Judgement Day for a Right-Wing Terrorist

Norway's notorious mass killer was sentenced in court today to the country's maximum penalty for murder, 21 years, with subsequent «forvaring» (literally, «custody»), a system not well known outside Norway, which entails his continued imprisonment after 21 years under the same conditions, with the possibility of a prison sentence lasting until his death. This, in other words, is not simply a 21-year sentence.

After the 21 years, the killer will be evaluated by the court for a possible 5-year extension of the punishment, and every 5 years thereafter the same evaluation will be repeated, potentially for the rest of his life. The criteria for release are the chances of recidivism and the danger to society of his/her release. Both were determined by the court today to be exceedingly high. These pronouncements will be the main criteria in evaluating his degree of «progress» after each 5-year period. As the Norwegian system is set up, these evaluations will begin already after his 10^th year in prison.

Although the Norwegian penal code has not even considered the possibility of anyone committing crimes like those at issue here, the custodial system (rarely used) recovers much of what the normal system misses – provided the court takes a strict rather than a lenient line in its follow-up decisions every 5 years.

In a country where the politically dominant center-left has previously tended to view criminals as victims of an unjust and vindictive society, this is not a sure thing. Still, one may hope the fact that the massacre was directed just at the Labour Party's youth organization may turn people in that political segment to a more realistic way of thinking, so that future generations of Norwegians can have a more balanced view of crime and punishment.  

What is on Trial in Oslo - the Actions of a Mass Murderer or His Ideology?

The ideology in question is that of right-wing extremism, a way of thinking usually typified by five characteristics: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democratic views and calls for a strong state.* In this case the perpetrator has shown in both written and verbal statements that his attitudes coincide with most of these criteria, and especially the aspects relating to what may be called «cultural racism», a strongly negative view of Islam seeing Muslims as «invaders» of Europe. The mass killer glorifies Norwegian and European historical traditions linked to Christianity. He claims to have defended these values by killing 77 people who were all somehow in his mind affiliated with the ruling political system in Norway, responsible for the country's openness to Muslim immigration. (Norway has 13% immigrant residents; the city of Oslo has 23%.)**

The case has triggered long debates both in Norway and in other countries, about right-wing extremism, political violence, freedom of expression, xenophobia, police surveillance, hand-gun control, bomb-making, etc. Media have focused to a great extent on the dangers of right-wing extremism. Still there is not much clarity about what is essential in the case, except the issue of the perpetrator's sanity and whether he can be held legally responsible for his actions. The court will decide on this in due time.

My question in all of this is: Could his actions make his particular attitudes (i.e., right-wing extremism) more dangerous – more attractive to other psychopaths like him - than previously thought? And are these attitudes more dangerous than other extremist views?

My view on both counts is, No. The European Left seems convinced that this mass murderer is only the tip of an iceberg of right-wing extremism. That's as faulty as thinking all terrorists are muslims. The danger lies in the demonstration of method and commitment to goal-oriented political mass-murder, a side-effect and possibly even a conscious purpose in which the killer has subsequently been greatly aided by the media. 


Extremist views of whatever nature, which advocate violence and attack democratic values, are all dangerous, and a democratic system has the right to defend itself against them with appropriate means. Extremist movements must all be countered and restrained, by democratic means if possible and by effective and continuous police action if necessary. There is no greater need to watch right-wing extremism than left-wing extremism or religious (including islamist) extremism or animal-rights extremism.

In other words, I disagree with the tendency in the debate about the Oslo/Utøya case to assign particular blame to right-wing extremism. I disagree especially with the tendency to see this as a simple extension of ordinary conservative and islam-critical views. Indeed,  I agree with the view recently put to me by a distinguished former colleague, that in contrast to what many people seem to think, conservatism (at least mainstream European conservatism) is not akin to and is not a more moderate form of right-wing extremism. Conservatism, especially in the tradition of Edmund Burke, is democratic, non-violent, anti-revolutionary and stands for cautious, incremental reform. Granted, there are other forms of conservatism that are authoritarian and reactionary, but they are rarely democratic. In any case, the proper focus of attention here is the violence, not the particular strain of thought.


In our time politically motivated violence increasingly overlaps with religious violence, to the extent that a distinction between the two is becoming meaningless. There is in my view nothing essential that separates this mass killer from the German and Italian left-wing terrorist killers of the 1970s and -80s or from the islamist mass killers (including suicide bombers) of today. It is not the particular type of extremism that is to blame, but the inhuman impulse to kill, and kill on a massive scale.


It is evidently the case that such an impulse to kill often has a theoretical or abstract motivation – political and/or religious – and this is why political surveillance of all kinds of extremism unfortunately is necessary. In my view, the attractiveness of the ideology is much less dangerous than the attractiveness of the methods, which all crackpots can use.

TO MAKE A COMMENT, please check the option "anonymous" before clicking "publish" - even if you sign by name, otherwise the system will not show your comment.

* See, e.g.: Cas Mudde, «Right-Wing Extremism Analyzed», European Journal of Political Research 1995, 27, 203-224.
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=cas_mudde

** Immigrants: Residents who are foreign-born plus their children born in Norway. Only about half of these immigrants are non-European, however. Source: SSB Statistics Norway.

Unsustainable Spanish Practices

(Note that by 2015 many of the generous social benefits described below have been removed by the conservative government of Mariano Rajoy.) 

Like those “blood-red”, conservative Americans, South Europeans hate to pay taxes. The only difference is, they don't talk about it. Unlike US conservatives, South Europeans have never raised their anti-tax convictions to the level of ideology. When it comes to VAT, they just don't pay. Other taxes are shunned if possible. That's why Greek, Italian and Spanish practices are undermining public finance and becoming a threat to US investors and other international financial market operators that “decide” whether the euro survives.


Beyond this paradox, however, there is a truth to be faced by the South Europeans. Their generous welfare states are built on sand. Spain, probably the best organized of the three, proves the point.

Who wouldn't like to have free medication for all chronic illnesses and heavily subsidized prices for practically all medicine? What insecure 20-year-old wouldn't jump for joy at the chance of having a free nose job or breast implant? Who wouldn't love to have Spanish job security, with up to 45 days of severance pay for each year worked? Who indeed, except employers – who in turn survive by ignoring the obligatory value-added tax (VAT) on their sales.

For that matter, who wouldn't like to be a government employee in a regional government like that of Valencia or Catalonia, where mid- to upper level employees have an official car at their free disposal - on or off duty, including vacations? Who would be afraid to be unemployed in a country where (provided you have had a steady job until then) you have two years of unemployment benefits to the tune of 500 euros per month for a single person and 1200-1400 euros for a family? Where you can turn down a job offer from the employment office and still retain your benefits? And where you, after receiving your unemployment benefit, could buzz off to your black-economy job around the corner without a chance of getting caught?

Surely, all of this cannot be true? But as far as I can tell, it is.* Of course, the unemployment benefit will only keep you minimally afloat; you will need some other assistance or income. And, naturally, it happens that the VAT is paid. In larger companies income tax and social benefit contributions are regularly withheld by employers. But in the Spanish medium-sized town near where I live, only the cafés and restaurants and bigger stores seem to pay VAT. Very few of the other shops and businesses give you a receipt unless you ask for it. Plumbers and electricians never even mention VAT unless you ask. Gardeners, who are still among the busy people in Spain, apparently never ask for VAT. To pay by bank transfer is unusual.

Today 4,5 million Spaniards are registered as unemployed, and a general strike is on to protest their plight. A study published by the Spanish savings banks' association FUNCAS last year estimated that the Spanish black (unofficial or “submerged”) economy provides jobs for 4 million people, and stands for 17% of the GDP. The study was conducted by economists at the Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, near Madrid. (Source: Typically Spanish, March 3, 2011.) 

Of course, this is unsustainable. In an article entitled “Don't forget my invoice!” (la Informacion, March 12), the Federation of Municipalities and Provinces of Valencia was quoted to the effect that “practically all” the municipalities of the region were asking for the bailout offered by Madrid to cover their unpaid bills, money owed to local businesses and self-employed people. A printed version of the same story said more starkly that without this aid, 80% of the municipalities in the Valencia region would go broke during 2012. Pharmacies are no longer able to furnish many brands of medication because their bills have not been paid by the regional government. The city of Valencia has not paid its own electricity or gas bills in years.

The general strike that started March 29 (2012) protested the labor reform of the conservative Partido Popular government of Mariano Rajoy. His measure is (inter alia) to draw down the severance pay from 45 to an average of 33 days per year worked. If you have worked 5 years for your employer you get 5 x 33 days' extra pay when you are laid off. The EU standard is nowhere near that high. A welfare state like Norway offers no more than one month's pay in a similar situation.

When workers are neither paid nor dismissed because there is no money for either – and they continue to work just to maintain their salary claim (BBC World, March 29, 2012) – things are not what they seem. Something is fundamentally wrong. A glance at similar tendencies in Italy and Greece tell me it will not be easily corrected.

Am I too pessimistic? A Sunday last summer my wife and I stopped for coffee in a little town in Valencia's Ebro Delta and were puzzled by the sight of a big official car from the city of Barcelona (clearly marked) – far away from home – that tried to park at the curb next to us. The car, loaded with beach gear and children, was clearly not there on official business. Bystanders were not slow to react. In a flash, jeering locals told the driver what they thought of his audacious presence and chased him away. Some sense of moral obligation evidently survives, in other words, at least when it comes to conspicuous over-consumption of “public” goods. Let's hope it grows to a broader vision encompassing more of Southern Europe.

*Until the Rajoy government started its reforms.

European Union: Foundations Shaking

For decades the EU has had a history of existing in near-constant crisis. This makes it difficult to properly assess each new crisis that comes along. Given the long succession of previous crises the EU has survived, it is easy to dismiss the seriousness of the next one.

The first – and supreme - danger to the EU at present is, of course, the euro failing. But part of what could make it fail is not usually recognized as a euro threat – that danger is the lack of political legitimacy at the European center. Part of the problem now is that EU leadership seems more to be a German affair than a joint affair. The ability to make decisions hangs on what Germany wants, more than on any collective will to decide. As I have noted before, German leadership (usually masked as German-French) is good for Europe – up to a point. But it is not acceptable for the European integration project in the longer term to be dependent on one member dragging the rest along.

Moreover, when determined leadership entails severe friction and even sentiments of public rage between countries, this is deplorable, but needs to be overcome. More important than the fact of the rage is the need for the target to be the collective decisionmaking center and not this or that other member country. As seen from the streets of Athens now the EU is a multiheaded monster, manipulated by Germany. The extremity of Greek opinion may be due to a mentality common in Greece (see my previous blog), but it may also be that other countries would produce similar manifestations of public discontent if they were put under similar pressure.

The lack of EU legitimacy is widespread and serious. The Slovak parliament at first refused to endorse the second Greek rescue package because their average income is lower than that of Greece. Who could fail to understand them? As seen from Copenhagen, the EU has long been a barely tolerable creature that has to be kept at arm's length with a stack of legal caveats to protect remaining Danish freedoms. The spirit of resistance, though more tempered, resembles the Greek. In Sweden the EU Commission's intervention in national wildlife policy has a considerable part of the population up in arms, literally, to resist what they see as improper decision-making over the heads of the Swedish government, stipulating the number of wolves and bears to be kept in freedom around their country. Hungary has collided head-on with both the EU and many member countries in deciding to change their constitution in an illiberal direction. We may not want a return to authoritarian ways, but there is also a limit to well-meaning intervention. (It should be added that the Commission has its allies in all of these member countries, so it is not entirely a one-sided affair.)

The examples could be multiplied. Indeed, as a Norwegian I cannot help noticing that most of these cases of conflict between member countries and Brussels coincide with the sentiments that twice led the Norwegians to reject membership in the EU. These cases reflect the most basic conflict involved in international integration, that between the national and the supranational. If you appreciate national values and customs (without therefore being an ugly nationalist), then this conflict can be painful, even enraging. At the same time, if European integration is to succeed (and the euro to be saved), national resistance must ultimately yield on many significant points, many more, even, than we can see on the agenda today.

Spain and Italy have ignored the obligations and pressures of the EU as much as they can. France has been shrugging them off for more than a generation (the Common Agricultural Policy, the Stability Pact for the Euro). This, to me, is a South European posture. Garner the advantages as long as you can, postpone the fulfillments as long as you can. Indeed, Greece is not alone here.

But ok, so I'm biased. I believe the Northern member states have done lots more to fulfill their obligations than the Southern ones have. I look to the Finns to find inspiration for those who resist repayment of their debts, even unfair ones, such as the Finnish war debts to the Soviet Union, repaid at express speed by the victim of aggression to the aggressor. Finnish Finance Commissioner Olli Rehn is a good man to have in Brussels.

Am I biased because these are «my» people? Not at all. I'm just an old square who thinks the EU without unison attention to joint obligations is a hopeless project. There is no opening here for a compromise. The laggards simply have to be brought up to speed. My new home country, Spain, has to be one of the first to make that turnaround. But sooner or later, it will be France's turn. I can't wait to see that struggle.

Greece and the Euro – Balkan Tribe meets Northern Barbarians

Understand the Greeks? Do we have to? I resist the impulse to seek an “explanation” that takes in the whole Greek nation, as if it were one person. And at this late stage, maybe I should just leave it alone after so many others have been heard on the subject. But then again, living in the euro zone it's hard to be indifferent to something very likely to affect your own future – affect it considerably. So my hesitation and resistance yield to curiosity.

First, like many visitors to Greece, I have always found their lifestyle and personal ways irresistibly charming, at least what they reveal to visitors. A Greek wants to be your friend, and he expects to be reciprocated. You will be won over. Millions of visitors to Greece will testify to the same thing. That is also why it is hard to be critical. However, in a serious situation like this one has a duty to give one's view as it is.

What is visible to us outsiders in Greece is public political life. From my profession I have learned there's a limit to what is worth observing there, compared to what is hidden behind the curtains. Still, judging from what little that is visible, and like most other observers, I find the behavior patterns of Greek politicians over time curious. Whether or not Greece ultimately defaults, I am utterly convinced that the Greek parliament and government have all along – for two years now - had the ability to quickly agree, accept the terms, implement them and thus resolve the crisis. That way Greeks could have gotten on with their lives, and left the rest of us to ours. In Greece it would have been a tougher life than before, no doubt, but not forever.

Compare Greece to Latvia, or Iceland, to offer just two examples of how it might have been. The Latvians have taken their medicine, several times, in fact, according to the dictation of the EU and the IMF, and now they are well on the way to recovery. Greek politicians, however, just haven't had the inclination.

The evident determination of the unions and large parts of the population to resist a solution dictated to them is perhaps admirable if seen in isolation. Yet the mentality seems to be that “we have done nothing wrong, and then these outsiders come in here and tell us what to do”.

Facts apart, this kind of closure to an us/them mode is interesting. Of course it is nothing extraordinary to a group under pressure, nothing specific to Greece. It still occurs to me, though, that there is an entirely different quality to it in Greece. I shall draw on a couple of points relevant to this tendency.

One is the Balkan thing. I always have to be reminded by my Greek friends when I come to Greece that they are a Balkan country; they are quite aware of this - and many are proud of it. But it does not fit our Western image of the country we regard (in a facile way) as the cradle of our European culture. To a Western mind the Balkan image does not bring up pleasant associations. Hence, we non-Greeks tend to suppress the knowledge that Greece is a Balkan country, and we expect them to behave according to our standards. But whatever they perceive themselves to be is what counts, it shapes their behavior. The rest of us need to adjust our own view to take that into account.

That identification of Greece as a Balkan country, and the established record of Greek negotiating behavior, bring to mind another Balkan negotiator, one who also had Western leaders in agony and rage over his style – Slobodan Milosevich. There was never a way he could be bound to finalize an agreement. He thought his procrastination was a way to win, but - as we all know and he learned too late - he misjudged his opponents. That tendency finally provoked NATO's attack on Serbia. It should not be forgotten that in the Kosovo War of 1999, the Greeks - though members of NATO - opted out of participating in NATO's military operations out of sympathy and solidarity with their Balkan brothers. Greek public opinion was massively against the war.

To say this is not to suggest that Greek politicians would condone the kind of violence previously long accepted by their Serb counterparts. But their style of negotiating is very similar. It reveals a basic attitude of defining an interlocutor – the person one negotiates with - as always an opponent to be beaten, combatting him and resisting him to the bitter end even over matters not vital, and by any means available, including mendacity if it saves Greek honor. Greek politicians demonstrate that to them negotiating is a game to win, not a way to settle differences. Many observers therefore argue that Greek political culture is not really of the West.

Most of us on the outside have tended to see Greece in this crisis as unified, of one ilk, with only its government (possibly) on the side of Western sanity. The Greek people see it the other way around, with only themselves representing sanity, their government caught in the middle, and the whole world outside ranged against them. Keep in mind, it was the Greeks who invented the word “barbarian”. Guess who's at the gates once more.

TO MAKE A COMMENT, please check the option "anonymous" before clicking "publish" - even if you sign by name, otherwise the system will not show your comment.

Spain's Rajoy: Asleep at the Helm?

Sorry to go on about Spain, but it is really a crucial country in the current set of European circumstances. In my last blog, I ended by saying - “... this can only work well if Rajoy comes out as a stronger visionary than he has appeared to be in the past.” Today, I'd say, even a visionary needs to share his vision.

With a comfortable absolute majority in the Congress after November's general elections, Spain's new Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy was in the best conceivable starting position to fix his country's economic troubles. As the weeks go by, however, one begins to wonder what he's making of it.

For one thing, he is literally nowhere to be seen. Though he is known to be somewhat reserved, by the third week of his governance people started talking about his absence. “Mariano who?” - “Has Rajoy been kidnapped?” His deputy fields all the media, and she's undeniably competent. On election night, she was the one who first appeared on TV to acknowledge the victory. At the formation of the government a month later, Rajoy showed up at the press conference to read out the list of ministers, then left without even answering the single question he had consented to hear. The remainder of the session was handled by Deputy Prime Minister Soraya Saenz de Santamaria. The deputy also runs the government's weekly press conferences. The Prime Minister himself waited three more weeks before he appeared and gave a speech at a party meeting in Malaga. Making himself scarce seems to be his tactic.

Still, the nation wants to see its elected leader once in awhile. Moreover, it's his duty to hold the government together. Leaving that task to a deputy is not good practice, even if the deputy's name sounds like a prayer. Now the ministers have started contradicting each other in public.

The background is that Rajoy decided to split the former Finance Ministry in two (Ministerio de la Economia, and Ministerio de la Hacienda) when he formed his government on December 21. Though a significant change, it was not a huge surprise, since this was the way it was the last time his party ruled the country (1996-2004). But today the change may have crucial implications. After all, the Ministry of Finance is the “Crown Jewel” of any serious-minded government anywhere seeking secure control of its own policy implementation. Under the current circumstances, Rajoy was expected above all to bring the country under tighter fiscal and financial control. The decision to split the ministry seems to be a step in the other direction. Rajoy's calculation may be that this way he makes it easier for himself to control economic policy from the top. If so, he may be wrong; at least he's liable to be wrong before he's right.

The reason I say this is that the two ministries are now competing publicly, both in the media and – more serious - apparently also in the execution of their functions. The misson of one, Economia under Minister Luis de Guindos, is to focus on the broader lines of policy and the internal and external financial relations of Spain. The other, Hacienda, under Minister Cristobal Montoro, focuses on the implementation of fiscal measures to control actual spending and collect taxes, including handling the relations with the autonomous regions in this regard.

Hence, one can discern the outline of two very different constituencies for these two ministries: the first speaks to the markets abroad and the other governments of the EU and the IMF, but also to the private banking sector at home. The second speaks to the autonomous regional governments of Spain and their underlying structures (provinces, municipalities) that deliver taxes to Hacienda in Madrid. Both ministries are to some extent dependent on their constituents. Spain needs credibility abroad for its public debt to be supportable, inter alia through the regularly repeated international auctions of government bonds (which on Jan 12 went unexpectedly well for Spain). The policies of Economia are primary in serving that end, and they need to look tough. De Guindo gave support to foreign anticipation when he told the Financial Times recently that strict budgetary controls were to be instituted whereby each autonomous regional budget had to be subject to prior authorization from Madrid.

A few days later his rival Montoro in Hacienda told a gathering of representatives from Spain's autonomous regions (in a speech given wide circulation) that they would receive “the full respect of the Partido Popular regarding their economical, political and financial autonomy”, and would be treated the way the EU (eurozone) treats its member states. Given the decentralized structure of the Spanish governmental system, controlling expenditures in the regions is more a matter of persuasion than dictation, and so Hacienda finds itself conducting diplomacy - rather than exercising power - among the regional governors. That notwithstanding, the system will not be without sanctions even under Montoro's Hacienda. If Montoro has his way, those who exceed the limits set by the center will be punished by fines, on the model of the EU system for member countries in the eurozone. (Does that model seem ominous?)

It seems to this writer that had the two units been under one hat as a Ministry of Finance, the diverging missions they now have could more easily have been synchronized without losing the rigorous control necessary for a healthy economy. In any case, the prior control model seems to require considerably more bureaucracy, not an easy thing to introduce under current conditions. In short, the budgetary horse has been out of the ministerial stable for years and is not about to come back soon.

At the moment Rajoy is said to be working on a new law to revise the present free-wheeling status of the autonomies in economic affairs. That might be why he's so invisible. In that case, we should all, in the name of eurozone stability, wish him good luck. And hope that he finds time for a break once in awhile to pop out his head and say hello to his countrymen. They'd love to hear what's keeping him so long.

TO MAKE A COMMENT, please check the option "anonymous" before clicking "publish" - even if you sign by name, otherwise the system will not show your comment. 

New Government of Spain: Right Priorities, Right Direction, Right Choices?

It's hard to tell. After the national parliamentary elections a month ago, won decisively by the conservative PP (Partido Popular), Spain's new government under Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy was sworn in this week (December 21). The uncertainties surrounding the Spanish economy have made it imperative for the new government to start its mission in a convincing manner. Some characteristic changes became visible from the start: 1. reduced government size, 2. concentration of functions in fewer hands. Rajoy's first signal a few days before revealing his new team was that there would be cuts in every governmental sector except for pensions.

Indeed, according to many commentators a concentration of official power is taking place which is unprecedented in the recent democratic period. First, economic policy is shifted towards the Prime Minister (“President of the Government” in Spain's official parlance). The cabinet's interministerial council for economic policy (Comisión Delegada de Asuntos Económicos) is normally chaired by the Minister of Finance. Rajoy has decided to chair it himself. Second, the Spanish intelligence service is normally part of the Ministry of Defence. Rajoy has decided to move it to the Presidency of the Government, the cabinet secretariat, under the direct oversight of his chief of cabinet, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria (40), who is also a ministerial appointment and Rajoy's deputy (Vice President of the Government).

Finally, adding to the above is the fact that this is not a government of independent-minded technocrats (unlike the new governments of Italy and Greece). The new Ministers are highly competent and experienced, but they are PP loyalists. They are Rajoy's close collaborators from many years before. The facts seem to bode for a tight-knit, centrally steered operation, with one possible exception: The all-important Ministry of Finance.

The Ministry of Finance has now been split in two, an “externally oriented” Ministry of the Economy and Competitiveness, with Luís de Guindos as the new minister, and an “internally oriented” Ministry of Finance and Public Administration – where the new appointee is Cristobal Montoro. In its long history the Spanish ministry of finance has several times and for considerable periods actually been two units, most recently with the José Maria Aznar government of 1996-2004, so the split may be in line both with historical precedent and with a preference of the Partido Popular. But why? And are two heads better than one?

My speculation is only that, but I believe Rajoy has made the best of a difficult situation where the judgement of the markets and the international community were primary: he had one fully capable man (Montoro) who could well have filled the job alone, but had inadequate foreign language skills, and a somewhat academic profile. Then he had another (de Guindos) who had the requisite skills for (at least) part of the job, an image of investment banking experience (Lehman Brothers in Iberia, no less!) and the language abilities to go with it. So the ministry was divided to fit the needs of the situation and the capabilities of the two men, while Rajoy in doing so also ensured that he would put himself in a stronger leadership position, which was further underlined by his taking the reins of the economic policy council into his own hands.

The question then is: Can the cabinet center manage it all? There is no doubt about Rajoy's motivation, nor about the clarity of his goals. He intends to drag his country out of this crisis no matter what. However, what we know of the new Prime Minister so far is that he is not given to Reaganesque free reins and lofty thinking. His performance in parliamentary debates of the past four years – as well as in the previous election debate with Zapatero of 2008 – shows a man who is polemic and does not hesitate to dive into detail. My suspicion is that here we may have a man of pedantic leadership, a nitpicking micromanager.

Possibly to compensate for this tendency, the Vice-President of the Government has been charged with the top managerial position. She certainly has both formal competence and experience, and she has worked for ten years with Rajoy. But with all these diverse responsibilities thrust upon her, one may well ask: Is Soraya up to it? As I see it, this can only work well if Rajoy comes out as a stronger visionary than he has appeared to be in the past.

TO MAKE A COMMENT, please check the option "anonymous" before clicking "publish" - even if you sign by name, otherwise the system will not show your comment.

Germany and France: Mainstays or Loose Cannons?

The infamous role of the dominant twins of Europe has been much in the news recently. In jest, someone named the monster “Merkozy” to signify the leaders of Germany and France grasping jointly at the dominance of Europe.

I am not so sure this gets at the reality of their relationship, nor at their role in the wider European Union. In my view, one needs a different angle. I shall look into the nature of their role in Europe by using the naval metaphors of the headline: Are Germany and France the main supports of the good ship Europe - without whom all is in risk of failing, or are they two dangerous heavyweight power players only looking out for their own good, to the point of wrecking anything that comes in their way? (No, I'm not going to end up somewhere in the middle, so you can keep reading.)

Have a look in the rear view mirror. In early 1990 Germany was not yet united, but just about to. It was clear to everyone that merging the two Germanies would produce a new magnum power, a fear-inspiring European giant. France and Britain evidently tried to block the move, but were too late. Soon, at Germany's request, its four occupying powers (Britain, France, the US and the USSR) started unification talks with German representatives in Berlin. At the talks, the Soviet Union was pushing for united Germany to be neutral and demilitarized, while the US Bush-I Administration pulled in the other direction, to have all of Germany, the East included, as part of NATO. For their new-found harmony to endure, the two Cold War opponents had to agree. While the talks were going on I visited Moscow in March as junior company to Johan Jørgen Holst, former Minister of Defence and later Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway and at that time my boss. Lithuania had just declared its independence and everything in the USSR was floating around and hanging loose. Holst had a time-out from official duty and used the time to check up on (inter alia) the situation in the USSR. In all our meetings with Soviet officials and analysts Holst pushed his theme that a neutral united Germany would be the worst thinkable solution - “a loose cannon on the decks of Europe” as he put it, the strongest power in Europe with no compelling structures to tie it down. Mr. Holst was already well known and respected in Moscow. His line was that only NATO and the European Communities could keep a united Germany in check. By July 1990 the Soviet leadership finally came around to that way of looking at it. Mr. Gorbachev gave his assent to united Germany's membership in NATO.

Loose cannon aside, was the 1990 image of a dominant new Germany a realistic danger? Moscow, for sure, has later regretted allowing the NATO move, which has shifted Germany further out of reach of Russia's influence. The rest of Europe has probably benefitted. In retrospect it is indeed an open question whether it was necessary to tie united Germany down, because the task of absorbing East German lands into the existing structures of federal Western Germany took an unprecedented toll on the Federal Republic's resources, dragging its economy into the doldrums for more than a decade. Moreover, now that the German economy is back in high gear, it is reassuring to know that the attitude of most Germans towards Europe was and is (in my personal estimation) an ideal mix of caution, standard-setting stringency and optimism.

France saw its role in post-World War II Europe from the earliest time as building a strong European house to contain (West) Germany so that German militarism would never more be a threat. France was the architect and the master builder of the European institutions we have since come to know so well. Hand-in-hand with integration came the development of the special Franco-German relationship, which to the French always was about gently guiding the Germans along the path to peace and democracy. The Germans, from Adenauer on, played along wisely and always prioritized the Franco-German relationship, never letting on that they might be able to find their way alone. This fiction legitimized West Germany's place as free Europe's solid but boring number 2, always a step behind the shining example of its western neighbor. To Germany the cost was not excessive - partly a matter of foregone prestige, but mainly a patient indulgence of being left to pay the lion's share of the cost of France's excessive benefits from European integration. The Common Agricultural Policy was (and is) waste hole number one, and Germany the biggest contributor. Hence, as long as Germany was divided the French (and European collective) mission of containing Germany remained a credible one.

But that figleaf suddenly disappeared with German unification, which is also why the French instinctively opposed the project when it emerged after the fall of the Wall. When that failed, they grasped at the nearest straw, the notion of stepping up the European ambition to the federalist level with the 1991 Maastricht Treaty creating the European Union, thus ensuring Germany's continued entanglement in European institutions. Since this was most Germans' wish anyway, there was no conflict here.

The slow progress and immense cost of Germany's unification on the ground during the 1990s made the reality of the coming tilt in German favor harder to see. Hence, France continued to act as if the new world of the European Union and united Germany was pretty much the same as the one before 1989. Moreover, most of the attention of the EU was focused on the process of dealing with the new applicant states in East Central Europe. The first opportunity to test the new Franco-German relationship came in 2000 when votes were to be weighted in the new expanded union (Nice Treaty) according to population. The sudden addition of 11 million East Germans to Germany's count made the former equals at one go unequal. Germany with 82 million inhabitants was 25 million ahead of Britain and France and demanded a corresponding voting weight. France refused to budge and won, helped by the reluctance of Chancellor Schroeder to challenge President Chirac. All the four biggest countries (Italy as well) were weighted equally at the top. At the same crucial summit a long prepared and much-needed drawdown of the agricultural policy was postponed for 10 years, again due to French resistance.

Actually, France was soon (from 2002) also in trouble with the euro by exceeding the debt limit, but nobody dared to raise the issue. The euro had just been introduced at this time and several countries, France at the head, but Germany too, were soon above the limit. German embarrassment over exceeding its own external debt limit probably discouraged Schroeder from raising the problem. So France's sins were forgotten along with the rest. Dealing with the problem was postponed, and it grew bigger - and bigger - and is haunting us, with a vengeance, today.

At the same time, the willingness of Germany and the rest to indulge French excesses is probably the secret of what keeps France in line.

What has changed after Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy entered the scene? Have they twinned their control of Europe and set themselves up as the mainstays of the good ship? If you take a closer look at what has been happening during the euro crisis, you will see that with Merkel at the helm Germany does not let France make major statements alone, thus gaining a closer grip on French policy positions. Berlin strives all the time to ensure that the two agree (not always succeeding). Most of the time Germany has been pushing for tougher financial controls than France wants.

Indeed, looking at the French record in public finance since the euro was introduced, and its stance in agricultural policy matters, I for one suspect that leaving France unfettered would certainly be to have a loose cannon on the decks of Europe. With Britain now effectively defining itself out of Europe, Germany alone is the indispensable controlling agent, keeping France in line and mobilizing French support for the badly needed leadership of the euro zone.

Therefore, to talk about dominance begs the question of what Europe's and the euro-zone problem is: a long-term lack of responsible leadership and fiscal discipline.

TO MAKE A COMMENT, please check the option "anonymous" before clicking "publish" - even if you sign by name, otherwise the system will not show your comment.

Spain: Pulling Back from the Brink?

On Sunday November 20, Spain elected a new conservative government. Garnering 44% of the vote, the Partido Popular was lavished by the d'Hondt electoral system with a comfortable absolute majority in the Congress of Deputies as well as the Senate. The participation of 72% of the voters must be said to be satisfactory under the dire economic circumstances. People knew a government of PP will take away even more of their treasured welfare state benefits – and even so, they voted for Mariano Rajoy.

According to the Constitution, the new government will not take office until four weeks after the elections, which is to say shortly before Christmas. The new Prime Minister, a somewhat reserved and taciturn man, is not an economist and - though several times a Minister - is untested in the top governmental position. It may have been typical of his cautious style that the several press apearances made on the day after the elections were handled by the secretary general of his party, not by himself.

According to observers, Rajoy's inability to speak English will not help him much in the coming fight to protect Spanish interests in the EU. That demanding leadership will have to be assumed by a strong Minister of Finance. One leading candidate for the post at this point may be the former Minister of Finance and former head of the IMF (2004-2007), Rodrigo Rato. Currently director of one of the struggling banks of Spain, Mr. Rato had a meeting with Rajoy the day after the election. Another candidate is Cristobal Montoro, also a former Minister of Finance and most recently economic spokesperson for his party. While the former obviously has the required language skills, media speculation is divided regarding the English ability of the latter. Other candidates are also rumored, but Rajoy evidently is determined to keep his selection process confidential.

The two “enemies” identified by Rajoy during his campaign were Spain's huge unemployment (22%) and the national debt problem. He is certainly right in pointing them out, but alleviating them is not going to be merely a matter of policy change. These problems are structural, embedded in the system of labor legislation and the de-facto federal system of government.*) Flexibility in the labor market is the key issue where employment is concerned. To get employers to hire, they must also be able to fire, and that is very difficult according to the law dating from the 1980s. The labor law was modified last year to make it less expensive for employers to fire employees, but it will still cost an employer prohibitive amounts in severance pay to adjust his firm to the much inferior market conditions of these crisis years. This is not obvious from a first reading of the rules. As pointed out in a recent IMF report,

“While Spain scores well on the length of notice periods and on procedures, it has among the highest severance payments and a very restrictive interpretation of fair dismissals ... . Severance payments typically depend on whether the dismissal is considered fair or unfair. But in Spain, due to the very restrictive interpretation of fair dismissals, about 90 percent of lay-offs of permanent workers are treated as unfair ... . In 70 percent of the cases, firms prefer to pay the higher severance payments upfront rather than going through a trial. The relevant severance payment is thus the one that applies to unfair dismissals. Severance payments are 20 days per year of service in case of fair dismissals and vary between 33 and 45 days per year of service for unfair dismissals ... . This is much higher than EU15 average severance payments ...” (IMF Working Paper. “The Spanish Labor Market in a Cross-Country Perspective.” Prepared by Florence Jaumotte. European Department. Authorized for distribution by James Daniel. January 2011, p 10.)

Excepting those who are apprentices or short term contract employees, people who are normally employed in Spain have a contract of indefinite duration, dismissible only with severance pay as described above. Draconian measures will be required to change this – but Rajoy now has at least the votes in parliament required to make the change, provided he can also rise above the storm of protest that is likely to follow.

Rajoy's second enemy was said to be the debt problem, but it is really the quasi-federal structure of Spain which is the most serious impediment to handling it. While public borrowing at the national level seems to be well under control, the autonomous regions that make up the country each have considerable freedom to make their own decisions about financing. Under the autonomies there are the provinces which also have the right to assume debt according to certain guidelines. That goes as well for the municipalities, which are not allowed to get indebted beyond 75% of the current year's budget. Checks on delinquent cases are apparently non-existent, or limited to notification by the Ministry of Finance that they have to put their house in order (to the extent they find out at all what is going on.) The upshot is that the level of public indebtedness in Spain appears to be a phenomenon beyond the knowledge, supervision or control of anybody. If Rajoy can change this he will have to take on the constitutional system that authorizes the budgetary freedom of the autonomous regions, most recently accepted by his predecessor Zapatero in the case of Catalunya in 2007. A long shot, but Spanish posterity should thank him if he succeeds.

In the interim, there are easier targets which could produce substantial improvements: public over-employment and excessive public spending. Consider the local public health system. Spain has a very generous policy of both free and subsidized medication – an obvious target in itself for cuts. But there is more here: only doctors employed in the local public health centers have the right to authorize prescriptions for this free medication. Private practitioners are perfectly legitimate, except they cannot authorize prescriptions for free medication. So if I need more expensive medication and want it free, I have to take my private doctor's prescription to the public health center and get it approved there, before going to the pharmacy. Two doctors doing the work of one. Then again, it turns out that the publicly employed doctor leaves his office at the public health center at 1 PM, because he or she has to attend to his/her private practice. A gold mine for these MDs - double salary every day. 

Rajoy clearly has a job to do.

*) According to the 1978 Constitution Spain is a unitary state (article 1). The powers granted to the main territorial subdivisions (the Autonomous Communities) are, however, substantial and roughly comparable to those of federations like Germany or Canada.

Hierarchy, Unity and Democracy

The welcome death of Gaddafi last week – and the unchecked, frantic killings by Bashir al-Assad - may bring us once more to reflect on the difference between dictatorship and democracy. Politics is said to be all about power. Democracy harnesses power; dictatorship monopolizes it. Gaddafi's death just as Tunisians went to the urns this weekend illustrate the span. Monopolize power or share it.

Yet the meaning of power remains elusive. Power is what it takes to deal with widespread conflict, public disagreement that is not easily otherwise resolved by compromise. The French say “trancher”, literally “slice through” a problem, as with a butcher's knife or an axe (Norwegians say the same, “skjære igjennom”) where compromise is unavailable. All societies have to find methods to handle public disagreement. In one way or another, all thinkable solutions involve what may be called the principles of (a) hierarchy and (b) unity. The principle of hierarchy says the top leader decides. The principle of unity says only one hierarchy is allowed; the domain in which decisionmaking applies must be preserved.

Complete hierarchy places all members of society in a rank order of levels where decisions for each level is made by the levels above, and one individual or small group at the top is the ultimate decisionmaker. China today is one example, Iran another, Burma a third. Within given functional areas sub-hierarchies may exist, like Chinese state-owned companies often posing as commercial ventures.

Nevertheless, hierarchies may be more or less complete or stringent. Dictatorships strive for complete hierarchy. But even democracies are hierarchies! All societies have to decide public disagreements; there is not room for everyone to participate in the making of every decision. Perfect democracy is a chimera. Democracies are always to some extent hierarchical, in that they define which representative assemblies and other publicly controlled bodies shall make which kinds of decisions, and prevent unauthorized decisions. Hence, although democracies strive for minimal hierarchy, they are not anarchical; they insist on the need for government to be given a mandate to make decisions for all. Implied here is also the legitimacy principle, the requirement that all must accept the decisions made, even if they disagree.

Here is where Greece makes a mockery of their own ancient invention – they elect a parliament and then take to the streets for months on end to oppose the parliament's decisions. And the Greek parliamentarians respond by similar betrayals, by increasing their own salaries while cutting everyone else's, and (most recently) by voting themselves new state-funded cars (!) after deciding on increased austerity for the citizens.  (http://www.grreporter.info/en/greek_parliamentarians_privileges/5216 )

Here is where the opening for grey areas and sham democracy appears – like Iran's and Russia's circumscribed democratic systems, or even Gaddafi's “green socialism” run by “people's committees” without any decisionmaking authority.

Here is also where the unity principle enters: The legitimate right to make decisions for a society includes a prohibition against mass escape. If you disagree, you cannot just take part of the country with you and leave, setting up shop for yourself. This was Lincoln's defense against the Southern secession 150 years ago. Provided you or your ancestors have agreed to a voluntary federation, you cannot just leave. (If you were forcibly annexed, like the Baltics in 1940, it's a different matter.)

The ingeniously simple formulation by Albert O. Hirschmann (1970) comes to mind: Exit, Voice or Loyalty. In every economic or political project, party, association, company - even nations - disaffected members (customers, affiliates, citizens) have three choices – they can leave (exit), they can complain (voice), or they can shut up, stay put and be loyal. National governments, of course, insist on unity along with hierarchy. That is why governments of hierarchically run countries with centrifugal forces (e.g. China or Russia) refuse to let the UN Security Council endorse humanitarian intervention in places like Syria (though they stepped aside by abstention to allow the Libyan intervention, a decision in hindsight not likely to be repeated any time soon).

That is also why the new governing systems about to be established in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya should consider that absolute principles of government – like those deriving from literal readings of Islam – must be tempered by the need to minimize hierarchy and find solutions in maximum tolerance. The easiest solution is to revert to hierarchy, or by another name, dictatorship.

TO MAKE A COMMENT, please check the option "anonymous" before clicking "publish" - even if you sign by name, otherwise the system will not show your comment.

Knee-jerk Conservatism in US and Europe

A socialist friend (on the European side of the Atlantic) has challenged me to give my views on taxes. Presumably he wants to put me on the spot since I call myself a conservative. The background, of course, is what among US conservatives passes for the plight of American taxpayers, fleeced year after year, while they see people in Europe happily paying their taxes without demur. In 2011 the US is in crisis over taxes, while Europe is in crisis over debt (at about the same level as the present US “non-crisis” over debt, public and private, but don't let anyone know). The circus atmosphere and lack of perspective in much of US public debate on the conservative side causes the Atlantic to seem wider than ever since steam replaced sails. Not that we can claim to be much better. On our side, we have the voters of Greece who expect the government to provide for them even without their paying taxes. We have the bankers of Spain who think the money in the vault is theirs to spend as long as the politicians agree (and get their share).

In short, though a conservative, I venture the possibly dangerous view that government is inevitable and so are the taxes required to pay for it. I even believe that view is fairly mainstream among European conservatives. Still, taxes and government are never swallowed without suspicion among our voters of the center-right.

A key problem for most conservatives is that bureaucratic growth is a self-propelled phenomenon and one very hard to restrain. Usually brushed off by the left as a minor issue or even myth, the phenomenon is a fact. It is widespread, and it is costly, especially in countries where civil servants are reasonably well-paid and taxes are already high. (For a good overview and synthesis see Marshall W. Meyer: “The Growth of Public and Private Bureaucracies”, Theory and Society

Volume 16, Number 2 (1987), 215-235.)

There is also a strong tendency among governmental representatives – civil servants – to see themselves as holders of a higher kind of knowledge (or “truth”) about what is best for ordinary citizens. Conservatives reject this. Both of these kinds of scepticism are at the core of conservative thinking, even across the Atlantic. Hence a restricted reading of Ronald Reagan's statement “government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem” can find support even in Europe. But that support does not extend to the loud-mouthed US crusades against government as such, which is the normal reading of Reagan's intention.

Bureaucratization and knowing what's best for you go together in the third scourge of social-democratic policies, namely reform policies. Nothing to me raises warning flags as surely as a government that announces the coming of some broad-scale reform. They are usually untested and usually require an expansion of government jobs. In this kind of reaction conservatives on the two sides of the Atlantic are pretty much in agreement.

Fortunately there are even conservative American commentators who are not altogether oblivious to the need for government and taxes. Recently, the Wall Street Journal's Daniel Henninger wrote, “To ensure American well-being, the pre-eminent purpose of a modern tax system should be to achieve the highest possible level of growth in the private economy with a competent, efficient state in a supporting role.” (Daniel Henninger, “What Are Taxes For?” WSJ, Dec 16, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704828104576021672925440698.html). His blog leaves unclear, however, how a competent, efficient state can be built without an expensive civil service paid for by taxes, presumably at the expense of his desire for growth. Finding the trade-off point is the hard part.

The bottom line must be that countries without government are anarchies, and that taxes are required to govern with some degree of stability. The curious idea that government is not needed was tested in the Iberian peninsula in the late Middle Ages. When Isabella and Ferdinand took over their reigns of Castile and Aragon in the 1470s, Castile especially had been living with weak government for more than a century and was in dire need of some semblance of order. Each town had been left to its own devices and many had created voluntary “brotherhoods” to protect their citizens. Isabella instituted la Santa Hermandad (the Holy Brotherhood), a national levy for Castile as a whole and soon changed the situation to the better. Resources were taken from (guess who?) the citizens, i.e., a form of direct taxation.

Taxation is much older, of course. The historian Charles Tilly wrote about early European state-building as a form of protection racket. The King's men would arrive in the villages during the day to declare that “We'll protect you from bandits if you pay your taxes.” The same people came back at night as bandits to visit those who didn't pay. Medieval common folk in Europe often had the scourge of competing tax collectors confiscating their harvest on behalf of rival claimants to the throne. Centuries later we hear about the need for a government to have a monopoly over the means of violence for political stability to exist. Even conservatives understand (except of course in the US).

At the other end of the scale of governmental ambition, however, is where the political battles of the 21^st century will be fought – how big an administration is needed to cater to the demands of rapidly growing, progressively more undereducated populations – and what tasks are better left to non-governmental organizations. This may sound like the US discourse, but it isn't. It is an open question whether reality will ever catch up with the US situation of massive untapped resources and unmet needs. My bet is it will.

Fair taxes will be recognized as such. Taxes are fair if they are paid by all, in the same proportion, and according to ability to pay. But I dissent on the principle of progressive taxation. Whether I make a million or just a hundred, I should pay the same percentage of my income.

While my American conservative friends assure me that I am not worthy of the name of a conservative, I hope I have shown that conservatism doesn't need to smell as much of sulphur as theirs. As for my socialist friend, I am sure he'll tell me I'm as deep in trouble as he thought before.

TO MAKE A COMMENT, please check the option "anonymous" before clicking "publish" - even if you sign by name, otherwise the system will not show your comment.

Oslo Massacre: Christian Fundamentalist or Extreme Anti-Marxist?

About 76 people were killed, 8 in a huge blast that devastated the main government building complex in central Oslo, and at least 68 of them about an hour later, participants in a Labour Party youth camp near Oslo on Friday July 22. All of the mayhem apparently the work of one man.

What kind of motive could be behind the double massacre in Oslo ? The self-avowed killer, Anders Behring Breivik, has told the police that his actions were "terrible, but necessary". In the hours since his arrest, a wealth of documentation has turned up, produced by himself and posted on the net. The first material that showed up was from a Norwegian conservative political website (document.no). The website is known as highly critical of muslim imigration to Norway and Europe, and while its conservative tendency is obvious, it cannot in my view be regarded as extremist. The site editor of document.no, obviously sensing the heat that was on when the suspect's name became known, compiled and published Breivik's “collected works” in one file in its pages the morning after the horrific events.

In what sense could he be a "Christian fundamentalist"? Judging from the 45 pages of his comments rambling across political topics, there is nothing to indicate a Christian fundamentalist leaning. There is hardly any talk of the Bible, God or Jesus Christ and what their teachings would dictate as right political action in today's world. The writer does declare himself to be a “conservative Christian”, and makes it clear that this makes him very critical of the Protestant Church of Norway. Apparently, though, he has referred to himself in his statement to the police as a "Christian fundamentalist".

This fits well with a propaganda video (a "manifesto", in English) which subsequently surfaced on the internet, produced by a man who calls himself "Andrew Berwick", and which is attributed to the suspect by the authorities. The themes of the video are anti-Marxist and anti-Islam, and the heroes are all the brave knights - especially crusading knights - who have kept Islam at bay through the ages. Curiously, there is no recent hero (ironically, El Cid is included though he spent years fighting for Muslims against Christians).  Notably, no heroes at all are portrayed in the fight against Marxism. That would perhaps have brought him uncomfortably close to the nazism that many of his ideas resemble, but which he takes care to stay clear of in all his statements. The video ends by showing the author himself posing in various gallant garb, in the last image posing with a machine gun.

The message of the video is clear. That of his other writings are more vague. There is a certain preoccupation with the pragmatic aspects of winning the soul of the Norwegian people for conservative causes, and a clear admiration of the success of the political left in Norway in monopolizing the country's political space for “Marxism” (he never talks about “socialism” and rarely about social democracy). That success of the left must in Breivik's view be destroyed, after which a new day will come for “conservative culture”. He views himself and other conservatives in Norway as hounded by “Marxism”. In a key passage Breivik says that “Today, Conservatives don't dare to flag their views on the street as they know that extreme Marxists will club them down. We cannot accept that the Labour Party subsidizes these violent 'Stoltenberg Jugend' [ref to Jens Stoltenberg, the Labour Party leader and Prime Minister] who systematically terrorize political conservatives.” (For those who do not know the country it may be added that there is no political violence occurring in Norwegian political life today that matches this description.) In a different context he also perniciously puns on the unofficial honorary label “Landsmoder” (Mother of the Country”) for the former Labour Party PM Gro Harlem Brundtland, making it “murderer” instead of “mother”. In short, there can be no doubt of his hatred for the Labour Party.

Breivik's obsession with what he sees as the need to stop Marxism and his hatred of the various political “boot camps” (youth camps) of the parties of the left are the most pronounced aspects of his writing that I see pointing toward the horrific deeds of July 22.

Among the latest materials to surface is also a sort of diary of the last 80 days before his attacks, detailing all his preparations of the bomb, test explosions, scares of being found out before he was ready, etc., the last entry made a few hours before the attacks.

This  man is clearly psychologically disturbed, but shows all the signs of normal intelligence. He has planned his acts meticulously, he writes well both in Norwegian and English and argues his viewpoints with considerable skill. A hard case to understand in all its grotesque inhumanity. If he wants to be known as a Christian fundamentalist, that may be a reflection of his evident admiration of the methods used by fundamentalist Islamists, a way to mark his "cause" as equally righteous as the beliefs held by the "marxists" and Islamists he hates so much. 

Indeed, the video is so full of hate that it alone explains the actions that followed. It is also so well made that it points to more than a lone man's work.

(This blog has been revised since July 23 due to the wealth of new material about the case. The number of victims was adjusted downward by Norwegian authorities from 93 to 76 on July 25.)

China Ready for War over the South China Sea Dispute?

Will China go to war with Vietnam and other regional neighbors over their disputed claims in the South China Sea? There are experts who think that is possible. Co-authors Rory Medcalf and Raoul Heinrichs of the Australian think-tank Lowy Institute argue this in a recently published report (Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific Asia, 2011). Their emphasis on the dangers focuses on the lack of regard in Asia for maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs).  

Though violent incidents in this area have been numerous over the years, I would personally doubt they could erupt into more sustained violence. Still, the dangers are legion and they are not being avoided, notably not by the major player on the scene, China. At this time tempers flare once more, as they have done intermittently since the 1980s. Governments of the Southeast and East Asian region – represented by their Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Ministries of Defence - are hotly involved, along with those of the United States. Navies conduct exercises and flagwaving protesters march on the streets of the region's capitals.

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has made maritime relations between countries and the resolution of disputes much calmer and easier to handle than they used to be (even though the United States after 30 years of the convention's existence has still not ratified it). Nevertheless, there are problem areas where disputes remain unresolved. The South China Sea may well be the most complex of these.

The South China Sea is bordered by Vietnam to the west, the Philippines to the east, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia to the south and China to the north. The eastern and northern parts of the sea are littered with reefs, sandbanks and occasional islands, mainly the Paracels to the northwest and the Spratlys to the southeast. Deposits of oil and other mineral resources have been located in many places. The South China Sea is also an area of active fishing by the littoral nations.

Moreover, a major portion of seaborne trade to and from (not least oil deliveries to) China, Taiwan, Japan and Korea moves through the area, making it both an area of general maritime interest to major maritime nations around the world, and a strategic interest for the countries referred to. By implication, that makes it an area of strategic interest even for other countries, most notably the United States.

Then why is there no movement towards resolving the issues? Because they are exceedingly complex.

Complexity factor 1: China claims sovereignty over all the islands in the South China Sea and the waters around them, for historical reasons. UNCLOS does not admit sovereignty claims on historical grounds. Customary international law, however, allows sovereignty claims for historical reasons under certain conditions (e.g., if the islands have been occupied, and the claims made public). The Chinese historical claims are not unfounded, but also not patently convincing.

Complexity factor 2: Six nations with territorial waters bordering on the South China Sea (Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam) are claimants for sovereignty over specific islands and/or exclusive Economic Zones in it. In addition, Taiwan advances its own claims on behalf of China.

Complexity factor 3: As just suggested, China's interests are claimed by two independent decision-making centres – the People's Republic of China in Beijing and the Republic of China in Taipei (Taiwan), each of which have established their own separate bases or installations in the area, and each of whom makes the claim on slightly different conditions. Taiwan, of course, is regarded as just a renegade province by China.

Complexity factor 4: While the claims of other littoral states are made in conventional terms according to UNCLOS, the Chinese claim is rather unconventional (a) in that China seems to claim the entire area – not just the islands but even the waters between them - exclusively for itself, and (b) also unconventional in that the Chinese do not declare specifically what the boundary of their claim is, but show it on maps represented by a dotted line – in fact, a line made up of nine (sic!) dashes. A normal claim for China would yield merely a slice of EEZ at the northern end.

Complexity factor 5: Islands with a civilian population or economic life of its own give rise to claims for maritime rights, especially the right to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). But islands in the South China Sea are uninhabited and mostly tiny (the largest is less than one square km), and some of the claims made in the area refer to structures built on reefs that are submerged part of the time.

Complexity factor 6: Instead of seeking peaceful settlement of the dispute, China has repeatedly resorted to aggressive moves, and as early as 1992 granted exploration rights to a US oil company in an area as remote as possible from the nearest Chinese point of land (about 1000 miles away). Now several other claimants (Vietnam and Indonesia) have done the same. Vietnam has recently also invited the Indian navy to make regular use of one of their coastal naval facilities. These continuing moves make the situation in the South China Sea disturbingly fluid and complicate further any attempt to start working towards a multilateral settlement.

Complexity factor 7: All the involved parties did succeed in 2002 in agreeing on a “document of conduct” (under the aegis of ASEAN) intended in time to lead to a “code of conduct” for the area. Yet the code of conduct has so far not materialized and the conduct of the parties in the meantime does not seem to be governed by the restraint and will to build confidence called for in the 2002 document. Acts of violence – even if non-lethal – continue to occur. Demonstratively aggressive postures are taken by naval forces, and media reports on all sides are frequently inflammatory.

At this point, tension is high as military exercises are being held by several of the parties. The United States is exercising jointly with the Philippines. China has announced trial runs for its first aircraft carrier in the South China Sea to begin on July 1. While China and Vietnam, as the most intensely engaged opponents, managed to agree to back off from further confrontation for the time being, it is curious that China as the dominant actor of the region is not able to offer a more consistent example of how to go about peacefully resolving a complex dispute.

As one of the parties to UNCLOS China has a clear obligation to take a step back from what it calls its “indisputable claim of sovereignty over the islands and the surrounding waters of the South China Sea”. The course it has chosen is another, pointing toward the simplest solution: that China grabs it all. Intimidation is the name of that game.

What's Wrong with Asking Israel to Stick to its 1967 Borders?

To most of my readers this is old news, and tiring news. But President Obama has spoken (Thursday May 19^th), and some reaction seems appropriate.

Here's an old Israel supporter who has gradually lost faith in the Israeli leadership. In the fall of 1990, representing my institute in Oslo, I spent a couple of hours at the dinner table talking to our up-and-coming political visitor from Israel, Benyamin Netanyahu – he was a most charming and spirited interlocutor, setting out in our conversation his deep concern about peace with the Palestinians and the need for a basic change to come about in their mutual relations. This was three years before the famous Oslo accords. It was therefore very difficult for me to understand later on that he would not sign off on that agreement, and that as time went by he slowly made it clear that he would not support its implementation, finally declaring that he would fight it in every way he could. Some of my colleagues who had watched his rise over a longer period warned me back then that I'd been had. It took me quite some time to accept that they were probably right. For the past decade or more I have resigned myself to the understanding that this man was not – and is not – credible.

Of course, Israeli politics is not run by one individual; from an initially fairly stable political unit it has become a complex short-term coincidence of incoherent political forces, each of which is insufficient to provide a stable course for the nation. Yet it has been tough for many of us who have sympathized with Israel's right to exist alongside its neighbours, to see the unrelenting course taken by its governments in the past decade. The Palestinian side has helped the extreme side of Israeli politics immensely with its own practice of (and ideological support for) indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilians. And so the old practice of an eye for an eye – the ancient law of Hammurabi, as familiar to Israel as it is to the rest of the region – goes on without pause. Israel attacks the Palestinians, and the Palestinians attack Israel, and no one knows for sure what is a retaliation and what is a fresh offence. The story is almost too familiar to repeat.

The Palestinians missed their chance in 1948 when they could have had what they are now denied – the entire West Bank and Gaza strip. They preferred instead to push the Israelis into the sea, having all Arab neighbours jointly attack the newly established state of Israel to achieve its extermination. After two years it was obvious that they had failed. The tottering Israeli state survived. Palestinian residents of Israeli-held territories left in large numbers, some under threat of force, others out of fear. The ensuing decades saw repeated attempts to shift the balance between the parties with surprise attacks, mostly by the Arab neighbours, but also by Israel (the 1956 war). The disastrous Arab failure in the 1967 Six-Day War - initiated by Israel after an escalating campaign of Arab provocations - led to Israel's long-term occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza strip and East Jerusalem as well.

I cannot believe that the great circle of Israel's (now gradually diminishing) sympathizers abroad would reject the 1967 borders. To terminate the occupation, to me, is the only way forward. The long series of permissions being unstoppably granted for new Israeli settlements to be established in the West Bank, and the unscalable wall to protect them, are a disgrace. Evidently the Obama administration is of the same opinion. It may be too little, too late.

With the Arab uprisings and regime changes of this year, democracy is uncertain to advance and some kind of primitive pay-back seems to be looming in any case. Israel has long held the key to its own future, but refused to put it into the lock. It may be a late stage now - perhaps too late? - to expect that same key to be able to turn things to the better.

(TO MAKE A COMMENT, please check the option "anonymous" before clicking "publish" - even if you sign by name, otherwise the system will not show your comment.)