Why these killings?

This space is open to all muslims who are willing to explain why it is necessary to kill innocent, unarmed people. Of course, I do understand that from a muslim perspective those killed are not in fact innocent. They are infidels. And therefore they must die. The killers, on the other hand, are muslim heros. They must also die, apparently. 

Our children want to know why a religion that calls for so much killing is a good religion. 

If there are any muslims wishing to express regret for what happened in Paris on Nov 13, 2015, they can do it here. I welcome every single one. 

The Ultimate Test of European Liberal Immigration Policies

Various evidence indicates that 2/3 or more of all non-European migrants currently arriving are in search of a better life. That is nothing for them to be ashamed of, but also no reason to grant them asylum. On the other hand, our European challenge now is much greater than just bolstering the shaky asylum regime. It must be changed, reformed, and nobody dares.

A liberal border and asylum regime in the European Union worked as long as most people outside the EU were reasonably content with their condition. They stayed at home, and Europeans expected them to continue doing that. In return, European development aid was a way of paying off a perceived debt of guilt.

But now, that formula no longer works. When war and social turbulence rattle a whole region in Europe's southeastern vicinity, one should not be surprised to see civilians moving away from chaos. Syrians' closest neighbors outside of that chaos are Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. They have done more than could be expected of them. After years of shouldering the burden, their capacity to help was exhausted. There was only Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states left who had resources and space to aid refugees.

But these Arab Muslim brothers were brothers only in theory. In practice, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia has showed itself to be morally sick. High on sharia, low on humanity.

So turning to the West was the alternative left to the refugees from Syria, Iraq, Libya and beyond. Indeed, over the horizon Europe was beckoning, with generous governmental subsistence grants (see my blog of June 26) for those who gained asylum. The policy of northern EU countries offered a predictable monthly respite from poverty - but also from the need to work or learn the language of the host country. Information on the amount of the subsidies was easily available even outside Europe, and the flow of migration went "to the highest bidders", Sweden and Germany. 

It may be crass to say it like that, perhaps, but that is the pernicious outcome of a well-intentioned policy that was supposed to be more or less the same all across the EU. Member states - like Sweden - who felt able to offer a bit more than the sparse EU average subsidy - were of course free to do so. This competition among the generous few led to the ludicrous situation that asylum grantees in Sweden receive more than the average income of Swedish citizens, and are not required to pay taxes on this income. Why seek a job under such circumstances?

Other Nordic countries, like Denmark and Norway, have recently changed their policies in a more sensible direction.

Of course, in the waiting period for a decision on their status, asylum seekers in Sweden are not as well provided for as those whose applications have already been accepted. Asylum seekers' per diem keeps them acceptably supported, and their lodging is free. Yet, if  their asylum application is denied, and they are due to be deported, Swedish authorities have not until now implemented their deportation immediately. Instead they have even continued to pay the same per diem as before, even though the recipients are (by now) illegals. Desperate to stay, these illegals do what most in their situation would - they hide. Some are stressed to the point of turning to violence, as recent cases in Sweden show.

Out of a desire to appear kinder than most, Sweden has also exceeded the EU advisory norms on other counts. The EU has advisory policies on most aspects of the treatment of non-European migrants. One of them is the special care to be taken to help unaccompanied children - defined as youngsters up to the age of 18. Now how do you tell the age of a person who has no reliable ID, or none at all? Using medical criteria is the obvious solution, as is done by most Nordic countries, and others. Except Sweden, where influential voices claim that such testing is a "breach of personal integrity".

So Sweden is now well stocked with "children" of normal adult stature, sporting beards, using drugs and showing rough behavior not exactly typical of children. Tests by migration authorities on hundreds of asylum seekers, conducted both in Denmark and Norway, have shown that between 3/4 and 9/10 of the asylum seekers who claimed to be children, are medically speaking over 18. Sweden accepts them on their word. Their acceptance as children in Sweden is jeopardizing the existence of the real child migrants who are housed separately and given special care. As I see it, those who lie about their age are not the kind to be welcomed as new residents of Europe.

Other statistics on the masses of non-European arrivals in 2015 indicate that a large number of them are young men, under 35, who are in search of a better life. Realistically, these young men have had the choice of either going to war for one of the fighting sides in Syria (or whatever country they are from), or get out, in search of a peaceful existence. Many of them have families. Of course they would not be safe if they should go back. So who can blame them for "choosing peace", which is actually what they do, even as they run away from deportation? Their situation illustrates the unsuitability of the entire asylum and immigration regimes for the kind of situation where a country's whole civilian population is on the run because of the conduct of a murderous few.

The true situation now, in which very large numbers of migrants will predictably see their asylum application rejected, is "how to move them back out of Europe", how to find "safe countries" to move them to. The impatient say, kick them out, send them back where they came from.

Will that work? Hardly. Large numbers of them are likely to run away, go underground. We Europeans have contributed - by a misconceived, excessively unconstrained policy - to creating a situation that is unsustainable. The consequences will now be fully upon us. We need to recognize that from now on, Europe has a large new contingent of prospective future citizens in our midst, a minority that we cannot simply treat as criminals. 

The massive numbers of present migrants are far beyond the capacity of EU member states to offer meaningful welfare. A completely revised legal regime is required. The prohibition on returning deported persons to unsafe countries of origin is idealistic, but unsustainable. It must end. 

At the same time, immigration on normal (non-asylum) grounds must become much more open, much more available to people from non-European backgrounds. Immigration for work is the only solution. EU labor unions hold the key to resolving this conundrum. If they do not see their current blocking position for what it is, we are headed for a spate of ugly conflicts all across our continent. In fact, they have already begun.

Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet

Unexpected by most people, the award has a sound logic: Middle Eastern countries have shown, with the Arab Spring rebellions and their aftermath, that what Weber called a “sultanistic regime”, an unlimited despotism, is deeply entrenched in the region (see my blog "Arab Democracy" of April 14, 2011). Most outside observers agree that this must change, and many have argued that the failed Arab Spring movements prove that change can only come from above, under strictly controlled circumstances. Egypt under President Sisi is their model.

The Nobel Peace Prize for 2015, however, underlines the need for long-term stable change to come from below and to involve all segments of society, not just some who claim ascendancy over all others. The danger of civil war when this line of thinking is ignored is obviously most clearly illustrated by Syria.

The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet includes the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers (Ordre National des Avocats de Tunisie). The Norwegian Nobel Committee states its motivation in these words:

"The Quartet was formed in the summer of 2013 when the democratization process was in danger of collapsing as a result of political assassinations and widespread social unrest. It established an alternative, peaceful political process at a time when the country was on the brink of civil war. It was thus instrumental in enabling Tunisia, in the space of a few years, to establish a constitutional system of government guaranteeing fundamental rights for the entire population, irrespective of gender, political conviction or religious belief."

With this fortunate award, the Norwegian Nobel Committee - appointed by the Norwegian Parliament - comes out of the shadows of a period of bad press and public infighting. The Committee's former secretary for 25 years, Geir Lundestad, recently (Sept. 17) published a volume of scandal-tinged memoirs, in which he sharply criticized the former Committee chairman, ex-premier and current Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Torbjørn Jagland, for poor leadership and bad decisions.

While the 2009 award to President Obama certainly raised eyebrows in most quarters, and the EU award in 2012 also was questioned by many, the attention of Mr. Lundestad's book was focused more on personal relations within the Committee. The "open-hearted" ad-hominem style of its author - a respected diplomatic historian - led to an acrimonious media debate in which Mr. Lundestad had to face his former employers and former admirers head on. He found his book less than well received. The Nobel Committee accused him of breach of the Foundation's pledge of secrecy, and ultimately expelled him from his office in the Nobel Foundation's building.

After this debacle, a late summer soap opera, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has marked itself with the award for 2015 as a change of course for the better, well reasoned and fortunate in its underlying evaluations. The Committee has no new members since last year, only a change of Chair and Secretary. Some of the credit for this whiff of change undoubtedly belongs here. The new leadership of Ms. Kaci Kullmann Five (Cons.) as Chair and Dr. Olav Njølstad as Secretary indicate that the Committee is in good health and on course to tackle more of these difficult decisions in the future.

European Xenophobia

Migrant smugglers have produced another hideous record number of victims in their detestable trade this week, in Austria and Hungary and in the Mediterranean off the Libyan coast. Smuggling refugees for money and then knowingly setting them up to die reveals a degree of inhumanity rarely seen. These smugglers are not just Africans or Middle Easterners. They are apparently also Europeans - as in the case of the truckload of dead bodies found in Austria this week. Other ugly anti-immigrant incidents and racist political tendencies have reappeared in Europe with the recent resurgent wave of refugees from Syria and other Mid-East war zones. I myself have long been sceptical of an open-arms policy for non-European immigration, given the proven lack of capacity for housing and decent living conditions in the countries most eager to receive non-European migrants - such as Sweden. But refugees from active war zones must be taken care of.

Here is where European Union countries fail, by their unwillingness to coordinate their policies and acting like a union, instead of like a flock of scared rabbits. Xenophobia - hatred and fear of strangers - is what it is about.

How widespread is this phenomenon? While reliable information is hard to come by for such a fleeting notion as xenophobia, one possibility to learn more is to have a look at asylum decisions made by the EU member governments. Are they equally strict, the way it is supposed to be according to EU policy? Or do some countries have much higher rejection rates than others? In that case one would suspect a bias in asylum seekers' disfavor.

The Eurostat figures on asylum seekers in 2014 published earlier this year make it possible to check and compare the rates of rejection of asylum applications in different EU countries. These rates are not published by Eurostat, but have instead been computed by this writer on the basis of the Eurostat figures for the number of applications and the number of rejections in each country.

One should note that these statistics are only from one year and so cannot tell whether the rate shown is a happenstance or part of a longer trend for the country in question. Comparing rejection rates for different countries also assumes that similar groups of migrants show up at all borders of the union. This may not necessarily be so. We know for instance that Germany for several years has had a considerable number of applicants from the former Yugoslavia, countries which do not give grounds for asylum now that they are at peace. Such applicants have not shown up in similar numbers elsewhere, and their applications naturally have (had) to be rejected.

But have a look at the figures. They span from 100% rejections down to 6.

                      Non-EU Asylum Rejection Rates 2014*

                     Pct rejected Total decisions Total accepted

Liechtenstein           100%                     10              0

Hungary                     91%                 5445          510

Croatia                      89%                   235            25

Luxembourg              86%                   885          120

Greece                       85%                13305        1970

France                       78%               68500       14815

Iceland                       75%                   120           120

Portugal                     74%                   155             40

Latvia                         74%                     95             25

Poland                       73%                 2700           720

Austria**                   70%               16610         4920

Czech Rep                  63%                 1000            375

Estonia                       63%                     55             20

Ireland                        62%                 1060          400

UK                             61%                25870       10050

Belgium                      60%                20335         8045

Lithuania                    59%                    185             70

Germany                    58%                97275        40560

Spain                           56%                 3620          1585

Romania                     53%                 1585            740

Slovenia                     53%                     95              45

Finland                        46%                 2340          1270

Italy                             42%               35180        20580

Slovakia                      39%                    280          170

Norway                       36%                  7640          4905

Netherlands                 33%                18790        12550

Denmark                      32%                  8055        5480

Switzerland                  29%                21800        15410

Malta                            27%                  1735        1260

Cyprus                         24%                  1305            995

Sweden                         23%                39905        30650

Bulgaria                          6%                  7435          7000

EU total**                   55%               357425      160070

*Computed from Eurostat, First Instance Decisions on (Non-EU) asylum Applications 2014.

** Austrian figures are from 2013. Hence, Austria is excluded from EU total.

First of all, note that the EU average is 55% rejections, a high figure if we can assume most of the arrivals are there for a legitimate reason. Next, to find Liechtenstein at the top with 100% rejections could be mainly a reflection of its tiny size. Then, on the other hand, among the highest ten we find a clear predominance of East-Central European countries. More significantly, France, Luxembourg and Iceland figure among the high scorers. Surprising, perhaps, but also disconcerting in the case of France, which is currently trying, along with Germany, to take a leading role in this field and set an example for others.

In contrast, one notes Italy with as low a rejection rate as 42%, amazing given their position as a first-line recipient country. Now, we know there are hidden aspects to these figures. Italy quietly encourages migrants to move north without registering in Italy, which gives these migrants a degree of choice and alternatives to the overflowing conditions of Italy. When some of them arrive in France, they are first held up at the border with Italy, and next, once they are on the French side most of them make a beeline for Calais, instead of stopping elsewhere in France, hoping to make it across to Britain somehow. That they are just passing through seems to suit the French fine.

The largest numbers find their way to Germany, where the generosity is great, while social pressures are also great. The old East of Germany reacts much like their reluctant eastern neighbors: "We just made it into prosperity, and now they come to take it away from us again!" Hungary is a notable case, clearly reflected in their high rejection rate. The Baltic states still have large numbers of Russian non-citizens living within their borders as relics of the Soviet past; they also are reluctant to open their doors any more, but their populations are so small it hardly affects the larger picture whatever they do.

The Swedish case, at the low end of the scale, is impressive. On a per capita basis Sweden tops all others in the EU and the EEA. The sheer number of asylum seekers accepted in 2014 by Sweden (30 thousand) is more than the total number combined accepted by France (14 000) and Britain (10 000). Only Germany took in a higher number.

Ultimately there is no way to decide with absolute certainty from these figures what is the state of xenophobia in Europe. But it does offer a glimpse. What one might more precisely call this attitude is a reluctance to share with those less-well off, and especially to share too close to home. "Take my foreign aid, but don't come here and mess up my doorstep." - Indeed, with the latest wave of refugees from the Syria of Assad and his Russian supporters, we may have reached the end of long-distance development aid - money from the wealthy north-west going to the poor south. As a BBC analyst recently expressed it, perhaps we shall have to restart the development process at home in the future. Why should we expect people to live under the brutal and corrupt regimes of the Middle East and Africa when they do not even get access to the foreign aid their rulers so gracefully cash in on their behalf? They are ultimately coming north. Perhaps we must accept that as the cost of having lived with such great global economic disparities for so long.

Nevertheless, the unsustainability case still stands. There is a limit to the capacity of Western welfare states to take in ever increasing numbers of refugees, as also the Danish historian Bo Lidegaard recently argued. How can we continue to also give 5 relatives permission to come after for family reunions for each asylum application granted? The standard levels of benefits must necessarily go down, protected job markets must open up, old privileges in the recipient countries must go, and emergency housing must be organized on an industrial scale.

This is also why the EU must share the burdens of the refugee situation in a better way, or face serious decline, perhaps collapse. The Schengen area is already in question. Under such tumultuous conditions on the old European borders as those we have seen this August, a serious shift in policy must come about. The challenge is on a par with the EU's task of taking in the former Soviet-controlled countries from 2004, nothing less.

Why are Many Nordics so Sceptical of Asylum Seekers?

Nordic parties critical of immigration have had astounding successes at the polls recently. The Danish People's Party was the clear winner of the parliamentary elections on June 18, becoming the country's second largest party and nibbling at the bait of participating in a new coalition government before finally pulling out. In Finland the EU-sceptical Finns Party is in government since late May, with four ministers, among them the Foreign Minister. The Norwegian immigration-sceptical Progress Party has been in a government coalition with the Conservatives since 2013.


In Sweden, the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats had a "shocking" success last October (2014) - winning 13% in the parliamentary elections. Their success has caused havoc in the Swedish political landscape, with the other parties scrambling to avoid shaking hands or having any other contact with "the fascists" (as they have repeatedly been called by Prime Minister Stefan Löfvén). Though coming out of a neo-fascist past in the early 1990s, and having some rough elements in their ranks, the Sweden Democrats have since cleaned up their act and follow normal democratic procedures and policies. They have now consistently been polling 18% for several months.


Scepticism of national and EU immigration policies is clearly behind the success of these parties, sometimes labeled "center extremists" - rather than right-wingers - by political scientists who follow them closely. That is because they all emphasize the value of the welfare state, unlike other right wingers.


Nevertheless, reactions outside Scandinavia have been aghast, not least in the United States, but also in the UK. Such reactions are misplaced, in my view. First of all, EU standards for the treatment of asylum seekers are high and generous, and Nordic countries exceed their fulfillment in many casesr. The main reason many North Europeans are critical of the level of immigration is not xenophobia, but the contrast evident between the expense lavished on asylum seekers and the social turbulence they bring. Nordic citizens in increasing numbers take this as signs of ingratitude and a lack of will to adapt to the society receiving them. Nordic citizens also worry about their already overburdened welfare states, and the undermining of traditional values of their countries. Only Norway is exceptionally well off among the Nordics, the others are struggling economically. 

EU asylum policy requires member states to satisfy asylum seekers' basic needs: shelter, food, health care, education for children, even work permits (after a waiting period). These benefits go to applicants whose decisions have not yet been made. Waiting periods can extend to more than a year.


By comparison, according to Human Rights Watch, in the United States "... asylum seekers are ... ineligible to receive nearly any type of government benefit while awaiting a decision on their cases." HRW also claims that "The United States stands alone among developed countries in denying both employment and governmental assistance." (Human Rights Watch, "US: Catch-22 for Asylum Seekers Arbitrary Ban on Working Causes Extreme Hardship and Should be Lifted" Human Rights Watch, November 12, 2013,) The US Government confirms this.*


In Sweden, the minimum for a single asylum seeker living in free accommodation with food provided is 75 euros per month in cash for personal needs. If living on his own outside asylum shelters, he gets 230 euros. In Germany, France and the UK cash benefits are roughly 350 euros a month for individual adults living outside asylum shelters. But Sweden has more to offer for those willing to sign up for language courses and job market training. In such cases, a single mother with three children 12, 13 and 14 years old, seeking asylum and renting a flat, is entitled to nearly 2500 euros a month, a salary roughly like that of a nurse, only tax free!


The Nordic right wing populist parties are mostly recruiting middle of the road voters, not extremists coming out of hiding, as social democrats or others on the left tend to imagine. Many middle of the road voters are getting impatient with the cost, the criminality and the lax justice for asylum-seeking offenders. The example of unaccompanied refugee children in Sweden is typical: While the age limit all over Europe is 18 for this category of refugee (which is given preferential treatment), Sweden has decided not to test their age medically, in order not to offend their "personal integrity". Fraud is often discovered. Norway introduced such tests a few years ago, after first testing an "honors system" which soon proved a failure.


The challenge of the right wing populists to the mainstream parties in Scandinavia is simply, speak frankly, bring the truth out. Both Sweden's previous and present government have refused to discuss touchy issues in parliament, such as the cost of the immigration policy, the abuse of benefits and the rates of crime associated with asylum seekers. Moreover, Swedish cultural self-confidence is often surprisingly low. School principals in many districts with many immigrants have forbidden the use of the Swedish flag at the school and the singing of the national anthem.



The desire of the rebellious populist parties is not a country without immigrants, but (unrealistically) one with fewer immigrants, and especially one in which immigrants respect the local culture and show a will to adapt. In the Nordic countries imigrants will always have ample space for their own culture as well. 

The way for the mainstream parties (Social Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives etc) to stop the populist parties is to take over some of the most sensible "populist" demands and satisfy them. No preferential treatment of immigrants is perhaps a good way to start.  


* NOTE: The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
website, under the heading "Obtaining Asylum in the US" says: "Affirmative asylum applicants are rarely detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). You may live in the United States while your application is pending before USCIS.  If you are found ineligible, you can remain in the United States while your application is pending with the Immigration Judge.  Most asylum applicants are not authorized to work."

Main Cause of the South China Sea Dispute: China's Claim

The various conflicts between the claims of the littoral states of the South China Sea are, with one exception, easily solvable. The claims of Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia are made within the principles and parameters set by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). They can be easily resolved by mediation or arbitration. There is only one outlier in these debates, China. Where other states claim zones of ocean off their coasts, China claims the ocean in toto. (See also my blog on the South China Sea, June 30, 2011.)

No other state in recent history has made such preposterous claims, and even brazenly called them "rightful, justified" on account of "Chinese sovereignty". It is as if Japan were to have claimed all of the Eastern Japan Ocean, or Russia to have claimed the entire Black Sea or the whole Baltic, or for the UK to have claimed the North Sea. This unprecedented quality is also the reason why reading the documents put out by the Chinese Foreign Ministry in defense of its stance has very little interest in this case. The global community spent years debating this in the 1970s, and China like most other states ratified UNCLOS. Only UNCLOS just does not recognize such claims. 

China puts its own case down to the rights said to be due to it because of its sovereignty. But the reason all of China's neighbors claim their respective shares of the ocean according to UNCLOS is also their sovereignty. The only thing that differs is that China has a bigger territory and a vastly bigger population. China's coastline on the South China Sea is very small, especially compared to its claim.


No one has heard such curious claims in modern times. Yet most commentators are too polite to say so. It might have been possible to suffer this foolish posture if it were not for the fact that a huge share of international maritime trade passes through the area. For one littoral state to take control of it all would be an unacceptable grab. The danger is that China has shown its ambition to be just that kind of grab, and that it is prepared to use violence to defend its provocative claims. 

(On October 29, 2015, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague gave its first decision in the case raised by the Philippines against China. The court concluded that it was indeed competent to decide in this case, thus deciding in favor of the Philippines. The court now proceeds to the substantive part of the case.)

Long trajectories - bad news for Ukraine, the South China Sea, Migrants

Cases I write about often have long trajectories, that is, they unfold over long periods of time rather than being sudden eruptions of events, as you can see from my earlier posts. If you are an adult, news of "Middle East conflict" has hit you in the face for years and years. Well, there are other cases, maybe more worthy of attention. Here I offer three examples: migrants crossing the Mediterranean, the Chinese 'sea-grab' in the South China Sea, and the Ukrainian progression from bad politics to worse. 

Take the Ukrainian case.

Yesterday (dateline April 16) the BBC wrote about 'smash-and-grab' robberies from cars stuck in traffic in the Landy tunnel in Paris. This apparently lucrative business has been going on for several years. The most recent victim was from Taiwan, but what caught my eye was one of the other victims, Kristina Chernovetska, whose father was at the time mayor of Kiev. She was relieved of a handbag full of jewelry said to be worth €4 million. 
Now, I am sure this is not news to anyone who follows celebrities, but to me it is. More important, it says a lot about Ukraine, though BBC did not mention it. What in heaven's name is a Ukrainian nobody doing in Paris with millions of euros? What other European country might even conceivably be the home of a politician's daughter on the lam like that? To her compatriots she was evidently best known as the director of a charity retirement home. Elsewhere the adage is that charity begins at home, but Ukraine is strong proof the old wisdom needs amendment. Most signals say the new government is not on a new course. Judy Dempsey had strong words on the subject yesterday, @Judy_Dempsey, comparing how Poland and Ukraine started out roughly at the same level in 1991, now being galaxies apart in economic development, oligarch structure and corruption being the main reason. We all need to see that Ukraine is not the candidate for change and innovation that George Soros believes it to be. Before we do more to help Ukraine, Kiev needs to make the country help itself. The long run prospect of a country evidently so culturally bound to mismanagement can only be much worse before it gets better. You will be hearing bad news from Ukraine for years to come, and the war in the east will be over long before the rest begins a turn for the better.

South China Sea
Next case: China's role in the South China Sea is another long trajectory. Ever since 1947 China has claimed sovereignty over the ocean the Anglo-Saxons call the South China Sea, but only more recently has the claim been taken seriously, partly because China has backed it up with force. Though verbally committed to the UN Convention on the law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which China is a party, the policy of Beijing has long been to claim the entire South China Sea for itself, under Chinese sovereignty, with all its islands and resources. This type of claim over a maritime area far from one's own shores is unheard of in our time, whether within the legal realm or the political. It is as if the UK were to have claimed all of the North Sea, or even the Bay of Biscay, for itself. 

The geographic features of the South China Sea makes it all the more intriguing, with large areas being quite shallow and most islands mere reefs and sandbanks, often submerged at high tide. Oil and gas resources in the underground seem not too promising, but nobody knows for sure. And meanwhile more than half of all the goods shipped by sea globally passes through the South China Sea. This motivates even outside powers to concern about what happens in the area. China's claims have been disputed by the other littoral states, most vigorously by the Philippines, who have launched legal proceedings, and by Vietnam. Since the 1990s, frail buildings have been erected on some of the larger islands. Clashes and intentional collisions between fishing boats and coast guard vessels have long been the order of the day. And China refuses to respond to the International Court of Arbitration which is considering the complaint brought by the Philippines.

Instead, last year a new type of venture was launched by China: dredging up sand around smaller reefs to create artificial islands big enough for airstrips. The best known case is Mischief Reef -  appropriately named. Clearly China, as its Foreign Ministry declared last week, is convinced of its right to do what it is doing, and equally convinced that its actions in the South China Sea are fully supported by international law. Clearly also, none of China's neighbors is up to the task of physically resisting the regional superpower. This is clearly another puzzle that is most likely to become a bigger headache before it gets smaller.

Migrants
Finally, consider the case of the migrants, refugees from the worst civil wars in memory in Syria, Iraq, Libya and more. The horror of the disaster on April 19 with nearly 700 lives lost is heightened by the tragic fact that their boat capsized as they were about to be rescued. 

No longer a case for simple immigration control, the wave of desperate people waiting in Libya was said last week to approach one million. This is no longer a matter of how nice we at the receiving end want to be. Thousands of lives will probably be lost, the EU will be most gravely affected and no solution seems to be in sight, except at the national level in Spain, Italy and Greece. Stopping the boat refugees before they get out to sea for real in their dangerous vessels must be the way to go, as shown by Italy's operation Mare Nostrum last year. Still even that is not satisfactory, unless paired with more drastic efforts onshore. The difficulty, of course, is the lack of governmental authority in Libya. That makes it possible for the human trafficking racket to go on. 

This conundrum makes it necessary for the EU to move ashore in Libya, with or without the agreement of the powers that be, and take control of ports and related facilities, establish humanitarian centres and organize the transfer of immigrants to the EU according to the criteria in force. Military force may have to be used. The model is the idea suggested, perhaps half jokingly after 9/11 by Robert Cooper, to recolonize the "third world" or at least part of it. That would mean getting serious about the selection of migrants to take into Europe, and about others to reject, to send back to their country of origin if possible, and in the meantime to feed and house and protect from harm in refugee camps on African soil. This kind of authority-grab is the only solution possible unless we want to see endless waves of bodies floating ashore in Italy, Malta or Libya. Of course, such action would be illegal and not doable for a multiheaded, multiwilled monster like the EU.

Spain has chosen a policy of return of refugees by agreement with its neighboring countries in Africa. Somehow this works, but it only works because these countries have governments that still function. A rocky but basically good neighborly relationship with Morocco - often shaken by migrants storming the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla - has been especially important. But until the government of Libya has been effectively restored, the choice in the Eastern Mediterranean is chaos or humanitarian intervention, which is the only truthful name for the policy needed.

Greece vs Germany: The Curious Case of Unpaid War Debts

Greece finally has a point. Against Germany, no less.

As everyone knows, Greece has made a reputation for itself as being untruthful and evasive, inter alia by hiding its unfit condition for the euro back when that system was adopted, and subsequently by cooking its national budgetary statistics, triggering a Eurozone crisis in 2009. In consequence Greece has not exactly been favorably treated by international media. I joined that chorus (Feb 2nd, 2012). Greece is the black sheep of Europe.

Germany, by contrast, is Europe's star performer. It is also the country with the heaviest involvement in Greek debt, voicing the sternest appeals to Greece to live up to its commitments and stop fooling around. Germany has its public affairs in order; the Greek government's affairs are chaotic. The Greek Finance Ministry is barely able to even collect its taxes. In economic matters, Germany is credible, Greece not.

Therefore, when Greece started talking about German war reparations from World War II, most reactions around Europe were skeptical if not downright dismissive. It was seen as trying to talk about something else to get out of a pinch. I myself, having been quite harsh in my earlier critique of Greek behavior in the debt and bailout business, started out viewing these World War II stories with great suspicion. But I thought they might be worth checking out.

I reasoned the quickest way to get at the truth in this matter - given all the previous Greek lies and evasions - must be to listen to what the German government has to say. I was wrong, ending up on a wild goose chase.

The German government's line is surprisingly succinct: case closed; this is all up and done with, long ago - legally as well as politically. More specifically, the German argument is that reparations were paid in 1960, and the German reunification agreement in 1990 bars any subsequent resumption of the matter. Moreover, Greece has received a lot of bilateral assistance from Germany over the years, which in the Federal Government's view must be seen as relevant to the case. This view has been supported by prominent commentators on both sides of the Atlantic.

It turns out this defense does not hold up. First, there is a political dimension to the case. Commentators rejecting the Greek claims appear to be mostly of the center-right. The other view initially was held by people of the left. Most prominently, the former East German communists, the PDS, raised the Greek case in the Bundestag in 1995. More recently this political split is fading; the Greek argument is increasingly becoming accepted by people of the center and right as well.

The best give-away that something is wrong with the Federal Government's argument has come with German voices of critique. Leading German publications such as Die Welt (reprinted in Time Sept 20, 2011) and Der Spiegel (SpiegelOnline, March 15, 2015) have recently demonstrated that the German line does not stand up to closer examination. The Spiegel account is especially disturbing.

In broad terms, the Greeks have made three claims: 1) reparations for individual suffering (250 000 died during the war), 2) reparations for material damage, and 3) repayment of a forced loan of 476 million Reichsmark (an amount which in today's money adds up to 11 billion euros without interest).

It is true that in 1960 the two governments agreed on the payment of reparations for the suffering of individuals during World War II. Greece accepted in that agreement that no more claims for individual suffering would be made. But other claims, such as damage to Greece's infrastructure, or the forced loan, are not included. The BBC has a nice summary:

323 billion euros is owed by Greece to the Eurozone.

162 billion euros is claimed by Greece in reparations, including 108 billion euros for damaged infrastructure, and 54 billion euros for a forced wartime loan imposed by Nazi occupiers on Greece.

250 000 Greeks died during the German occupation.

(Source: BBC and Open Europe.)

What exactly has been done to settle these claims? First, they were registered in the process of establishing the post-World War II Inter-Allied Reparations Agency in 1946, which made an organized survey of all claims against Germany and her allies resulting from the war, and granted each claimant a share of the total reparations to be awarded. (Agreement in Paris, 14 January 1946)

The realization of the settlement, however, was postponed, due to American fears of another German economic and political collapse like that of the interwar years. Ultimately, another reparations agreement (the London agreement) was entered into by the same parties in 1953, essentially deciding to defer payment until the German question (i.e., reunification) was settled.

In 1960 Greece and Germany concluded an agreement of reparations to individual victims of the conduct of the Wehrmacht during the war, in the sum of 115 million DM, and with the proviso that no further claims for the suffering of individuals would be made.

In 1965, the Greek government sent Andreas Papandreou on a mission to the West German government in Bonn to raise the matter of the outstanding reparations and the forced loan. By Papandreou's own account, "I went to Bonn in 1965 and met Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to discuss, as I was instructed by the Cabinet of the Government of my father, George Papandreou, the issue of reparations and the return of the loan. Mr Erhard acknowledged that our claims were rightful, but he told me that he could not do anything until there is a peace agreement. He did not agree to exactly return to us the loan, but clearly recognized the right basis of our claim, the satisfaction of which was referred in the future tense, after signing a peace agreement." (Retold in the Greek publication Investor in 2010 and 2013.)

In 1990 German reunification was achieved with the so-called "2+4 agreement" between the two German states and the four occupying powers. One might have expected that Germany would now finally accept settlement with Greece. That did not happen.


A legal study put it this way: "The question of reparations, which had been postponed until the formal entering into force of a peace treaty with Germany, is not finally solved. A formal peace treaty could be seen in the 1990 Treaty of Moscow, the so-called 2+4 Treaty. However, this treaty did not regulate the question of reparations, at least not with regard to Greece. First of all, the question of reparations was not mentioned at all. Secondly, the 2+4 Treaty was only signed by the two German states and the four former Allied States, i.e. the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. According to the pacta tertiis rule laid down in Art. 34 VCLT [Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties], the signatories could not settle the question of reparations with binding force for third states." (p. 490*) In short, the way was open for Greece to raise its claims of reparations again.


Greece did not give up, and presented a formal diplomatic note in 1995 raising the matter of reparations and the loan once more. The German government again rejected the Greek approach. In a statement before the Bundestag in January 1996, responding to questions from the PDS party representatives, the Federal Government rejected all suggestions that Greece had a claim on reparations. Reparations to individuals had been made by the 1960 payment. Claims for infrastructure damage were covered partly by the silence of the 1990 reunification agreement on reparations, which therefore were moot, partly also by the considerable transfers to Greece of international assistance in programs of European cooperation in the postwar years. The veracity of the Ludwig Erhard statement in 1965 was denied. (See Bundestag documents.)

Afterward, the matter has been regarded as closed by the Federal Government of Germany.

One wonders: Why has not Greece been more insistent? A possible reason is that it would take considerable political courage to endanger what was otherwise a friendly relationship between two governments with a sensitive and serious case like this.

Another matter is, why have so few voiced questions regarding the German evasiveness in this matter? It is embarrassing for Germany, and for all of Germany's friends. That does not make Greece any more trustworthy in general economic affairs. But it does point a way to a more amicable resolution of the current Greek-German standoff.

In my view, reparations for individual suffering may, regrettably (and despite the law study cited), be regarded as settled with the 1960 agreement. The claim for damage to infrastructure needs to be considered in real terms. In any case, the forced loan will have to be repaid.

*) "Jus Cogens vs. State Immunity, Round Two: The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Kalogeropoulou et al. v. Greece and Germany Decision." By Kerstin Bartsch and Björn Elberling. German Law Journal 2003 vol 4 no 5 pp 477-491.

Gangsters in Government: When Sensible Opposition Becomes Dangerous

In October I reminded myself that despite the "gangsterous" ways of the current regime in Russia, there are still wiser voices there (see my blog, Oct 2014). Now another one of these voices - and a booming one - has been cut off, murdered, shot in the back.

Remember Boris Nemtsov.

Gangsters in government are on the rise. Unfortunately, gangsters scare easily. Questions scare them, contradiction is scary, opposition also. Untidy politics is dangerous. Gangster protection - "protection" - is effective. Or so they apparently think, Putin's numerous supporters.

Remember Anna Politovskaya. Remember ...

Too many more to remember. Too many never heard of.
Do not forget the few you can keep in mind.

Too many countries under the gangsters' sway. A brotherhood of gangsters - national and international - is growing by the day.

Too few righteous ones. Strangers to most of us, strangely courageous, strangely ordinary. Conveying images of a better public life.

Putin's Halloween Prank

(On this story, see also the June 1st feature in Politico,)

October 2014 saw a dramatic and much publicized submarine hunt in Swedish waters, just as a shaky new coalition was taking power in the Swedish Riksdag. Against the backdrop of continual Russian air provocations against most Nordic and Baltic countries, as well as the ongoing Ukrainian war, suspicions were quickly focused on Moscow. The search was terminated inconclusively. Unknown at the time, a second submarine hunt was secretly launched just the week after the first. 

The news about this broke only in January 2015, by Dagens Nyheter, a leading Swedish newspaper. Moreover, a few weeks later, on February 8, additional details became known that put the story in an even more intriguing light, as reported by Dagens Nyheter's security policy specialist Mikael Holmström.  Another "possible submarine" of unknown origin had been spotted entering Stockholm harbor.

Apparently it is now regarded as nearly certain, though unofficial, that four sightings of submarines in the Stockholm archipelago after the big hunt earlier in October were of the same submarine, making it possible to map its route over two days, October 31 and November 1st. The first sighting was in the outer approaches to Stockholm where the search had gone on the week before. The second and third of these sightings were made five hours after the first, at Vaxholm, much closer to Stockholm. Pictures were taken this day, October 31, showing the sub slowly cruising in surface position in the early evening sun, headed towards the city harbor only a few miles ahead, with a number of smaller local boats passing it at close range. The Swedish navy vessel that was urgently brought to the scene found nothing. The next day another sighting at Vaxholm reported a similar submarine in surface position leaving the area. According to Holmström, the Swedish Defence Forces have announced that they regard all four sightings as the same sub. It is part of the story that the waters of Stockholm harbour have only one channel of entry and exit for large vessels. In other words, Putin's submarine apparently spent the night of Halloween tucked away somewhere in Stockholm harbor. Some prank to pull. 

So what lesson to draw? A few may ask what's wrong with a peaceful visit by a neighbor country's submarine. Most, however, probably feel deep concern after more than a decade of sharp reductions in Swedish defense budgets.

As another commentator wrote, military courtesy and sovereignty (!) aside, here you have the parliament and government of Sweden literally sitting ducks for commando teams aboard an intruding vessel. Mr. Putin must have had a good laugh.

PS. The latest news in this story, as of April 13, 2015, is that the Swedish Navy now deny the picture shows a black submarine. They claim instead that it shows a smaller white fiberglass boat used by the Swedish Navy for maintenance purposes. The skipper of that boat in turn disputes this new story, pointing out that his boat is indeed in the picture but in a different location than the clearly visible submarine. Three other witnesses stick to their earlier reports. One of them is a retired navy officer.

Moldova: An Old Hot Potato in European Security

Moldovan elections have once more put the country on our mental maps - for a moment. The country deserves to stay there for a while longer. There is indeed reason to fear that Mr. Putin will now help put it higher on Europe's security agenda, as Judy Dempsey suggested today in the Moscow Times (December 4, 2014). In other words, as we shall see, the election results of November 30 reflect more than a passing cleavage between East and West.

The background is this. Part of Moldova has been a de-facto Russian exclave since 1991, when the Soviet Union died and the Post-Cold War Russian Federation was born. The Republic of Moldova arose along with it. In hindsight its modern history might look like a plan conceived by Mr. Putin, only he wasn't there at the time. A combination of chance and foresight allowed ex-soviet loyalists in Moldova, with open and clandestine support from Russia, to retain a military foothold there on the pretext of guarding a soviet-era munitions depot and armaments factory.

Already before Moldova's independence was fully established, the region along the east bank of the Dniester river declared its secession from Moldova and after a short and bloody war managed to solidify its claim. Transnistria has since been run by old soviet army veterans and emigré politicos in the rebel capital Tiraspol, although no other UN member has ever recognized them. To calm the simmering conflict, the OSCE authorized a peace-keeping force to be stationed in the breakaway republic. Somehow this mission ended up consisting only of Russian military personnel. Russia does not need to invade Moldova. It is already there.

Moldova's divided condition is a nearly perfect example of what a relentless campaign of politico-military meddling and influence-mongering by Russia can produce - and apparently is producing in many other places between the EU and Russia.*

But, to be fair, there is also a strong element of pro-Russian feeling even in the population on the western side. This can be seen in the simultaneous victory of a pro-Russian Socialist party (21%), and the likely majority coalition of three pro-EU parties (jointly 45%, yielding a slim majority in the parliament). The Communists (18%) are not unequivocally pro-Russian, but have for some years declared in favor of closer relations to the EU. The present outcome, divided as it is, is nevertheless not new, it is similar to most previous parliamentary elections in Moldova in which blocs have been hovering around a 50/50 split, with the Communist Party previously in a dominating role it has since lost. Presidential elections, indirect through the parliament, were effectively stalemated for nearly three years from 2009 by political infighting and procedural issues.

Two additional problems add to Moldova's woes: endemic corruption, and near-total dependence on gas from Russia. When gas prices are disputed with Russia, the supply is shut off - always in winter, of course. A combination of these two problems recently showed up when Moldova opened a new gas pipeline from Romania to add an alternative, non-Russian source of energy supply: There was no gas in the pipeline. Surprise!**

In formal terms the Republic of Moldova is an independent state, member of the United Nations, the OSCE and the WTO. Moldova signed an association agreement with the European Union in 2014. The question of candidacy for accession to the EU is not yet on the table, however, and Russia has issued a warning against such a move - in itself indicative of the kind of unashamed pressure the Kremlin applies to presumably independent countries.

Informally, Moldova's political status is therefore a bit ambiguous. The EU, on the other hand, has a considerable presence via bilateral agreements to provide assistance to the reconstruction of key sectors of Moldova's public administration.

Among the multifarious pieces and fragments of the old Soviet Union, Moldova fits a broader pattern: footholds, or toeholds, for Kremlin remote control or influence. Partly on legal grounds, partly on military grounds, partly based on popular affinities. Kaliningrad, annexed in 1944, was perhaps the first of this kind; the annexation of Crimea the most recent. Despite the formalities, Moldova was in reality never released from Russian ties since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Endless talks in various formats, involving at different times the EU, the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, have tried to untangle the security knot of the armaments depots and the political knot of the divided affections of the population. In the process Moldova's Chisinau government has entered numerous agreements with the breakaway government, many brokered by Russia and Ukraine. These agreements have subsequently tied its hands.***

Only the EU has the potential to drag the country out of Putin's clutches. After the elections the Commission issued a conditionally supportive statement on December 1, 2014 (excerpt):

"... A new impetus to key reforms will be crucial for the Republic of Moldova´s political association and economic integration with the EU. The EU will remain a reliable partner supporting the Republic of Moldova´s reform endeavours and working towards unleashing the full benefits of the Association Agreement in the interest of all its citizens, wherever they live."

It also said:

"The EU remains committed to work with the future government towards a comprehensive, peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for Transnistria. ..."

The issues are recognized, and the slow, patient route towards a solution agreed to by all is pointed out. In Moldova, the EU vs Russia is pedagogy competing with the power of money and weapons.

The big question for the EU is whether the 28 members really want to put the resources and serious effort into it that the problem requires. When it comes to spheres of influence, Putin is serious. In Brussels, spheres of influence are known only as ancient history.

*Judy Dempsey, "The Western Balkans are Becoming Russia's New Playground", November 24, 2014, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=57301&reloadFlag=1.

**"Empty Pipeline Shows Difficulty Of Breaking Moldova's Gazprom Addiction." By Liliana Barbarosie and Robert Coalson. RFE-RL September 29, 2014.

*** For more on this, see: "Executive Summary: Moldova’s Transnistrian Conflict." Prepared by Olav F. Knudsen, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) with assistance from Andris Spruds, Latvian Institute of International Affairs and Barbara Kunz, SIIA.

http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic-topics/Articles/friends-of-belarus/moldova_exec_summ.pdf

Decision on Catalonia - updated

Catalonia's informal consultation of the public's opinion November 9th about independence from Spain ended with a whimper. While the Catalonian government and friendly foreign press reported an impressive support for independence with 80% yes votes, voter turnout was rarely cited. It was in fact very low, 36 %. Nearly two thirds of the voters stayed home, in other words. No big step forward for the independence movement occurred, rather the opposite. And the chances of some kind of agreement with Madrid are now more remote than ever.

So, why could not reasonable political leaders, who disagree fundamentally, but still inhabit the same country and live under the same laws, sit down and talk like civilized people about the issues that divide them? Probably because the issues between Barcelona and Madrid, or between Spain and its autonomous community Catalonia, are not really substantial (see my blogs January 2014, September 2013, November 2012, October 2012). This is also obviously why so many voters declined to participate. 

Europe supposedly is the home of political reason. But secession, like amputation, is a painful matter. One way to handle such business was recently demonstrated by Russia, who seized Crimea from Ukraine after a sham referendum. No need to talk there. At the other extreme, in September 2014 Scotland and the United Kingdom showed the world how to go about this kind of affair in a civilized manner.

In Spain, as the Catalonian issue has surged during the last few years, the two sides have repeatedly urged negotiations. A few attempts have been made to start talking. Nevertheless, nothing has come out of it. Spain's Premier Rajoy has dragged his feet, bolstered no doubt by the clear letter of the Spanish constitution, the strong legalistic tradition of his country and the absolute majority his party (Partido Popular) enjoys in the national assembly. Catalonian president Artur Mas has been the vocal force behind the Catalonian campaign. He promised nevertheless after one of these sessions in Madrid that he would do nothing illegal. Yet his actions at home leave that in doubt.

Catalonia and Mas have continued to declare their intentions quite clearly, followed up with formal steps. In early 2013 the Catalonian parlament passed a resolution declaring sovereignty and independence for Catalonia. The Spanish government responded by calling for the Spanish Constitutional Court to decide on the declaration's constitutionality. The court responded by ordering the suspension of all efforts to prepare for implementation of the declaration (April 2013).

Still, Catalonia's government proceeded half a year later to pick a date for the referendum (to take place on November 9, 2014). The wording of the questions to be asked at the referendum was decided at the same time. In January (2014) Catalonian members of the Spanish national assembly in Madrid proposed to the Congress to permit a referendum to take place in Catalonia about future relations between Spain and Catalonia, a belated nod to the UK procedure. The proposal was rejected out of hand. Perhaps too hastily.

Scotland's forthcoming decision then kept all in suspense from March to September this year. The subsequent failure of the Scottish independence campaign triggered further immediate steps in Spain. Within days, the Catalonian parlament decided, in spite of the Constitutional Court's earlier decision, to go ahead with preparations for the November 9 referendum. President Mas signed a decree following up on the practical preparations. Madrid responded with dispatch, submitting the case once more to the Constitutional Court, and receiving its preliminary judgement a few days later: Catalonia's decisions were illegal.

President Artur Mas, the self-declared law-abider, was not deterred. True to his demagogic bent, he proceeded from formality to informality. If we are not allowed a formal referendum, then why not go for a spontaneous, informal one? Let the people come forth. We will provide rooms for the occasion. "Bring your own paper and pencil." That certainly cannot be illegal?

Madrid thought otherwise. After first appearing to brush this latest attempt aside as farce, the government on October 31 brought even this matter to the urgent attention of the Constitutional Court, arguing that the realities of the case were the same as before. On November 6, the Court decided to suspend even this alternative version of the referendum.

Secession is indeed difficult.

In legal terms this case is closed. In political terms it might have been possible to solve more smoothly with some give and take. Here, I believe, is where North European and Spanish political cultures diverge. In Spanish thinking "the law is the law". Further north the thinking is, there is always room for discussion. Madrid does not want to discuss with Barcelona as long as the law has the answer. This may be good law, but not excellent politics.

Moreover, there are others queuing up behind Catalonia, above all the Basque Country, which to me has a stronger case for independence, at least politically. Other autonomous regions may also aspire to the same. The central government is bound to deal with all of them if it cannot stop Catalonia now. This points to the larger issue.

Spain would benefit from a structural makeover to let its constituent 17 pieces fit better into the whole. This is a constitutional issue, left only half resolved by the democratic document of 1978. As an insolent outsider, I would suggest the Spanish Constitution must be revised to give the country a clearer federal structure. Several parties in Spain have already had this demand on their program for some time.

The issue is not only a Spanish or a British one. It affects the whole European region, partly with side effects, partly with the contagion of separatist sentiment. It is somewhat problematic in this context that the EU has assumed such great competence and is making such great resources available to regions within member countries, bypassing their national governments, at least in a political (though not juridical) sense.

So to Catalonia's demand, there is a counter-question: What if all the rest of the regions of Spain, of Britain, of France, and of Italy, ... (etc) were to make the same demand? Why should their demands not be met? Yes, why not, indeed? We are approaching the realm of child-rearing here, the problematic sort that raises all kinds of issues. "If the kid wants something, let him have it." Catalonia's case is not a forced union. The last time Catalonia had a referendum - some thirtyfive years ago - it was along with all of Spain, and Catalonia voted yes to the Spanish constitution with over 90%, the highest in Spain. They freely chose it, and they should be made to make the best of it.

Says this supporter of Baltic independence in the 1990s (they left a forced union), and supporter of Norwegian secession in 1905 (also from a forced union). I hate to think what kind of Europe would be the outcome of secession on demand.

Globalizing Tyrannies

Globalization is a system based on mutual trust, on granting and receiving mutual benefits, and refraining from violence. Its weakness is that trust can be breached and benefits enjoyed unilaterally without serious consequences, at least until someone else reacts. Low-level violence can be used to good advantage by those ready to bend or break the rules. Two powerful countries are now engaged in an unashamed exploitation abroad of the freedoms offered by globalization, while themselves denying others similar freedoms on their own territories.

The rise of authoritarian China and the recuperation of an aggressive Russia are prominent facts of the present world. The rise of China was widely anticipated, the Russian restoration less so, but both changes have been facilitated and vastly accelerated by globalization. Globalization has long been criticized by the political Center-Left. It is high time its drawbacks were recognized by the Center- Right as well.

One thing I learned from my early studies of international political economy (on international shipping, and foreign direct investment) was that most national governments at that time (post-WWII) were being used - or let themselves be used - as vehicles to promote particular interests, in competition with other economic interests within their own country, and competing with the interests championed by other national governments. The national interests of a country at that time were (to put it a bit crudely) whatever particular interests managed to hijack the government's support. And I am not talking primarily about the socialist countries of that period, or third world countries - rather, OECD countries, western industrialized countries. Of course, these governments did not primarily act in the markets as if they were companies themselves (although that also happened), but they struggled continuously to shape and reshape the rules of international markets in favor of their own chosen industries. The interests of the general public were not often mentioned. At the time I found this to be a shocking bit of evidence against the ruling norms of the "free world", supposedly the guardians of free markets and fair competition.

Having moved on from the naive views of my youth, I believe the world of global economic relations is very much the same interest-ridden complexity today, only the basic rules have changed, making it much more difficult (provided they play by the rules) for national governments to protect against foreign competition. With the lowering of national barriers and the rise of the electronic worldwide network, vast new fields of social, economic, religious and political activity have opened up. The actors have changed as well, with national governments less prominent, and international organizations and NGOs greatly expanded in functions and influence. Multinational (transnational) corporations have grown as expected since the 1970s, but have not achieved world dominance. Power is, to some extent, shared. There are multiple actors, multiple power centers, multiple possibilities. Globalization has in large part become the definition of the world scene.

Given my skeptical view of national governments as economic actors, I initially welcomed this great transition. Later I have, like others, come to doubt the wisdom of promoting such enormous change. The most obvious reason, launched by critics early on, was that globalization brings unmanageable side effects while reducing the possibility of putting on the brakes. Free movement, unfettered transnational transactions, is the main leverage for achieving globalized effects. It is also the cause of most of the trouble. It has allowed unprecedented agglomerations of money and power where there should be none - in vicious criminal networks, operating drug trafficking and human trafficking, in authoritarian regimes abusing the globalized freedoms for anti-democratic purposes, in the corruption undermining many apparently democratic governments. The undermining of governments around the world has also been facilitated by the untrammeled trade in small arms. Fanatical religion has spread and multiplied their support via global communication networks.

Ideally, the coexistence of different cultures and conflicting ideas should be at the core of globalization. A freely transacting world must come to terms with the continuing presence of widely diverse cultures. For this to happen, either one (western), secular culture must become universally accepted as a functional economic and political overlay to genuine, deep subcultures, or a truly tolerant multicultural civilization must come into being that can allow political and economic activities to proceed undisturbed. Until the failure of the "Arab spring" we could still believe in the beneficial potential of the unlimited spread of ideas - good ideas. It turned out we did not all agree on what were the good ideas. Multiculturalism became impossible when violence to "non-believers" was sanctioned by religious groups.

Of all these side effects, the undermining of liberal democracy and the unleashing of unabashed authoritarianism is nevertheless in my view the most serious.

In two highly readable, recent articles Michael Ignatieff points out the surprising and threatening breakthrough for authoritarianism around the world, and especially what he calls authoritarian capitalism, excelling in China and Russia, giving the lie to the old "truth" that democratic capitalism is the only workable system (see New York Review of Books, July 10 and September 25, 2014). The assertive power of these two dictatorships and the way their power is exercised - freely, brazenly - is also new, and scary. Secret illegal action is covered up with blatant lies. When violent crackdowns or other oppressive action have to be made in plain view, excuses are no longer made. Power is its own justification. And as Ignatieff also points out, it is corrupt power, a sophisticated system infused and maintained with money from secret, illicit sources.

Aggressive authoritarianism exploits globalization. This has been further facilitated by the widespread reduction of arms in the western world. The post-cold war era was the world of the "peace dividend", even in spite of the Yugoslav, Afghan and Iraqi wars. European military forces were significantly reduced. Since 1991 the response capacity of Russia's western neighbors to armed provocations has been built down to near zero, on the expectation that Russia would now be a friendly country with no reason to pick quarrels with its neighbors. It was thought a safe gamble at the time. Not today.

Recent aggressive action by Russia, and not merely in Ukraine, is quite serious. Russia is probing borders and repeatedly provoking incidents between its military aircraft and naval units and the legitimate civilian activities of other countries in their space or in international waters, from the Baltic and Barents Seas to the Bering Strait. Sweden presently finds itself in a bind over unexpected Russian submarine activity in the approaches to Stockholm. Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states have been challenged numerous times during the past year by Russian air force units.

In similar activities China has been harassing its neighbors to the south for decades in the waters of the South China Sea, which it ludicrously claims in its entirety, contrary to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (to which China is a party - see my blog on the South China Sea, June 30, 2011). The South China Sea, sectors of which are legitimately claimed by the littoral states, also is the main shipping route for trade between China, the Middle East and Europe. To keep that traffic lane free and open is obviously a vital Chinese interest, as it is a vital interest of the other littoral states and the international community at large. But having a vital interest does not allow China to arrogate the whole sea to itself.

In sum, playing at geopolitics has become simpler as borders have become porous and global transaction rules have been standardized. Given the unavoidable presence in the future of these and other similarly unscrupulous actors, a measured retreat from the current wide open version of globalization to something more reliant on nation-state actors would seem to be necessary. Ironically, in the internet world this is clearly something both China and Russia have long been seeking, in order better to control their own populations and keep foreigners out of their home space. Their provocations are bound to be temporary, but the broader effects are likely to be a less globalized world and a bigger role for closed, large markets (USA, China, EU, India). The present xenophobia of Russia will hopefully subside, but in the meantime we shall have to suffer the "gangsterous" types while waiting for wiser Russian voices to break through. They exist, I know.