Russia and the Sphere of Influence - Back from its Shallow Grave

One of the axioms of the brave new world that emerged as the Berlin Wall fell was supposedly the end of power politics, at least among industrialized nations. No more of the old, tainted notion of spheres of influence. Instead there would be endless opportunities for cooperation. Win-win was the slogan of the 1990s. Well, one place where win-win was a hard sell was in Moscow. Win-lose was a well-established concept in that part of the world, and what need was there for anything to replace it?

So we discover, belatedly, that the Russians do not consider themselves bound by broadly agreed international rules and that they will certainly not abide by Western rules of conduct, whether in diplomacy or in military procedure short of war. Actually, the Kosovo War in 1999 had already demonstrated this, but by most observers it was set aside as exceptional. Now we see it is not. This split over basic rules of conduct is the procedural side of the Western conflict with Russia. It is evident in the lack of progress in the post-Crimean talks between Foreign Ministers Lavrov and Kerry.

Then there is the substantive side. Consider the Russian preference for spheres of influence.

In 1997, anticipating and seeking to preempt a Finnish and Swedish move to join NATO, Russia made an under-the-table proposal to make the Baltic Sea region into a "non-bloc zone", encapsulating even the three Baltic states. The states in the area were to promise they would abstain from joining alliances. A flurry of low-key "preventive" diplomacy followed, led by Finland and Sweden, to put the proposal aside. And fortunately, the world never heard of that non-bloc zone again.

Until now, that is. On March 17, the day after the tainted Crimean referendum, the Russian Federation set forth a proposal for the future of Ukraine, covering both its internal affairs and its foreign relations. On the latter, it was said, “'[Ukraine’s] sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral military-political status will be guaranteed by Russia, the EU and the US, supported by a UN Security Council resolution'. The document appeared to make clear that Russia’s main 'red line' was future Nato membership for Ukraine..." (Financial Times, March 17, 2014) We see the same underlying fear here, on the part of Russia, as that which triggered their invasion of Georgia in 2008. Any proposed guaranteed neutrality for Ukraine must be up to Ukrainians themselves to consider, not for others to discuss over their heads.

Am I not too hasty in saying the assumptions of post-cold war east west relations are no longer valid?

One way to examine that is to object to this degree of generalization, and point out that the circumstances preceding the Crimea annexation were special. Ukraine had descended into a chaos in the streets of Kiev and other cities, lasting for months, and barely ending when the Ukrainian president Yanukovich fled to Russia. That led the Russian speaking majority population of Crimea to call for a transfer of their region to Russia, to which Russia for historical and other reasons could not but respond positively. Moreover, the historical loss of former Russian-controlled territory here and elsewhere was an accident; the dissolution of the Soviet Union was “... the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century”, according to Mr. Putin, and so we should have understanding for their loss and support the return of what is rightfully theirs. By some accounts, not just old Soviet but also old Russian imperial territory. Such as Ukraine, of course, but also Moldova, Georgia, Finland and the Baltic states.

Not everyone is ready to believe that Putin's ambitions are this great. On the other hand, nor is everybody ready to accept the argument about the worthiness of Russian imperial restoration.

The other answer on East-West relations is that Russia will take, by stealth or by force, what they want and cannot get by diplomacy. This fits a recognizable pattern. Pristina Airport in 1999 was a perfect example of the Russian mode of operation. They did it for their friends, the Serbs, of course. They were crystal clear about who their friends were; others were treated like enemies, even in a negotiated partnership operation under UN auspices. The Georgian invasion in 2008 was another example.

NATO must now resume its prior, more vigilant attitude and its better prepared military posture towards Russia. Good that NATO has just selected as its new Secretary General Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, the former Prime Minister of Norway, this country being the only original NATO member with a direct border to Russia and a healthy sceptical attitude to that eastern neighbour ever since 1991. A revised military posture does not mean itching for a shooting war, but being better prepared in posturing and holding. There is a lot of chess in this, and the Russians love that game.

The Russian behavior pattern is to a considerable extent opportunistic. They are robbers by opportunity. If you have something you want to keep, you have to hold it securely, and with strength.

Given what we now know, I question the wisdom of the Ottowa Convention on land mines. Passive means of defense, adequately protected, are workable. Finland and the Baltic states would be in a much better position with land mines on their border with Russia.

Some would put all their trust in the Americans. Look how President Obama is being hounded for his pusillanimous stance over Ukraine. I doubt there was anything much he could have done, short of going to war. Posturing without readiness to fight is only dangerous. I'm afraid US backup of NATO allies via the article V guarantee is less firm than often believed. Let us not get to the point of testing it.

Finally, of course, there is the EU's dependency on Russian natural gas. The EU was warned so many times. (Check out the writings of Vladimir Socor.) But, apparently, they thought, how convenient to have it all from one source. My lament is merely, why are we Europeans endowed with such geopolitical brilliance at the Parliamentary level?

Am I alarmist on Russia? Of course. Just as I've been a couple of times before. In 1980 over Afghanistan. In 1992 over Soviet fragmentation. My Norwegian colleagues shook their heads. Some will again.

Ukraine and Crimea - Not Primarily an International Crisis

Somehow the future of Crimea has suddenly become an urgent issue we are expected to consider, as if it were the previously hidden heart of Ukraine's problems, as if the rights of Mr. Putin and the Russian nation have been offended by some major misdeed against Crimea's Russian-speaking population. As if Ukrainians are collectively guilty of Crimean atrocities, justifying a Russian intervention. No, neither Ukraine nor Crimea is primarily at the center of an international crisis.

The real problem is the long-lasting, and increasing, misgovernment and mismanagement of Ukraine, dating back two decades or more, but reaching a crescendo this winter. For a big industrialized country to sink so deep in economic woes, there is more than just a bit of ignorance and misfortune behind it all. A country in which the shadow economy is estimated at 50% or more of GDP, where a whole social layer of smart movers - mid-level and higher "managers" - are organized in networks that skim the profits of most sectors of the economy. A parliament filled with collaborators of those shadow-economy chieftains, and a government skimming the skimmers. The corruption networks have been known for years and are well described by the Economist in a recent issue.

 The only surprise is that large numbers of ordinary Ukrainians ultimately find the strength to protest outdoors for months on end - in wintertime, no less. Actually, their behavior fits the old J-curve hypothesis about revolutions, how people revolt when, after gradually experiencing improved conditions, they suddenly see their hopes quashed by some dramatic event. That fits the story of Ukraine's negotiations for EU association during most of 2013, only to call it off when the agreement was ready to be signed. And no wonder they were skeptical about the new government as well when Mr. Yanukovich later fled the country.

Basically, of course, Ukraine is dependent on economic relations both with Russia and with Europe. To Russia, Ukraine is probably more a strategic than an economic asset. To the EU, probably neither. Just a key relay station for Russian gas pipelines to the west, which the EU has - indolently and carelessly - allowed itself to become dependent on.

So, whether Crimea is right or wrong to suddenly demand secession from Ukraine, and a reunion with Russia, this is simply a red herring. Indeed, one can easily sympathize with a demand for a referendum from a population that has several times been shifted like a package between Russia and Ukraine, without anybody asking those involved what they thought about it. Except, why has this demand been raised just now, when the problems of Ukraine are acute, but have nothing to do with Crimea? This is sheer manipulation, and who the manipulator is, is obvious.

But Ukraine cannot escape its cohabitation with Russia. Managing its own internal affairs better is Ukraine's only solution. At this stage, losing Crimea - one way or the other - is likely to be the price they will have to pay for getting through it all. It will be their punishment for allowing themselves to continue after 2004 living in such political and economic disorder. The betrayal of the Orange Revolution says it all.

In international strategic terms, Ukraine's only significance is being the missing piece in Russia's games with its imaginary enemies. Of course, that makes it also of considerable interest to the West. But let no one fool you to feel sorry for Ukraine.