Ukraine - Europe's first taste of blood in 15 years, but the first in 70 years to also bring a whiff of hitlerian tactics, as Putin smuggles incognito soldiers into Ukraine and boasts of his ability to wipe out European capitals at will. We have seen ground war, indiscriminate slaughter, a civilian airliner downed with 300 passengers dead and local populations caught up in war-gamers' mayhem. But don't complain: Collateral damage has to be suffered for the higher ends of local "sovereignty". Further west, in European capitals, there is secret relief that so far the conflict remains mostly within the Slavic family.
Security is divisible, in case you thought otherwise, and despite the 1990 CSCE declaration of Paris ("Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is intrinsically linked to that of every other.") Of course, Russia and Ukraine were not there, in Paris. The USSR was. And the Europeans and North Americans, little knowing what was about to happen in Yugoslavia, the latter also present in Paris. Divisibility, yes, of states. Here is much of the problem we are facing in Europe today. Scotland's decision to remain in the UK was a healthy sign, an example for Spain's Catalonia to follow. The cracks in the present state construction are readily visible.
Looking back, it was only a year after that Paris declaration that the Soviet Union was chopped up, divided into its multiple constituent parts. Ukraine became independent, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan, Georgia ... And Russia. At that unique moment a wisely conceived multilateral treaty could have created a modern, democratic multistate union with a solid central core. No such thing happened. Instead, the Commonwealth of Independent States was created to replace the Soviet Union, substituting the uncertainties of free choice in politically immature republics for the familiar dictation of Moscow. Cooperation was initiated in many policy areas between CIS members, but Ukraine kept defense to itself. To Moscow - where politicians still thought of themselves as the Center - the new system was slow, cumbersome and unpredictable. So, if you think the idea of reuniting the empire was a Putin invention, think again.
As far back as 1990, many observers thought it only logical that the Soviet Union had to collapse - "what goes up must come down"! - while others among us had the additional thought (and expressed it, to the annoyance of some): "What goes down must come up". In other words: To political leaders and their aspiring successors in the superpower that was the USSR, the horror of watching it tumble like a house of cards must in itself have created a strong motivation to rebuild it, in all its former glory. Now - in 2014 - we have seen that begin to happen - or something along those lines. Still, the basic assumption of the "post-cold war" settlement was that the new Russia would be content to be "new", and would fit within the strictures of the CSCE/OSCE.
Signs of trouble came early on. One was when Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev in December 1992 gave a scary speech that sounded exactly like the old Soviet line (it was soon retracted, but - he said - meant as a warning of the dangers represented by the Russian opposition he was facing at home). Other signs followed. I discover notes from a discussion with Russian colleagues at the Carnegie Moscow Center in 1997, the year of opening talks for NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe, and of the Russia-NATO Founding Act cementing the future collaboration between the two sides. Again the question was, would Russia really fit within the framework of such a "new normal"? There were both hawkish and dovish voices to be heard, but all thought the chances for a durable friendly coexistence were slight. A key problem was seen to be the emotionality of the issues to Russia. The Baltic states were, of course, at the center of the attention. Compare that to Ukraine today: "The Baltics cannot be members of a military alliance which is closed to Russia." One called the idea of an expansion of NATO a "preplanned crisis". "When the expansion of NATO is a fact, all other Russian-Western relations will deteriorate to a cold peace, maybe even a cold war." Nevertheless, later on Russia saw both the Visegrad states and the Baltic states join NATO and kept its cool (mostly). With Ukraine, there will be no such patience.
The Russian project is empire. By now there is nothing new in saying so. But there is a need for those of us on the responding side to make that a policy assumption, not just something that can be waved aside. We Europeans need to have a reasoned and united approach. So far it has been evasive and reluctant. Sanctions, yes, but not too strict. Russia celebrates our dithering by pushing the limits - military aircraft intrusions abound, border controls become difficult, etc.
Worse, some think a Russian empire restored is the Russians' right. What they had in 1917 then becomes the norm. Such views are common in Germany. And who knows? My crude guess is that the end of this conflict for the foreseeable future will be a negotiated agreement between Russia and Ukraine that acknowledges the "legitimate transfer" of Crimea to Russia, that outlines a future "union" of the two countries with a joint defense organization, and that pledges an arms-length distance in the relations of Ukraine to Western organizations. Moldova and its Transnistrian district will have to be handled in a separate agreement. All told, a power-package deal masked as a fair agreement between equals. Tell me whether that is right or wrong.
If Putin has a bit of statesmanship in him that he has not shown so far, he still has a chance of constructing that multistate agreement I described above - but not at gunpoint.
Showing posts with label NATO. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NATO. Show all posts
Sunday, September 21, 2014
Sunday, August 24, 2014
Confidence-Building: Oops, There Goes Another Basic Principle!
Recent developments between Russia and the West not only undermine a set of values previously thought to have been shared by the two sides. (See my blog on Russia last March.) It is now increasingly clear that confidence-building - the chief principle supporting conflict management between the Soviet Union and the West since the early 1960s - is no longer effective between the two sides. The notion of confidence-building was not very familiar in strategic military thinking when it made its appearance, and it has only gained widespread adherence in Europe. Asian political leaders find it illogical.
The main assumption is that the two sides confronting each other in an international conflict basically want peace, but have to overcome the problem that they have no trust in each other. Distrust between national (ethnic) groups is often historically based and therefore deeply engrained. Accordingly, the opposing parties need help to alleviate their lack of trust, to build confidence.
Notice how different this is from the most common competing idea, namely that in serious conflict there is only one winner. The winner takes all. The loser is obliterated. In this conception, trust is warranted only in one's own side. You must not trust the other side. You must be alert and suspicious. Just think of all the action movies and thrillers that start from this principle.
Confidence-building is an uncertain alternative, though ethically preferable. According to confidence-building, we can only resolve conflict by helping the parties to break out of the pattern of distrust. Suspicion can be dealt with by ensuring full mutuality in dealings, by openness and transparency. To allay suspicion, there is the proof of experience. Let the parties try in small ways at first, then let them decide what to do based on what they have experienced. If they were cheated, they can pull out. If small steps prove successful, more important ones can follow.
These ideas were essential to the negotiations that led to the main arms control agreements of the Cold War, starting in the 1960s. When even arms statistics were kept secret by the Soviet side, the US side suggested using US data instead, even for Soviet weapons. The Soviets accepted this as an experiment. Ultimately this led to agreement, and subsequently to a long series of other agreements. Probably the most prominent of these were the INF Treaty (intermediate range nuclear forces) and the CFE Treaty (conventional forces in Europe). Unfortunately, they are no longer the cornerstones they used to be in European security. One (the CFE) has been suspended by Russia several years ago. The other is currently being questioned by the development of new Russian missiles.
Russia is not the only one to blame here. The US suspended the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) Treaty under President George W. Bush in 2001 in order to develop a more modern anti-missile shield, thus also breaking the confidence built over the old agreement. In various arms control matters, Russian leaders claim to have experienced that their concerns have not been fairly dealt with. Doubtless, part of this has to do with the fact that Russians are culturally less trusting than many Westerners. Still, it might have paid off for us all if NATO had been more attuned to the prickly Russians. Trust needs to be nurtured. Clearly, Russian leaders, and Mr. Putin not least, are more at ease with the certainties of suspicion, than with the uncertainties of trust.
At present, confidence-building is in bad shape. The OSCE, once Russia's favored club, is no longer respected by Russia. The Ukraine crisis demonstrates what is missing without the CFE Treaty.* Israel and the Palestinians seem to prefer the fighting and the blind killing to the confidence-building option once offered in the Oslo accords.
Perhaps the way confidence-building has been construed in the West has taken the "building" part of the concept a little too seriously. What we should discover is the need for confidence-maintenance and confidence-nurturing, instead of being satisfied to have completed a "building". The job is never finished.
*See the article by Elisabeth Brocking in The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/remember-the-cfe-treaty-10203
The main assumption is that the two sides confronting each other in an international conflict basically want peace, but have to overcome the problem that they have no trust in each other. Distrust between national (ethnic) groups is often historically based and therefore deeply engrained. Accordingly, the opposing parties need help to alleviate their lack of trust, to build confidence.
Notice how different this is from the most common competing idea, namely that in serious conflict there is only one winner. The winner takes all. The loser is obliterated. In this conception, trust is warranted only in one's own side. You must not trust the other side. You must be alert and suspicious. Just think of all the action movies and thrillers that start from this principle.
Confidence-building is an uncertain alternative, though ethically preferable. According to confidence-building, we can only resolve conflict by helping the parties to break out of the pattern of distrust. Suspicion can be dealt with by ensuring full mutuality in dealings, by openness and transparency. To allay suspicion, there is the proof of experience. Let the parties try in small ways at first, then let them decide what to do based on what they have experienced. If they were cheated, they can pull out. If small steps prove successful, more important ones can follow.
These ideas were essential to the negotiations that led to the main arms control agreements of the Cold War, starting in the 1960s. When even arms statistics were kept secret by the Soviet side, the US side suggested using US data instead, even for Soviet weapons. The Soviets accepted this as an experiment. Ultimately this led to agreement, and subsequently to a long series of other agreements. Probably the most prominent of these were the INF Treaty (intermediate range nuclear forces) and the CFE Treaty (conventional forces in Europe). Unfortunately, they are no longer the cornerstones they used to be in European security. One (the CFE) has been suspended by Russia several years ago. The other is currently being questioned by the development of new Russian missiles.
Russia is not the only one to blame here. The US suspended the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) Treaty under President George W. Bush in 2001 in order to develop a more modern anti-missile shield, thus also breaking the confidence built over the old agreement. In various arms control matters, Russian leaders claim to have experienced that their concerns have not been fairly dealt with. Doubtless, part of this has to do with the fact that Russians are culturally less trusting than many Westerners. Still, it might have paid off for us all if NATO had been more attuned to the prickly Russians. Trust needs to be nurtured. Clearly, Russian leaders, and Mr. Putin not least, are more at ease with the certainties of suspicion, than with the uncertainties of trust.
At present, confidence-building is in bad shape. The OSCE, once Russia's favored club, is no longer respected by Russia. The Ukraine crisis demonstrates what is missing without the CFE Treaty.* Israel and the Palestinians seem to prefer the fighting and the blind killing to the confidence-building option once offered in the Oslo accords.
Perhaps the way confidence-building has been construed in the West has taken the "building" part of the concept a little too seriously. What we should discover is the need for confidence-maintenance and confidence-nurturing, instead of being satisfied to have completed a "building". The job is never finished.
*See the article by Elisabeth Brocking in The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/remember-the-cfe-treaty-10203
Monday, March 31, 2014
Russia and the Sphere of Influence - Back from its Shallow Grave
One of the axioms of the brave new world that emerged as the
Berlin Wall fell was supposedly the end of power politics, at least
among industrialized nations. No more of the old, tainted notion of
spheres of influence. Instead there would be endless opportunities
for cooperation. Win-win was the slogan of the 1990s. Well, one place
where win-win was a hard sell was in Moscow. Win-lose was a
well-established concept in that part of the world, and what need was
there for anything to replace it?
So we discover, belatedly, that the Russians do not consider themselves bound by broadly agreed international rules and that they will certainly not abide by Western rules of conduct, whether in diplomacy or in military procedure short of war. Actually, the Kosovo War in 1999 had already demonstrated this, but by most observers it was set aside as exceptional. Now we see it is not. This split over basic rules of conduct is the procedural side of the Western conflict with Russia. It is evident in the lack of progress in the post-Crimean talks between Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Kerry.
Then there is the substantive side. Consider the Russian preference for spheres of influence.
In 1997, anticipating and seeking to preempt a Finnish and Swedish move to join NATO, Russia made an under-the-table proposal to make the Baltic Sea region into a "non-bloc zone", encapsulating even the three Baltic states. The states in the area were to promise they would abstain from joining alliances. A flurry of low-key "preventive" diplomacy followed, led by Finland and Sweden, to put the proposal aside. And fortunately, the world never heard of that non-bloc zone again.
Until now, that is. On March 17, the day after the tainted Crimean referendum, the Russian Federation set forth a proposal for the future of Ukraine, covering both its internal affairs and its foreign relations. On the latter, it was said, “'[Ukraine’s] sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral military-political status will be guaranteed by Russia, the EU and the US, supported by a UN Security Council resolution'. The document appeared to make clear that Russia’s main 'red line' was future Nato membership for Ukraine..." (Financial Times, March 17, 2014) We see the same underlying fear here, on the part of Russia, as that which triggered their invasion of Georgia in 2008. Any proposed guaranteed neutrality for Ukraine must be up to Ukrainians themselves to consider, not for others to discuss over their heads.
Am I not too hasty in saying the assumptions of post-cold war east west relations are no longer valid?
One way to examine that is to object to this degree of generalization, and point out that the circumstances preceding the Crimea annexation were special. Ukraine had descended into a chaos in the streets of Kiev and other cities, lasting for months, and barely ending when the Ukrainian president Yanukovich fled to Russia. That led the Russian speaking majority population of Crimea to call for a transfer of their region to Russia, to which Russia for historical and other reasons could not but respond positively. Moreover, the historical loss of former Russian-controlled territory here and elsewhere was an accident; the dissolution of the Soviet Union was “... the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century”, according to Mr. Putin, and so we should have understanding for their loss and support the return of what is rightfully theirs. By some accounts, not just old Soviet but also old Russian imperial territory. Such as Ukraine, of course, but also Moldova, Georgia, Finland and the Baltic states.
Not everyone is ready to believe that Putin's ambitions are this great. On the other hand, nor is everybody ready to accept the argument about the worthiness of Russian imperial restoration.
The other answer on East-West relations is that Russia will take, by stealth or by force, what they want and cannot get by diplomacy. This fits a recognizable pattern. Pristina Airport in 1999 was a perfect example of the Russian mode of operation. They did it for their friends, the Serbs, of course. They were crystal clear about who their friends were; others were treated like enemies, even in a negotiated partnership operation under UN auspices. The Georgian invasion in 2008 was another example.
NATO must now resume its prior, more vigilant attitude and its better prepared military posture towards Russia. Good that NATO has just selected as its new Secretary General Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, the former Prime Minister of Norway, this country being the only original NATO member with a direct border to Russia and a healthy sceptical attitude to that eastern neighbour ever since 1991. A revised military posture does not mean itching for a shooting war, but being better prepared in posturing and holding. There is a lot of chess in this, and the Russians love that game.
The Russian behavior pattern is to a considerable extent opportunistic. They are robbers by opportunity. If you have something you want to keep, you have to hold it securely, and with strength.
Given what we now know, I question the wisdom of the Ottowa Convention on land mines. Passive means of defense, adequately protected, are workable. Finland and the Baltic states would be in a much better position with land mines on their border with Russia.
Some would put all their trust in the Americans. Look how President Obama is being hounded for his pusillanimous stance over Ukraine. I doubt there was anything much he could have done, short of going to war. Posturing without readiness to fight is only dangerous. I'm afraid US backup of NATO allies via the article V guarantee is less firm than often believed. Let us not get to the point of testing it.
Finally, of course, there is the EU's dependency on Russian natural gas. The EU was warned so many times. (Check out the writings of Vladimir Socor.) But, apparently, they thought, how convenient to have it all from one source. My lament is merely, why are we Europeans endowed with such geopolitical brilliance at the Parliamentary level?
Am I alarmist on Russia? Of course. Just as I've been a couple of times before. In 1980 over Afghanistan. In 1992 over Soviet fragmentation. My Norwegian colleagues shook their heads. Some will again.
So we discover, belatedly, that the Russians do not consider themselves bound by broadly agreed international rules and that they will certainly not abide by Western rules of conduct, whether in diplomacy or in military procedure short of war. Actually, the Kosovo War in 1999 had already demonstrated this, but by most observers it was set aside as exceptional. Now we see it is not. This split over basic rules of conduct is the procedural side of the Western conflict with Russia. It is evident in the lack of progress in the post-Crimean talks between Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Kerry.
Then there is the substantive side. Consider the Russian preference for spheres of influence.
In 1997, anticipating and seeking to preempt a Finnish and Swedish move to join NATO, Russia made an under-the-table proposal to make the Baltic Sea region into a "non-bloc zone", encapsulating even the three Baltic states. The states in the area were to promise they would abstain from joining alliances. A flurry of low-key "preventive" diplomacy followed, led by Finland and Sweden, to put the proposal aside. And fortunately, the world never heard of that non-bloc zone again.
Until now, that is. On March 17, the day after the tainted Crimean referendum, the Russian Federation set forth a proposal for the future of Ukraine, covering both its internal affairs and its foreign relations. On the latter, it was said, “'[Ukraine’s] sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral military-political status will be guaranteed by Russia, the EU and the US, supported by a UN Security Council resolution'. The document appeared to make clear that Russia’s main 'red line' was future Nato membership for Ukraine..." (Financial Times, March 17, 2014) We see the same underlying fear here, on the part of Russia, as that which triggered their invasion of Georgia in 2008. Any proposed guaranteed neutrality for Ukraine must be up to Ukrainians themselves to consider, not for others to discuss over their heads.
Am I not too hasty in saying the assumptions of post-cold war east west relations are no longer valid?
One way to examine that is to object to this degree of generalization, and point out that the circumstances preceding the Crimea annexation were special. Ukraine had descended into a chaos in the streets of Kiev and other cities, lasting for months, and barely ending when the Ukrainian president Yanukovich fled to Russia. That led the Russian speaking majority population of Crimea to call for a transfer of their region to Russia, to which Russia for historical and other reasons could not but respond positively. Moreover, the historical loss of former Russian-controlled territory here and elsewhere was an accident; the dissolution of the Soviet Union was “... the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century”, according to Mr. Putin, and so we should have understanding for their loss and support the return of what is rightfully theirs. By some accounts, not just old Soviet but also old Russian imperial territory. Such as Ukraine, of course, but also Moldova, Georgia, Finland and the Baltic states.
Not everyone is ready to believe that Putin's ambitions are this great. On the other hand, nor is everybody ready to accept the argument about the worthiness of Russian imperial restoration.
The other answer on East-West relations is that Russia will take, by stealth or by force, what they want and cannot get by diplomacy. This fits a recognizable pattern. Pristina Airport in 1999 was a perfect example of the Russian mode of operation. They did it for their friends, the Serbs, of course. They were crystal clear about who their friends were; others were treated like enemies, even in a negotiated partnership operation under UN auspices. The Georgian invasion in 2008 was another example.
NATO must now resume its prior, more vigilant attitude and its better prepared military posture towards Russia. Good that NATO has just selected as its new Secretary General Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, the former Prime Minister of Norway, this country being the only original NATO member with a direct border to Russia and a healthy sceptical attitude to that eastern neighbour ever since 1991. A revised military posture does not mean itching for a shooting war, but being better prepared in posturing and holding. There is a lot of chess in this, and the Russians love that game.
The Russian behavior pattern is to a considerable extent opportunistic. They are robbers by opportunity. If you have something you want to keep, you have to hold it securely, and with strength.
Given what we now know, I question the wisdom of the Ottowa Convention on land mines. Passive means of defense, adequately protected, are workable. Finland and the Baltic states would be in a much better position with land mines on their border with Russia.
Some would put all their trust in the Americans. Look how President Obama is being hounded for his pusillanimous stance over Ukraine. I doubt there was anything much he could have done, short of going to war. Posturing without readiness to fight is only dangerous. I'm afraid US backup of NATO allies via the article V guarantee is less firm than often believed. Let us not get to the point of testing it.
Finally, of course, there is the EU's dependency on Russian natural gas. The EU was warned so many times. (Check out the writings of Vladimir Socor.) But, apparently, they thought, how convenient to have it all from one source. My lament is merely, why are we Europeans endowed with such geopolitical brilliance at the Parliamentary level?
Am I alarmist on Russia? Of course. Just as I've been a couple of times before. In 1980 over Afghanistan. In 1992 over Soviet fragmentation. My Norwegian colleagues shook their heads. Some will again.
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