cases are not able to enter the labour market directly and who are allowed (indeed, for a long time were encouraged) to keep their own language and thus to remain unemployable in the long run. Next, the principle of “family reunion” allows them to bring their relatives to join them in the new country. These are in most cases not “the poorest of the poor”. They are those sufficiently healthy, crafty, moneyed and enterprising to beat their less fortunate brethren to the departure point on the Mediterranean coast or Turkey's eastern border.

Had there been a selection at the source it would have been possible to pick out only the really needy. As it is, the selection of non-European immigrants arriving is a confused self-selection, such that there is no obvious criterion to say, why not admit all others as well? In short, the policies of the EU and the individual destination countries are not sustainable. Even worse, the Nordic governments have refused to take the full and open debate required. The Swedish elections last autumn showed how this dam of political correctness – intended to stop populists from taking advantage of the immigration unrest - probably only served to channel additional power to Sverigedemokraterna.

So, the problem is partly that Social Democracy is disintegrating in the Nordic countries while the successor parties have not yet fully established themselves. In the process, the loyalty of “the people” - previously the unquestioned prize of the Left - is up for grabs. Beyond that, the current maelstrom of change also reflects the painful effort of disoriented voters to find a way to stop the effects of a world without borders. Messy, perhaps, but this is no threat to Nordic democracy.

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“Arab Democracy” – What Kind of Animal?

How do Arabs think of democracy? I am not an Arabist but there is one impression that stands out in my mind from this Arab spring: the call for leaders to step down and be replaced. Beyond that, I suspect the ideas of democracy among common men and women in the Middle East are rather hazy.

Nevertheless, the World Values Survey undertaken from 1995-6 to 2001-2 shows Arabs strongly agreeing with the statement that “democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government”. These UNDP studies show also that Arabs were the regional group that most strongly rejected authoritarian rule defined as a strong leader who does not have to bother with a parliament and elections.* The meaning of such responses is still less than crystal clear.

Watching from afar as Arab protests have played out in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain and Syria, we have heard unceasing calls for "democracy" and "freedom". Yet, we Westerners should perhaps stop and consider the possibility that maybe we don't know what they are talking about. And Arab readers of English-language commentaries should also ponder the chance that language and tradition could play tricks on all of us. Slogans, internet postings and interviews are translated, either by the demonstrators themselves or by reporters. How do we know what they really mean? What does "democracy" mean to most Arabs – and to young Arabs in particular? While a Westerner's first thought may be that we all know what democracy is, the thing they have on their mind may not be the same as the image raised in our minds by their shouts.

Of course, there are different types of democracies, and in recent decades a broad range of would-be democracies have emerged around the world that don't fit the classical mould. Democracy theorists have been struggling to classify them. For some of those imperfect variants the label “diminished subtypes” has been suggested** – these are cases that have some characteristics of democracy, but lack others. Sort of like a judgement of "not bad, but not quite".

Indeed, some countries in the Middle East claim to have a kind of democracy not found in the West, Libya under Gaddafi with its People's Committees being the most prominent case. On a visit there in 2003 I was told by my guide that Libyans all governed themselves by participating in the committee meetings for their neighborhood, and there was hardly ever any disagreements because “we all understand what is the right thing to do”. In reality, since the 1970s Gaddafi's Libya has had two pillars of government – the People's Committees that have mobilized support for the regime, and the Revolutionary Security pillar that exercises actual control in secret. Of course, the official account of the system only mentions the first pillar. The farce of Gaddafi's system did not really fool his people for long, but they went along, and young people like my guide naturally started out believing what they were told.

But Libya as Gaddafi made it could hardly be classified as a “diminished subtype” of democracy – it is rather what Weber called a “sultanistic regime”, an unlimited despotism. Lebanon, on the other hand, could perhaps be classified as a diminished subtype of democracy, diminished due to its constitutional grant of parliamentary seats to specific groups without regard for their popular support. Turkey might be another example of a diminished subtype, due to the constitutional role of the military and the judiciary.

Beyond these examples, however, traditional Arab ideas pertinent to democracy are not terribly impressive. There is the obligation (non-binding) of the ruler to consult with the ruled, and about governing "with mutual consent" (among the elites, that is). In fact there is no Arab concept of democracy even remotely reminiscent of the Western idea, whether in theory or practice.

Given this foggy state of affairs, what could the demonstrators mean? For the sake of simplicity, let us say there are two main possibilities. Either (1) the demonstrators know what real democracy is, and say they want it. Or (2) they have something else in mind that they call "democracy", which may be short of or different from the Western idea, but is something that would still be a huge improvement to them.

Admittedly not knowing the true answer, I suspect a tiny fraction of one percent of the demonstrators may fit the first alternative (they know that what they are talking about is what their Western listeners think they are talking about), while the rest, the vast proportion of them, are looking only for one big thing: to get rid of the present ruler NOW and be given a chance to elect a different one closer to their preference. Then, if even that person were to prove a bad choice, they want the additional chance of getting rid of that leader as well in a future election. This big dream is the primitive essence of democracy – asking for bad leaders to step down, asking for change for the better, and asking for a chance to throw even the new leaders out if they don't deliver.The hard part about it all, of course, is to organize it so that it can become a durable system for the long term. This is where some societies offer better preconditions than others for what Westerners call democracy.

Though I don't agree with Thomas Friedman's recent claim that the East European countries revolting in 1989 were so much simpler in societal make-up than those of the Middle East, I do share his pessimism about the prospects for the Middle East (“Pray, Hope, Prepare”, New York Times, April 12). If the demonstrators and freedom fighters are lucky, as I see it, they may be granted the first part of their wishes, getting rid of the tyrant - like the Tunisians and Egyptians have done. The next challenge – getting the opportunity to scuttle even their next ruler – may be no more than a dream vision.

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*M. Browers, Democracy and Civil Society in Arab Political Thought, Syracuse University Press, 2006, p 4, citing UNDP.

** D. Collier & S. Levitsky, Research Note: “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research.” World Politics. Volume 49, Number 3, April 1997, pp. 430-451.