The first – and supreme - danger to the EU at present is, of course, the euro failing. But part of what could make it fail is not usually recognized as a euro threat – that danger is the lack of political legitimacy at the European center. Part of the problem now is that EU leadership seems more to be a German affair than a joint affair. The ability to make decisions hangs on what Germany wants, more than on any collective will to decide. As I have noted before, German leadership (usually masked as German-French) is good for Europe – up to a point. But it is not acceptable for the European integration project in the longer term to be dependent on one member dragging the rest along.
Moreover, when determined leadership entails severe friction and even sentiments of public rage between countries, this is deplorable, but needs to be overcome. More important than the fact of the rage is the need for the target to be the collective decisionmaking center and not this or that other member country. As seen from the streets of Athens now the EU is a multiheaded monster, manipulated by Germany. The extremity of Greek opinion may be due to a mentality common in Greece (see my previous blog), but it may also be that other countries would produce similar manifestations of public discontent if they were put under similar pressure.
The lack of EU legitimacy is widespread and serious. The Slovak parliament at first refused to endorse the second Greek rescue package because their average income is lower than that of Greece. Who could fail to understand them? As seen from Copenhagen, the EU has long been a barely tolerable creature that has to be kept at arm's length with a stack of legal caveats to protect remaining Danish freedoms. The spirit of resistance, though more tempered, resembles the Greek. In Sweden the EU Commission's intervention in national wildlife policy has a considerable part of the population up in arms, literally, to resist what they see as improper decision-making over the heads of the Swedish government, stipulating the number of wolves and bears to be kept in freedom around their country. Hungary has collided head-on with both the EU and many member countries in deciding to change their constitution in an illiberal direction. We may not want a return to authoritarian ways, but there is also a limit to well-meaning intervention. (It should be added that the Commission has its allies in all of these member countries, so it is not entirely a one-sided affair.)
The examples could be multiplied. Indeed, as a Norwegian I cannot help noticing that most of these cases of conflict between member countries and Brussels coincide with the sentiments that twice led the Norwegians to reject membership in the EU. These cases reflect the most basic conflict involved in international integration, that between the national and the supranational. If you appreciate national values and customs (without therefore being an ugly nationalist), then this conflict can be painful, even enraging. At the same time, if European integration is to succeed (and the euro to be saved), national resistance must ultimately yield on many significant points, many more, even, than we can see on the agenda today.
Spain and Italy have ignored the obligations and pressures of the EU as much as they can. France has been shrugging them off for more than a generation (the Common Agricultural Policy, the Stability Pact for the Euro). This, to me, is a South European posture. Garner the advantages as long as you can, postpone the fulfillments as long as you can. Indeed, Greece is not alone here.
But ok, so I'm biased. I believe the Northern member states have done lots more to fulfill their obligations than the Southern ones have. I look to the Finns to find inspiration for those who resist repayment of their debts, even unfair ones, such as the Finnish war debts to the Soviet Union, repaid at express speed by the victim of aggression to the aggressor. Finnish Finance Commissioner Olli Rehn is a good man to have in Brussels.
Am I biased because these are «my» people? Not at all. I'm just an old square who thinks the EU without unison attention to joint obligations is a hopeless project. There is no opening here for a compromise. The laggards simply have to be brought up to speed. My new home country, Spain, has to be one of the first to make that turnaround. But sooner or later, it will be France's turn. I can't wait to see that struggle.
4 comments:
Dear Olav,
Thanks for a new, thought-provoking blog. I have just a brief comment to your example of Sweden not being allowed to decide by itself how large population of wolves etc. to keep and further on something on a possible new direction of EU integration. Regarding the wolves, this is a type of issue – biodiversity, protection of species and habitats - that really cannot be handled well by nation-states, I think. Suppose, for example, we have a species that happens to be rare in Sweden (Storks?), primarily because the south of Sweden is in its outskirts of the natural Stork habitat. From a national perspective, we might want to “protect” the Stork, but is it really reasonable, given that it might not be at all threatened in the more central parts of its habitat? Isn’t it more reasonable to look at the big picture, irrespective of man-made country borders? Is it a national interest to keep the Stork as part of the Swedish fauna, or is more important to look at the totality of populations to see whether it needs protection? The same argument holds for the wolves. From an ecological perspective, it is hardly up to individual countries whether protection is needed or not. It depends on the bigger picture – do we need more wolves in Sweden to secure a healthy population in northern Europe? I am not certain if we do, but if we decide on this issue from a purely national point of view, the outcomes might not be what we had expected.
Regarding EU integration, I agree with you that the current crisis in legitimacy is serious. From a Swedish perspective, I cannot really see a wide-spread and strong EU identity in our country. And without a sense of identity, how can you get legitimacy? It might be different in other countries, but I don’t think Sweden is unique in this respect. As long as we think that we, as a country, benefit from being in the Union, we don’t complain. But if we begin to feel that the burdens are larger than the benefits, we will complain. To me, this is position closer to opportunism than to identity. However, there have been signs lately that EU gives more credence to so-called Macro regions (for example the Baltic Sea region). Today, we have Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) in the fishery sectors. There are discussions on setting up similar bodies in the agricultural sector. We also have a rather ambitious Baltic Strategy dealing with environmental issues, but also with economic growth and sustainability. Although just a few, minor examples, is this a sign of Brussels surrendering some of its central power? Or is it a conscious decentralization strategy aimed at increasing EU legitimacy? I’m not sure, but I think the former is closer to the truth than the latter. It was no coincidence that the Baltic Strategy, for example, was established during the Swedish chairmanship. And it is no secret that it reflected Swedish preferences quite closely. So, the strategy seems to be to try to get as much out of EU as possible, not thinking too much on the legitimacy of decision-making in Brussels. After all, who gets any votes for defending Brussels?
Björn H
Your point on biodiversity is of course correct, Björn, but it overlooks some crucial aspects. It makes a difference what animal we are speaking about. The issue is not merely the well-being of the species involved, but also the question of coexistence between man and animal. Storks are no problem to a human population, the two species practically cohabit in many areas. A wolf is a different matter, at least for people who live nearby. That's why you see the support for animal rights being much stronger in urban areas than in rural ones, especially peripheral districts. A good test of animal rights sincerity is to propose relocating wolves, bears and other dangerous species to areas near cities. Somehow that idea never attracts the animal rights groups' support – their excuse is usually that there is not sufficient space for the animals near urban areas. To me that is just a lame excuse for what is really a utopian romanticism. You need a touch of realism. I love my dog, without ever forgetting that it is an animal. I love cats. And, from a distance, I also love polar bears, tigers, lions and grizzly bears (which are now, by the way, about to be introduced to Sweden, believe it or not!). From a distance I could therefore also be an animal rights activist. But I'm not. Allowing such groups to unduly influence EU policymaking is therefore a danger to wider EU legitimacy.
On macro-regions your questions are well taken. I have no good answer, except to say the EU has long endorsed border-transcending policies as a matter of basic philosophy. I agree with that. Still, it is a challenge to handle these issues at the EU's external borders. But that is beyond my topic here.
An alternative to TINA
Interesting stuff you brought up in this article, Olav. I am happy to learn your antagonistic stance towards the Greek seems to have softened, due to the question of legitimacy of the EU rule. That legitimacy in my opinion could solely come by means of a referendum in the countries concerned, because deals with matters of sovereignty. There are few governments which go down that path, mainly out of fear for the outcome. They prefer riots in the streets above a yes- or no-vote to which they will be answerable as a test for their legitimacy.
Without popular consent this top-down austerity regime of the Troika will always be felt as illegitimate and the rage of the people against their own treacherous government will create chaos and endless misery.
With few exceptions unity of countries has been accomplished by war, until one side gave up the struggle out of exhaustion and lack of resources. Thus by overwhelming power of one of the participants. I don’t see Germany following that war-path in this time and age.
Determined leadership cannot overcome the present-day obstacles without a referendum.
What Olli Rehm did, might be possible within one country which at that time did not have much of a long-established democratic tradition as is the case in the EU-countries.
But, maybe we are looking in the wrong direction for a solution. Austerity-measures have never and nowhere resulted in a turn for the better in any country – more in a “Verelendung without end. The financial elite (banks and subsidiaries) hold the populations of the countries hostage with their “derivative weapons of mass-destruction” and threaten their governments in submission by bribes and infiltration – to fiend off any regulation of their speculative activities. This predator free-market behaviour must be curbed.
But apart of this, prof. Vincente Navarro shows another way out of the Spanish debt-trap in his article “There is an Alternative! How Spain could pursue expansionary Policies”:
http://www.social-europe.eu/2012/02/there-is-an-alternative-how-spain-could-pursue-expansionary-policies/
He proposes a Swedish approach of the fiscal policies to fight the deficits of the social infra-structure of the country and a reversal of the tax-cuts culture of the former government. Spread the gospel of this Alternative! The tunnel-vision of TINA is a lie.
Charles Rodijk, 10-03-2012
Charles, I appreciate your viewpoints and even agree with many of them. But please don't pin views on me that I don't have. For starters, my views on Greece have not changed, but in a broader perspective Greece is not the only scoundrel, only the worst in its class.
Also, get TINA out of the way, I never said there is only economic liberalism. Expansion has to come from somewhere. Still, that is not a simple thing either. The Obama stimulus of 2009 went right into drawers and mattresses, as I understand. Expansionary measures assume a willingness to spend, all around the economy - from households to local governments, rather than to save or just pay off old debts.
The question I raise about legitimacy in my most recent blog concerns where it is anchored – whether in the nation or in the supranational union. My argument is not that it is more «right» to anchor legitimacy to a greater extent in Brussels, only that it is necessary if we want the EU to deliver something good to its member countries in the long run. We can't just pull down the national curtain and pretend not to be home when the collection man arrives.
Yet, in most EU countries most people still have the nation as the focus of their identity. The fact that much of their wealth and their political stability depends on collaborative efforts orchestrated in Brussels is easily overlooked. But demands from Brussels to deliver something in return are not overlooked, they are seen as undue interference in national life. To say that it must be a matter of give and take is too nice; give and take it is, but it happens in a tough battle of interests.
The public understanding that EU politics is like a never-ending battle of national interests is fairly widespread and to some extent realistic. But unfortunately it also breeds a misunderstanding that is pernicious to the project of integration. When the EU delivers, they believe it is because a battle in Brussels was won and thus brought home the goods.
Look at the French way of literally milking the common agricultural policy. They are just one of the worst examples of a widespread practice. As in many other EU sectors, there are costly side effects to policies that have (or once had) some good in their purpose. These side effects become goods highly appreciated by those who benefit by the windfall. No wonder they refuse to give it up. And their appetite is sharpened for more. The integration project becomes like a gold mine without an owner, only squatters looking for gold nuggets for themselves.
As for «the people» being betrayed by their governments, you apparently believe the slogans in the streets. Most member countries of the EU have joined after very close consideration of the issues and broad public debate. Some, again, like the Greeks, have not bothered to look at it so closely and now feel misled. However, many have only joined after a positive referendum. To say the people have not been heard is just not true.
But, then again, hearing the people's voice must have a limit. Check in with your old friend Lenin, whose views of the masses, cynical though they were, contained a kernel of truth. Countries – or politics at any level - cannot be run just by public opinion. What people think must be part of the picture, but you cannot have a referendum every week. Leadership is required – not Lenin's tight, conspiratory group, but an elected leadership that has some leeway to think and act on behalf of the nation for four or five years. That's what we know as democratic government. You should appreciate the fact that all EU governments are proper democratic governments.
Yes, a Swedish solution like that in 1994 would be a good thing for other EU countries – pensions were reduced by 20%, lots of people had to sell their homes at great loss, many of the big banks failed, and how many were out in the streets marching and shouting at the «traitors» at the top? Not a soul. A few years later Sweden was growing again.
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