Moldova: An Old Hot Potato in European Security

Moldovan elections have once more put the country on our mental maps - for a moment. The country deserves to stay there for a while longer. There is indeed reason to fear that Mr. Putin will now help put it higher on Europe's security agenda, as Judy Dempsey suggested today in the Moscow Times (December 4, 2014). In other words, as we shall see, the election results of November 30 reflect more than a passing cleavage between East and West.

The background is this. Part of Moldova has been a de-facto Russian exclave since 1991, when the Soviet Union died and the Post-Cold War Russian Federation was born. The Republic of Moldova arose along with it. In hindsight its modern history might look like a plan conceived by Mr. Putin, only he wasn't there at the time. A combination of chance and foresight allowed ex-soviet loyalists in Moldova, with open and clandestine support from Russia, to retain a military foothold there on the pretext of guarding a soviet-era munitions depot and armaments factory.

Already before Moldova's independence was fully established, the region along the east bank of the Dniester river declared its secession from Moldova and after a short and bloody war managed to solidify its claim. Transnistria has since been run by old soviet army veterans and emigré politicos in the rebel capital Tiraspol, although no other UN member has ever recognized them. To calm the simmering conflict, the OSCE authorized a peace-keeping force to be stationed in the breakaway republic. Somehow this mission ended up consisting only of Russian military personnel. Russia does not need to invade Moldova. It is already there.

Moldova's divided condition is a nearly perfect example of what a relentless campaign of politico-military meddling and influence-mongering by Russia can produce - and apparently is producing in many other places between the EU and Russia.*

But, to be fair, there is also a strong element of pro-Russian feeling even in the population on the western side. This can be seen in the simultaneous victory of a pro-Russian Socialist party (21%), and the likely majority coalition of three pro-EU parties (jointly 45%, yielding a slim majority in the parliament). The Communists (18%) are not unequivocally pro-Russian, but have for some years declared in favor of closer relations to the EU. The present outcome, divided as it is, is nevertheless not new, it is similar to most previous parliamentary elections in Moldova in which blocs have been hovering around a 50/50 split, with the Communist Party previously in a dominating role it has since lost. Presidential elections, indirect through the parliament, were effectively stalemated for nearly three years from 2009 by political infighting and procedural issues.

Two additional problems add to Moldova's woes: endemic corruption, and near-total dependence on gas from Russia. When gas prices are disputed with Russia, the supply is shut off - always in winter, of course. A combination of these two problems recently showed up when Moldova opened a new gas pipeline from Romania to add an alternative, non-Russian source of energy supply: There was no gas in the pipeline. Surprise!**

In formal terms the Republic of Moldova is an independent state, member of the United Nations, the OSCE and the WTO. Moldova signed an association agreement with the European Union in 2014. The question of candidacy for accession to the EU is not yet on the table, however, and Russia has issued a warning against such a move - in itself indicative of the kind of unashamed pressure the Kremlin applies to presumably independent countries.

Informally, Moldova's political status is therefore a bit ambiguous. The EU, on the other hand, has a considerable presence via bilateral agreements to provide assistance to the reconstruction of key sectors of Moldova's public administration.

Among the multifarious pieces and fragments of the old Soviet Union, Moldova fits a broader pattern: footholds, or toeholds, for Kremlin remote control or influence. Partly on legal grounds, partly on military grounds, partly based on popular affinities. Kaliningrad, annexed in 1944, was perhaps the first of this kind; the annexation of Crimea the most recent. Despite the formalities, Moldova was in reality never released from Russian ties since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Endless talks in various formats, involving at different times the EU, the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, have tried to untangle the security knot of the armaments depots and the political knot of the divided affections of the population. In the process Moldova's Chisinau government has entered numerous agreements with the breakaway government, many brokered by Russia and Ukraine. These agreements have subsequently tied its hands.***

Only the EU has the potential to drag the country out of Putin's clutches. After the elections the Commission issued a conditionally supportive statement on December 1, 2014 (excerpt):

"... A new impetus to key reforms will be crucial for the Republic of Moldova´s political association and economic integration with the EU. The EU will remain a reliable partner supporting the Republic of Moldova´s reform endeavours and working towards unleashing the full benefits of the Association Agreement in the interest of all its citizens, wherever they live."

It also said:

"The EU remains committed to work with the future government towards a comprehensive, peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for Transnistria. ..."

The issues are recognized, and the slow, patient route towards a solution agreed to by all is pointed out. In Moldova, the EU vs Russia is pedagogy competing with the power of money and weapons.

The big question for the EU is whether the 28 members really want to put the resources and serious effort into it that the problem requires. When it comes to spheres of influence, Putin is serious. In Brussels, spheres of influence are known only as ancient history.

*Judy Dempsey, "The Western Balkans are Becoming Russia's New Playground", November 24, 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57301&reloadFlag=1.

**"Empty Pipeline Shows Difficulty Of Breaking Moldova's Gazprom Addiction." By Liliana Barbarosie and Robert Coalson. RFE-RL September 29, 2014.

*** For more on this, see: "Executive Summary: Moldova’s Transnistrian Conflict." Prepared by Olav F. Knudsen, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) with assistance from Andris Spruds, Latvian Institute of International Affairs and Barbara Kunz, SIIA.

http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/Articles/friends-of-belarus/moldova_exec_summ.pdf

Decision on Catalonia - updated

Catalonia's informal consultation of the public's opinion November 9th about independence from Spain ended with a whimper. While the Catalonian government and friendly foreign press reported an impressive support for independence with 80% yes votes, voter turnout was rarely cited. It was in fact very low, 36 %. Nearly two thirds of the voters stayed home, in other words. No big step forward for the independence movement occurred, rather the opposite. And the chances of some kind of agreement with Madrid are now more remote than ever.

So, why could not reasonable political leaders, who disagree fundamentally, but still inhabit the same country and live under the same laws, sit down and talk like civilized people about the issues that divide them? Probably because the issues between Barcelona and Madrid, or between Spain and its autonomous community Catalonia, are not really substantial (see my blogs January 2014, September 2013, November 2012, October 2012). This is also obviously why so many voters declined to participate. 

Europe supposedly is the home of political reason. But secession, like amputation, is a painful matter. One way to handle such business was recently demonstrated by Russia, who seized Crimea from Ukraine after a sham referendum. No need to talk there. At the other extreme, in September 2014 Scotland and the United Kingdom showed the world how to go about this kind of affair in a civilized manner.

In Spain, as the Catalonian issue has surged during the last few years, the two sides have repeatedly urged negotiations. A few attempts have been made to start talking. Nevertheless, nothing has come out of it. Spain's Premier Rajoy has dragged his feet, bolstered no doubt by the clear letter of the Spanish constitution, the strong legalistic tradition of his country and the absolute majority his party (Partido Popular) enjoys in the national assembly. Catalonian president Artur Mas has been the vocal force behind the Catalonian campaign. He promised nevertheless after one of these sessions in Madrid that he would do nothing illegal. Yet his actions at home leave that in doubt.

Catalonia and Mas have continued to declare their intentions quite clearly, followed up with formal steps. In early 2013 the Catalonian parlament passed a resolution declaring sovereignty and independence for Catalonia. The Spanish government responded by calling for the Spanish Constitutional Court to decide on the declaration's constitutionality. The court responded by ordering the suspension of all efforts to prepare for implementation of the declaration (April 2013).

Still, Catalonia's government proceeded half a year later to pick a date for the referendum (to take place on November 9, 2014). The wording of the questions to be asked at the referendum was decided at the same time. In January (2014) Catalonian members of the Spanish national assembly in Madrid proposed to the Congress to permit a referendum to take place in Catalonia about future relations between Spain and Catalonia, a belated nod to the UK procedure. The proposal was rejected out of hand. Perhaps too hastily.

Scotland's forthcoming decision then kept all in suspense from March to September this year. The subsequent failure of the Scottish independence campaign triggered further immediate steps in Spain. Within days, the Catalonian parlament decided, in spite of the Constitutional Court's earlier decision, to go ahead with preparations for the November 9 referendum. President Mas signed a decree following up on the practical preparations. Madrid responded with dispatch, submitting the case once more to the Constitutional Court, and receiving its preliminary judgement a few days later: Catalonia's decisions were illegal.

President Artur Mas, the self-declared law-abider, was not deterred. True to his demagogic bent, he proceeded from formality to informality. If we are not allowed a formal referendum, then why not go for a spontaneous, informal one? Let the people come forth. We will provide rooms for the occasion. "Bring your own paper and pencil." That certainly cannot be illegal?

Madrid thought otherwise. After first appearing to brush this latest attempt aside as farce, the government on October 31 brought even this matter to the urgent attention of the Constitutional Court, arguing that the realities of the case were the same as before. On November 6, the Court decided to suspend even this alternative version of the referendum.

Secession is indeed difficult.

In legal terms this case is closed. In political terms it might have been possible to solve more smoothly with some give and take. Here, I believe, is where North European and Spanish political cultures diverge. In Spanish thinking "the law is the law". Further north the thinking is, there is always room for discussion. Madrid does not want to discuss with Barcelona as long as the law has the answer. This may be good law, but not excellent politics.

Moreover, there are others queuing up behind Catalonia, above all the Basque Country, which to me has a stronger case for independence, at least politically. Other autonomous regions may also aspire to the same. The central government is bound to deal with all of them if it cannot stop Catalonia now. This points to the larger issue.

Spain would benefit from a structural makeover to let its constituent 17 pieces fit better into the whole. This is a constitutional issue, left only half resolved by the democratic document of 1978. As an insolent outsider, I would suggest the Spanish Constitution must be revised to give the country a clearer federal structure. Several parties in Spain have already had this demand on their program for some time.

The issue is not only a Spanish or a British one. It affects the whole European region, partly with side effects, partly with the contagion of separatist sentiment. It is somewhat problematic in this context that the EU has assumed such great competence and is making such great resources available to regions within member countries, bypassing their national governments, at least in a political (though not juridical) sense.

So to Catalonia's demand, there is a counter-question: What if all the rest of the regions of Spain, of Britain, of France, and of Italy, ... (etc) were to make the same demand? Why should their demands not be met? Yes, why not, indeed? We are approaching the realm of child-rearing here, the problematic sort that raises all kinds of issues. "If the kid wants something, let him have it." Catalonia's case is not a forced union. The last time Catalonia had a referendum - some thirtyfive years ago - it was along with all of Spain, and Catalonia voted yes to the Spanish constitution with over 90%, the highest in Spain. They freely chose it, and they should be made to make the best of it.

Says this supporter of Baltic independence in the 1990s (they left a forced union), and supporter of Norwegian secession in 1905 (also from a forced union). I hate to think what kind of Europe would be the outcome of secession on demand.

Globalizing Tyrannies

Globalization is a system based on mutual trust, on granting and receiving mutual benefits, and refraining from violence. Its weakness is that trust can be breached and benefits enjoyed unilaterally without serious consequences, at least until someone else reacts. Low-level violence can be used to good advantage by those ready to bend or break the rules. Two powerful countries are now engaged in an unashamed exploitation abroad of the freedoms offered by globalization, while themselves denying others similar freedoms on their own territories.

The rise of authoritarian China and the recuperation of an aggressive Russia are prominent facts of the present world. The rise of China was widely anticipated, the Russian restoration less so, but both changes have been facilitated and vastly accelerated by globalization. Globalization has long been criticized by the political Center-Left. It is high time its drawbacks were recognized by the Center- Right as well.

One thing I learned from my early studies of international political economy (on international shipping, and foreign direct investment) was that most national governments at that time (post-WWII) were being used - or let themselves be used - as vehicles to promote particular interests, in competition with other economic interests within their own country, and competing with the interests championed by other national governments. The national interests of a country at that time were (to put it a bit crudely) whatever particular interests managed to hijack the government's support. And I am not talking primarily about the socialist countries of that period, or third world countries - rather, OECD countries, western industrialized countries. Of course, these governments did not primarily act in the markets as if they were companies themselves (although that also happened), but they struggled continuously to shape and reshape the rules of international markets in favor of their own chosen industries. The interests of the general public were not often mentioned. At the time I found this to be a shocking bit of evidence against the ruling norms of the "free world", supposedly the guardians of free markets and fair competition.

Having moved on from the naive views of my youth, I believe the world of global economic relations is very much the same interest-ridden complexity today, only the basic rules have changed, making it much more difficult (provided they play by the rules) for national governments to protect against foreign competition. With the lowering of national barriers and the rise of the electronic worldwide network, vast new fields of social, economic, religious and political activity have opened up. The actors have changed as well, with national governments less prominent, and international organizations and NGOs greatly expanded in functions and influence. Multinational (transnational) corporations have grown as expected since the 1970s, but have not achieved world dominance. Power is, to some extent, shared. There are multiple actors, multiple power centers, multiple possibilities. Globalization has in large part become the definition of the world scene.

Given my skeptical view of national governments as economic actors, I initially welcomed this great transition. Later I have, like others, come to doubt the wisdom of promoting such enormous change. The most obvious reason, launched by critics early on, was that globalization brings unmanageable side effects while reducing the possibility of putting on the brakes. Free movement, unfettered transnational transactions, is the main leverage for achieving globalized effects. It is also the cause of most of the trouble. It has allowed unprecedented agglomerations of money and power where there should be none - in vicious criminal networks, operating drug trafficking and human trafficking, in authoritarian regimes abusing the globalized freedoms for anti-democratic purposes, in the corruption undermining many apparently democratic governments. The undermining of governments around the world has also been facilitated by the untrammeled trade in small arms. Fanatical religion has spread and multiplied their support via global communication networks.

Ideally, the coexistence of different cultures and conflicting ideas should be at the core of globalization. A freely transacting world must come to terms with the continuing presence of widely diverse cultures. For this to happen, either one (western), secular culture must become universally accepted as a functional economic and political overlay to genuine, deep subcultures, or a truly tolerant multicultural civilization must come into being that can allow political and economic activities to proceed undisturbed. Until the failure of the "Arab spring" we could still believe in the beneficial potential of the unlimited spread of ideas - good ideas. It turned out we did not all agree on what were the good ideas. Multiculturalism became impossible when violence to "non-believers" was sanctioned by religious groups.

Of all these side effects, the undermining of liberal democracy and the unleashing of unabashed authoritarianism is nevertheless in my view the most serious.

In two highly readable, recent articles Michael Ignatieff points out the surprising and threatening breakthrough for authoritarianism around the world, and especially what he calls authoritarian capitalism, excelling in China and Russia, giving the lie to the old "truth" that democratic capitalism is the only workable system (see New York Review of Books, July 10 and September 25, 2014). The assertive power of these two dictatorships and the way their power is exercised - freely, brazenly - is also new, and scary. Secret illegal action is covered up with blatant lies. When violent crackdowns or other oppressive action have to be made in plain view, excuses are no longer made. Power is its own justification. And as Ignatieff also points out, it is corrupt power, a sophisticated system infused and maintained with money from secret, illicit sources.

Aggressive authoritarianism exploits globalization. This has been further facilitated by the widespread reduction of arms in the western world. The post-cold war era was the world of the "peace dividend", even in spite of the Yugoslav, Afghan and Iraqi wars. European military forces were significantly reduced. Since 1991 the response capacity of Russia's western neighbors to armed provocations has been built down to near zero, on the expectation that Russia would now be a friendly country with no reason to pick quarrels with its neighbors. It was thought a safe gamble at the time. Not today.

Recent aggressive action by Russia, and not merely in Ukraine, is quite serious. Russia is probing borders and repeatedly provoking incidents between its military aircraft and naval units and the legitimate civilian activities of other countries in their space or in international waters, from the Baltic and Barents Seas to the Bering Strait. Sweden presently finds itself in a bind over unexpected Russian submarine activity in the approaches to Stockholm. Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states have been challenged numerous times during the past year by Russian air force units.

In similar activities China has been harassing its neighbors to the south for decades in the waters of the South China Sea, which it ludicrously claims in its entirety, contrary to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (to which China is a party - see my blog on the South China Sea, June 30, 2011). The South China Sea, sectors of which are legitimately claimed by the littoral states, also is the main shipping route for trade between China, the Middle East and Europe. To keep that traffic lane free and open is obviously a vital Chinese interest, as it is a vital interest of the other littoral states and the international community at large. But having a vital interest does not allow China to arrogate the whole sea to itself.

In sum, playing at geopolitics has become simpler as borders have become porous and global transaction rules have been standardized. Given the unavoidable presence in the future of these and other similarly unscrupulous actors, a measured retreat from the current wide open version of globalization to something more reliant on nation-state actors would seem to be necessary. Ironically, in the internet world this is clearly something both China and Russia have long been seeking, in order better to control their own populations and keep foreigners out of their home space. Their provocations are bound to be temporary, but the broader effects are likely to be a less globalized world and a bigger role for closed, large markets (USA, China, EU, India). The present xenophobia of Russia will hopefully subside, but in the meantime we shall have to suffer the "gangsterous" types while waiting for wiser Russian voices to break through. They exist, I know.

The New Russia - to the Dniestr?

Ukraine - Europe's first taste of blood in 15 years, but the first in 70 years to also bring a whiff of hitlerian tactics, as Putin smuggles incognito soldiers into Ukraine and boasts of his ability to wipe out European capitals at will. We have seen ground war, indiscriminate slaughter, a civilian airliner downed with 300 passengers dead and local populations caught up in war-gamers' mayhem. But don't complain: Collateral damage has to be suffered for the higher ends of local "sovereignty". Further west, in European capitals, there is secret relief that so far the conflict remains mostly within the Slavic family.

Security is divisible, in case you thought otherwise, and despite the 1990 CSCE declaration of Paris ("Security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is intrinsically linked to that of every other.") Of course, Russia and Ukraine were not there, in Paris. The USSR was. And the Europeans and North Americans, little knowing what was about to happen in Yugoslavia, the latter also present in Paris. Divisibility, yes, of states. Here is much of the problem we are facing in Europe today. Scotland's decision to remain in the UK was a healthy sign, an example for Spain's Catalonia to follow. The cracks in the present state construction are readily visible.

Looking back, it was only a year after that Paris declaration that the Soviet Union was chopped up, divided into its multiple constituent parts. Ukraine became independent, as did Belarus, Kazakhstan, Georgia ... And Russia. At that unique moment a wisely conceived multilateral treaty could have created a modern, democratic multistate union with a solid central core. No such thing happened. Instead, the Commonwealth of Independent States was created to replace the Soviet Union, substituting the uncertainties of free choice in politically immature republics for the familiar dictation of Moscow. Cooperation was initiated in many policy areas between CIS members, but Ukraine kept defense to itself. To Moscow - where politicians still thought of themselves as the Center - the new system was slow, cumbersome and unpredictable. So, if you think the idea of reuniting the empire was a Putin invention, think again.

As far back as 1990, many observers thought it only logical that the Soviet Union had to collapse - "what goes up must come down"! - while others among us had the additional thought (and expressed it, to the annoyance of some): "What goes down must come up". In other words: To political leaders and their aspiring successors in the superpower that was the USSR, the horror of watching it tumble like a house of cards must in itself have created a strong motivation to rebuild it, in all its former glory. Now - in 2014 - we have seen that begin to happen - or something along those lines. Still, the basic assumption of the "post-cold war" settlement was that the new Russia would be content to be "new", and would fit within the strictures of the CSCE/OSCE.

Signs of trouble came early on. One was when Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev in December 1992 gave a scary speech that sounded exactly like the old Soviet line (it was soon retracted, but - he said - meant as a warning of the dangers represented by the Russian opposition he was facing at home). Other signs followed. I discover notes from a discussion with Russian colleagues at the Carnegie Moscow Center in 1997, the year of opening talks for NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe, and of the Russia-NATO Founding Act cementing the future collaboration between the two sides. Again the question was, would Russia really fit within the framework of such a "new normal"? There were both hawkish and dovish voices to be heard, but all thought the chances for a durable friendly coexistence were slight. A key problem was seen to be the emotionality of the issues to Russia. The Baltic states were, of course, at the center of the attention. Compare that to Ukraine today: "The Baltics cannot be members of a military alliance which is closed to Russia." One called the idea of an expansion of NATO a "preplanned crisis". "When the expansion of NATO is a fact, all other Russian-Western relations will deteriorate to a cold peace, maybe even a cold war." Nevertheless, later on Russia saw both the Visegrad states and the Baltic states join NATO and kept its cool (mostly). With Ukraine, there will be no such patience.

The Russian project is empire. By now there is nothing new in saying so. But there is a need for those of us on the responding side to make that a policy assumption, not just something that can be waved aside. We Europeans need to have a reasoned and united approach. So far it has been evasive and reluctant. Sanctions, yes, but not too strict. Russia celebrates our dithering by pushing the limits - military aircraft intrusions abound, border controls become difficult, etc.

Worse, some think a Russian empire restored is the Russians' right. What they had in 1917 then becomes the norm. Such views are common in Germany. And who knows? My crude guess is that the end of this conflict for the foreseeable future will be a negotiated agreement between Russia and Ukraine that acknowledges the "legitimate transfer" of Crimea to Russia, that outlines a future "union" of the two countries with a joint defense organization, and that pledges an arms-length distance in the relations of Ukraine to Western organizations. Moldova and its Transnistrian district will have to be handled in a separate agreement. All told, a power-package deal masked as a fair agreement between equals. Tell me whether that is right or wrong.

If Putin has a bit of statesmanship in him that he has not shown so far, he still has a chance of constructing that multistate agreement I described above - but not at gunpoint.

Confidence-Building: Oops, There Goes Another Basic Principle!

Recent developments between Russia and the West not only undermine a set of values previously thought to have been shared by the two sides. (See my blog on Russia last March.) It is now increasingly clear that confidence-building - the chief principle supporting conflict management between the Soviet Union and the West since the early 1960s - is no longer effective between the two sides. The notion of confidence-building was not very familiar in strategic military thinking when it made its appearance, and it has only gained widespread adherence in Europe. Asian political leaders find it illogical.

The main assumption is that the two sides confronting each other in an international conflict basically want peace, but have to overcome the problem that they have no trust in each other. Distrust between national (ethnic) groups is often historically based and therefore deeply engrained. Accordingly, the opposing parties need help to alleviate their lack of trust, to build confidence.

Notice how different this is from the most common competing idea, namely that in serious conflict there is only one winner. The winner takes all. The loser is obliterated. In this conception, trust is warranted only in one's own side. You must not trust the other side. You must be alert and suspicious. Just think of all the action movies and thrillers that start from this principle.

Confidence-building is an uncertain alternative, though ethically preferable. According to confidence-building, we can only resolve conflict by helping the parties to break out of the pattern of distrust. Suspicion can be dealt with by ensuring full mutuality in dealings, by openness and transparency. To allay suspicion, there is the proof of experience. Let the parties try in small ways at first, then let them decide what to do based on what they have experienced. If they were cheated, they can pull out. If small steps prove successful, more important ones can follow.

These ideas were essential to the negotiations that led to the main arms control agreements of the Cold War, starting in the 1960s. When even arms statistics were kept secret by the Soviet side, the US side suggested using US data instead, even for Soviet weapons. The Soviets accepted this as an experiment. Ultimately this led to agreement, and subsequently to a long series of other agreements. Probably the most prominent of these were the INF Treaty (intermediate range nuclear forces) and the CFE Treaty (conventional forces in Europe). Unfortunately, they are no longer the cornerstones they used to be in European security. One (the CFE) has been suspended by Russia several years ago. The other is currently being questioned by the development of new Russian missiles.

Russia is not the only one to blame here. The US suspended the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) Treaty under President George W. Bush in 2001 in order to develop a more modern anti-missile shield, thus also breaking the confidence built over the old agreement. In various arms control matters, Russian leaders claim to have experienced that their concerns have not been fairly dealt with. Doubtless, part of this has to do with the fact that Russians are culturally less trusting than many Westerners. Still, it might have paid off for us all if NATO had been more attuned to the prickly Russians. Trust needs to be nurtured. Clearly, Russian leaders, and Mr. Putin not least, are more at ease with the certainties of suspicion, than with the uncertainties of trust.

At present, confidence-building is in bad shape. The OSCE, once Russia's favored club, is no longer respected by Russia. The Ukraine crisis demonstrates what is missing without the CFE Treaty.* Israel and the Palestinians seem to prefer the fighting and the blind killing to the confidence-building option once offered in the Oslo accords.

Perhaps the way confidence-building has been construed in the West has taken the "building" part of the concept a little too seriously. What we should discover is the need for confidence-maintenance and confidence-nurturing, instead of being satisfied to have completed a "building". The job is never finished.

*See the article by Elisabeth Brocking in The National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/remember-the-cfe-treaty-10203

Russia and the Sphere of Influence - Back from its Shallow Grave

One of the axioms of the brave new world that emerged as the Berlin Wall fell was supposedly the end of power politics, at least among industrialized nations. No more of the old, tainted notion of spheres of influence. Instead there would be endless opportunities for cooperation. Win-win was the slogan of the 1990s. Well, one place where win-win was a hard sell was in Moscow. Win-lose was a well-established concept in that part of the world, and what need was there for anything to replace it?

So we discover, belatedly, that the Russians do not consider themselves bound by broadly agreed international rules and that they will certainly not abide by Western rules of conduct, whether in diplomacy or in military procedure short of war. Actually, the Kosovo War in 1999 had already demonstrated this, but by most observers it was set aside as exceptional. Now we see it is not. This split over basic rules of conduct is the procedural side of the Western conflict with Russia. It is evident in the lack of progress in the post-Crimean talks between Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Kerry.

Then there is the substantive side. Consider the Russian preference for spheres of influence.

In 1997, anticipating and seeking to preempt a Finnish and Swedish move to join NATO, Russia made an under-the-table proposal to make the Baltic Sea region into a "non-bloc zone", encapsulating even the three Baltic states. The states in the area were to promise they would abstain from joining alliances. A flurry of low-key "preventive" diplomacy followed, led by Finland and Sweden, to put the proposal aside. And fortunately, the world never heard of that non-bloc zone again.

Until now, that is. On March 17, the day after the tainted Crimean referendum, the Russian Federation set forth a proposal for the future of Ukraine, covering both its internal affairs and its foreign relations. On the latter, it was said, “'[Ukraine’s] sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral military-political status will be guaranteed by Russia, the EU and the US, supported by a UN Security Council resolution'. The document appeared to make clear that Russia’s main 'red line' was future Nato membership for Ukraine..." (Financial Times, March 17, 2014) We see the same underlying fear here, on the part of Russia, as that which triggered their invasion of Georgia in 2008. Any proposed guaranteed neutrality for Ukraine must be up to Ukrainians themselves to consider, not for others to discuss over their heads.

Am I not too hasty in saying the assumptions of post-cold war east west relations are no longer valid?

One way to examine that is to object to this degree of generalization, and point out that the circumstances preceding the Crimea annexation were special. Ukraine had descended into a chaos in the streets of Kiev and other cities, lasting for months, and barely ending when the Ukrainian president Yanukovich fled to Russia. That led the Russian speaking majority population of Crimea to call for a transfer of their region to Russia, to which Russia for historical and other reasons could not but respond positively. Moreover, the historical loss of former Russian-controlled territory here and elsewhere was an accident; the dissolution of the Soviet Union was “... the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century”, according to Mr. Putin, and so we should have understanding for their loss and support the return of what is rightfully theirs. By some accounts, not just old Soviet but also old Russian imperial territory. Such as Ukraine, of course, but also Moldova, Georgia, Finland and the Baltic states.

Not everyone is ready to believe that Putin's ambitions are this great. On the other hand, nor is everybody ready to accept the argument about the worthiness of Russian imperial restoration.

The other answer on East-West relations is that Russia will take, by stealth or by force, what they want and cannot get by diplomacy. This fits a recognizable pattern. Pristina Airport in 1999 was a perfect example of the Russian mode of operation. They did it for their friends, the Serbs, of course. They were crystal clear about who their friends were; others were treated like enemies, even in a negotiated partnership operation under UN auspices. The Georgian invasion in 2008 was another example.

NATO must now resume its prior, more vigilant attitude and its better prepared military posture towards Russia. Good that NATO has just selected as its new Secretary General Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, the former Prime Minister of Norway, this country being the only original NATO member with a direct border to Russia and a healthy sceptical attitude to that eastern neighbour ever since 1991. A revised military posture does not mean itching for a shooting war, but being better prepared in posturing and holding. There is a lot of chess in this, and the Russians love that game.

The Russian behavior pattern is to a considerable extent opportunistic. They are robbers by opportunity. If you have something you want to keep, you have to hold it securely, and with strength.

Given what we now know, I question the wisdom of the Ottowa Convention on land mines. Passive means of defense, adequately protected, are workable. Finland and the Baltic states would be in a much better position with land mines on their border with Russia.

Some would put all their trust in the Americans. Look how President Obama is being hounded for his pusillanimous stance over Ukraine. I doubt there was anything much he could have done, short of going to war. Posturing without readiness to fight is only dangerous. I'm afraid US backup of NATO allies via the article V guarantee is less firm than often believed. Let us not get to the point of testing it.

Finally, of course, there is the EU's dependency on Russian natural gas. The EU was warned so many times. (Check out the writings of Vladimir Socor.) But, apparently, they thought, how convenient to have it all from one source. My lament is merely, why are we Europeans endowed with such geopolitical brilliance at the Parliamentary level?

Am I alarmist on Russia? Of course. Just as I've been a couple of times before. In 1980 over Afghanistan. In 1992 over Soviet fragmentation. My Norwegian colleagues shook their heads. Some will again.

Ukraine and Crimea - Not Primarily an International Crisis

Somehow the future of Crimea has suddenly become an urgent issue we are expected to consider, as if it were the previously hidden heart of Ukraine's problems, as if the rights of Mr. Putin and the Russian nation have been offended by some major misdeed against Crimea's Russian-speaking population. As if Ukrainians are collectively guilty of Crimean atrocities, justifying a Russian intervention. No, neither Ukraine nor Crimea is primarily at the center of an international crisis.

The real problem is the long-lasting, and increasing, misgovernment and mismanagement of Ukraine, dating back two decades or more, but reaching a crescendo this winter. For a big industrialized country to sink so deep in economic woes, there is more than just a bit of ignorance and misfortune behind it all. A country in which the shadow economy is estimated at 50% or more of GDP, where a whole social layer of smart movers - mid-level and higher "managers" - are organized in networks that skim the profits of most sectors of the economy. A parliament filled with collaborators of those shadow-economy chieftains, and a government skimming the skimmers. The corruption networks have been known for years and are well described by the Economist in a recent issue.

 The only surprise is that large numbers of ordinary Ukrainians ultimately find the strength to protest outdoors for months on end - in wintertime, no less. Actually, their behavior fits the old J-curve hypothesis about revolutions, how people revolt when, after gradually experiencing improved conditions, they suddenly see their hopes quashed by some dramatic event. That fits the story of Ukraine's negotiations for EU association during most of 2013, only to call it off when the agreement was ready to be signed. And no wonder they were skeptical about the new government as well when Mr. Yanukovich later fled the country.

Basically, of course, Ukraine is dependent on economic relations both with Russia and with Europe. To Russia, Ukraine is probably more a strategic than an economic asset. To the EU, probably neither. Just a key relay station for Russian gas pipelines to the west, which the EU has - indolently and carelessly - allowed itself to become dependent on.

So, whether Crimea is right or wrong to suddenly demand secession from Ukraine, and a reunion with Russia, this is simply a red herring. Indeed, one can easily sympathize with a demand for a referendum from a population that has several times been shifted like a package between Russia and Ukraine, without anybody asking those involved what they thought about it. Except, why has this demand been raised just now, when the problems of Ukraine are acute, but have nothing to do with Crimea? This is sheer manipulation, and who the manipulator is, is obvious.

But Ukraine cannot escape its cohabitation with Russia. Managing its own internal affairs better is Ukraine's only solution. At this stage, losing Crimea - one way or the other - is likely to be the price they will have to pay for getting through it all. It will be their punishment for allowing themselves to continue after 2004 living in such political and economic disorder. The betrayal of the Orange Revolution says it all.

In international strategic terms, Ukraine's only significance is being the missing piece in Russia's games with its imaginary enemies. Of course, that makes it also of considerable interest to the West. But let no one fool you to feel sorry for Ukraine. 

Russia's Moment

With the Sochi Olympics successfully out of the way, President Vladimir Putin's main worry may likely be Ukraine. And at this particular moment, on Sunday, February 23, 2014, Ukraine is without leadership. The President has disappeared, there is no police, just the Parliament and its Speaker, appointed temporarily to assume presidential authority. Masses are still gathered in the streets of Kiev, still suspicious of any claim to authority, even from Yulia Timoshenko, former prime minister and unsuccessful presidential candidate, just released from prison on their demand.


So what has this confusion got to do with Russia? Not much more than Russia's power position in the world. With Ukraine part of Russia for centuries, Russia was powerful. Without it, so much less. When the Soviet Union fell apart, and Ukraine found itself independent, the expectation was they would soon find their way together again. That did not happen. And without Ukraine, Russia sees itself as so much less than in their former united position. Ukraine, the cradle of Russia.


Estonian politicians I interviewed before their country was accepted to join NATO still said Russia was no threat to them - "not as long as Ukraine stays independent". Other Baltic leaders echoed this view. Without Ukraine, Russia is perhaps a great power, sort of. United with Ukraine, Russia will once more be a superpower. Or so they think.


Leaders of other leading powers think so, too. US policy on Ukraine has been consistently supportive, no matter what. EU policy has been lined up in a similar effort. Both see a tottering giant and struggle to keep it from collapse. Keeping Ukraine afloat is as much about keeping Russia weak as about securing Ukraine's freedom.


If Ukrainians can sort out their troubles and disagreements, chances are they will be okay. But those troubles are not likely to disappear quickly; they have been on display for years and have much to do with the divided nature of their country's identity, but also much to do with a rather chaos-prone political culture. United they stood in the Orange Revolution of 2004, divided they were, nevertheless, soon thereafter when their leaders fell out. United they have been standing in Freedom Square, Maidan, for months until their oppressor fell. Can they stand up to the vacuum that follows?


Russia's possibilities are legion. Deposed president Yanukovich will seek their backing. With Ukraine without leadership, military or manipulative steps need not be drastic to tip the scales once more in the other direction. Watch Russia during the coming weeks! And watch the game between the great powers as well.

Catalonian Games

(This post is no longer relevant, since the Congress of Deputies in Madrid voted a resounding No to the Catalonian proposal on April 8, 2014. I leave it here nevertheless, for whatever interest the details of the proposal might have.)

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 explicitly declares the country is indivisible. That constitution was adopted in a referendum in which more than 80% voted yes, and Catalonians voted more than 90% yes. Times do change.

When I last wrote on Catalonia, its President Artur Mas had just declared that he would not do anything illegal in his quest for independence. Not long after that the Catalonian government made public its proposed questions for a referendum on independence, and announced that it would be held on the 9th of November 2014. The government in Madrid, however, made clear in no uncertain terms there would be no referendum. 

Then, in mid-January 2014, came the next rebellious step from Catalonia. The Parlament in Barcelona decided by a nearly two-thirds majority to ask the Spanish Congress for permission to hold a referendum. 

This request by the Catalonian Parlement has been widely interpreted as a plea to be allowed to vote on independence. But this is not what the proposal says. Anyone who reads the Spanish text will see that it is much more intricately worded than that. The request is framed within a constitutional provision (article 150.2) that enables delegation of extraordinary power to an autonomous community such as Catalonia to undertake exceptional measures for a limited time, in this case a referendum. In the proposal the word "independence" is not mentioned. The stated objective is to allow Catalonians to express their views in a consultative referendum on "the collective political future of Catalonia, taking as its point of departure terms to be agreed with the Government (of Spain)". 

Obviously, independence is not mentioned because it is prohibited by the Spanish Constitution. But then why ask permission for a referendum anyway? I can see a couple of reasons why. 

1. It is the civilized thing to do, what Europe would expect, and what Scotland already did in a similar situation. To refuse to allow a simple advisory expression of popular opinion will be very poorly received outside Spain, and the political battle over Catalonia's future has in large part become a contest over images in international media. Madrid would come out looking exceedingly bad if they refuse.

2. If the request is accepted - along with some kind of (miraculously) negotiated agreement - Catalonia and Madrid might actually come to terms in a way that saves face on both sides, provided the question to be voted upon does not refer to "independence". It is fairly certain that while a Catalonian vote could exceed 50% yes to something phrased akin to independence, it is unlikely to offer a political platform for secession. 

Regardless of all the rhetoric, secession even after a 60% yes vote would be a political non-starter, a project doomed to failure - with Catalonia left outside the EU and with Spain subsequently vetoing its application to become a member of the Union. In my judgment therefore, Artur Mas is already in a dead-end street. A referendum result of about 50% would let him bow out gracefully, and Catalonia could continue in its role as an intransigent region of Spain.

3. It is also possible that the request is simply a political trap, designed specifically to be rejected by Mr. Rajoy. Like practically everyone else, he may brush aside the objection that independence is not mentioned, because (as one can imagine him saying) "everyone knows what the Catalonians want, and this is how they have planned to wangle it out of us". So he and his party will deny the request with his absolute majority in the Congress of Deputies. From the perspective of the independence supporters in Barcelona, such an outcome would be just what they want, and to them politically, utterly insignificant. They would move ahead with their referendum in any case, and the whole thing would simply be a great publicity victory for Catalonia abroad.

But this last possibility will not change the political realities that come after a vote in favor of Catalonian independence. Either Mas gets off the bus at that point, and all will be reasonably well for the great majority of Catalonians - even those who saw their dream crushed. 

Or Artur Mas will charge ahead with an independent Catalonia into the great unknown, with or (if he is fortunate) without Spanish troops at his heels.