A Spaniard is Never Wrong

When I first arrived in Spain to live, I soon encountered an unexpected phenomenon in public offices and many shops: a disinterest in customers or clients and a stubborn refusal to admit error, both of which are clearly dysfunctional to the conduct of daily business. One of my first sketches for a blog had the headline you see above. But then I thought, let's cool it. We all have our quirks. And many foreigners coming to Spain are quite overbearing. I laid that blog on ice.

Still, these impressions on my part assumed that those Spanish habits were only directed at foreigners. Later I realized I was wrong. The post-election circus of January-February surrounding the formation of a new national government is revealing of just these tendencies. The insistence on being right and holding their own line is not just a way of facing foreigners; it is how Spaniards treat each other, at least in public affairs.

Two words in Spanish may illustrate. First, equivocarse, "being wrong". Spanish is a language kind to people in the wrong. It assumes that a person who acts contrary to rules or logic is not wrong, he or she only mistakes one thing for another, or does something poorly, or misunderstands. To be wrong in a more direct sense is not part of the picture. If a Spaniard acts contrary to rules or logic, it is not because he fails to grasp, to understand things, or because he intentionally breaks the rules. Doing so would assume he is either stupid or criminal. The prevalence of this kind of attitude smooths relations at all social levels, at least for those who understand what's going on. It may also serve to hide the truth from others, who don't really get it.

Not surprisingly, therefore, there is no direct translation. The Spanish word for being wrong is «equivocarse», quite close to the English word equivocate. You know what that word means in English; it signals ambiguity, to speak with double meaning. In French it connotes uncertainty, dubiousness, misunderstanding. In the Spanish language «equivocarse» is the nearest one can come to saying someone is in error. In my Spanish-Spanish Diccionario de Bolsillo the verb «errar» (Eng.: to err) is defined as «equivocarse». But there can be no doubt the etymology is about "two or more equal calls", two voices, two meanings. Nothing about error.

What is the broader significance of this? It shows a cultural reluctance to admit error, to refuse to take the bull by the horns (sic!), or to confront error with a correction. Errors are not really errors, just mishaps. Corruption is not really corruption, it is rather just something that oils the machinery of public affairs. Nothing wrong with that, is there? In general the soft tone of equivocarse may be irritating, or sometimes even charming. Nevertheless, in public administration and politics it can cause complications.

Next word: «compromiso». Unless you know the language you might think it means compromise, but in a timely article in El Pais, John Carlin points out that the idea of arriving at agreement by making mutual concessions is foreign to Spanish political culture. The word compromise evidently has no direct translation into Spanish.

(See "Una palabra elemental que no existe en español", El Pais, January18, 2016.).

Now, clearly there are other expressions in Spanish that convey that meaning, for example "transigir" (to make concessions). That goes as well for being wrong, "equivocarse". My point is, though, that compromise and equivocate are words familiar in the political discourse of other European languages, but their meaning in Spanish is shifted to something else. The underlying tendency in their Spanish sense is to avoid losing face if you fail. Barring that, stick to your guns and press others to concede.

This tendency of inflexibility is reflected in the actions of the major party leaders in Spanish politics after the elections of December 20. They stick to their "red lines" (irrevocable positions) despite knowing well that nobody else will accept them. With open eyes, and the deadline fast approaching for deciding on new elections, they are heading for the precipice. New elections. As if that will save them.

Spanish Elections: Punishment for Rajoy

The mood ahead of the elections was morose, in some quarters tending towards the rebellious. It shows in the results. The Spanish political system, for years dominated by two political parties, is now in splinters. Since 1996 the country has had alternating governments by conservative PP (Partido Popular) and socialist PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), most recently four years in majority led by PP's Mariano Rajoy, following an eight year stint (one period in majority, one in minority) by the socialist party under José Luis Zapatero, and eight years before that under PP with José Maria Aznar.

The latest poll by Sigma Dos for El Mundo (December 14) indicated only 27% for PP (they got 28%, a severe loss since 2011 when they won 45% and an absolute majority of seats). The socialist PSOE garnered 22%, also a significant loss, down from 29% in 2011. The real winners were the two new challenger parties offering themselves as alternatives to the two old majors: Podemos (“We can”, socialist-left) now nearly as big as the old PSOE, and Ciudadanos ("Citizens") eating into the support for the old PP. Both will now be key partners in the coalition talks ahead.


Rajoy’s tumble from an absolute majority to less than a third reflects the trouble he has had, though many would say he put himself into it. On the one hand, his great victory in November 2011 was more due to the severity of the economic crisis and the apparent inability of the Socialists to do anything about it than to any overwhelming charm or political skill on the part of the winner. On the other hand, the challenge of the Catalonian independence movement came like a hurricane with little warning, along with the Spanish banking crisis in 2012.


The banking crisis followed on the collapse of the real estate market, beginning in 2008, which then PM Zapatero refused to call a crisis. That opened the way for PP to demand a true austerity program, including reform of the labor market, which ultimately led to PP’s victory in 2011. The banking crisis started as a bad loans crisis as in many other countries, but the tight relations between the banking and political sectors in Spain made everything worse. It tied into the extraordinary public debt level in the country that qualified it for inclusion in the PIGS acronym.


One of the first things Rajoy actually pushed for after coming to power was the public debt issue. In particular the debt of the autonomous regions had been ballooning without any clear regime to contain it, partly due to the absence of any constitutional division of powers in this regard. Economics Minister Montoro put his hand to institutionalizing an improvised, concerted co-management of the regional debt and gradually brought it under control. Hence Rajoy felt he had it in line, and was clearly annoyed when European and US players began demanding more external aid for Spain. In August 2012 the Wall Street Journal made waves by noting that American investors and the New York stock exchange were getting nervous because Rajoy refused to accept an EU bailout for Spain. He preferred to maintain the austerity programs already in place. Ultimately a bailout came forth, but Rajoy insisted it was not a bailout like those for Greece, Portugal and Ireland, since it was merely for the private banking sector.


The labor market reform was perhaps less noted among Rajoy’s controversies, probably because even the socialists knew that something had to be done to rein in the over-generous severance pay system, though they hated it. PP’s labor reform has led to a system where most jobs are temporary, which is the main complaint against it. Other industrialized countries’ labor markets function well with this kind of system. Permanent employment is a thing of the past. As with the debt problem, the labor market is among Rajoy’s successes, in my view.


On the downside of the austerity success, Rajoy has been blamed for the fact that 110,000 patients have died while waiting for an operation in his term of office, many more than in the preceding period. A tough charge, not lightly dismissed, but at the same time a tragic systemic effect, not a personal decision.


Rajoy has also been severely criticized for his handling of the Catalonian challenge. Especially his anti-catalonian rhetoric has been questioned. Opposition party leader Pedro Sanchez of PSOE charges Catalonian president Artur Más as the one responsible for this fracas (as he certainly is), while he simultaneously points to Rajoy as the one “guilty”, that is, of being too passive in the case. But when he has to tell the truth, Sanchez is as critical of the Catalonian independence project as nearly everyone else in the Madrid political universe. That is as it should be. My view is that as compared to the rabid antics of Artur Más, Rajoy is an example of patience and reasonableness. (See my several blogs on the Catalonian independence demands since 2011.)


Finally, there is the revelation by PP party treasurer Bárcenas of the secret funds in Swiss bank accounts he had been managing for his party, sensationally published by the two leading newspapers El Mundo and El Pais in January 2013. Secret payments had been made for decades as (extra) PP salaries and to cover expenses for party officials, including Rajoy. Resisting insistent calls for his demission, the Prime Minister explained to the Parliament that he himself had done nothing illegal and that without knowing what was going on he had trusted Bárcenas - as he would have trusted anyone he did not have reason to disbelieve or suspect of wrongdoing. Clearly this implied declaration of distance from the secret funding is less than convincing, even more so considering that Rajoy is famous for his micromanagement of both the government and his party. (See my blog in the summer of 2013, comparing Rajoy and Helmuth Kohl.)

A more straightforward political failure is the disastrous PP loss in the Andalucian elections spring 2015 in which Rajoy and the PP national leadership involved themselves deeply, in support of a weak candidate. This was a case of severe prestige loss more than anything. It was the worst result for PP in Andalucia in 25 years, down ⅓, after recently gaining the prize of becoming the biggest party in the 2012 elections. Andalucia, the most populous region in Spain, is a socialist stronghold and losing in 2015 the top position gained in 2012 was a major setback.

Ultimately, despite the loss for Rajoy, he will remain a leading player in the post-election game of constructing a workable government. It will not be easy. The outcome is deeply fragmented.

New Government of Spain: Right Priorities, Right Direction, Right Choices?

It's hard to tell. After the national parliamentary elections a month ago, won decisively by the conservative PP (Partido Popular), Spain's new government under Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy was sworn in this week (December 21). The uncertainties surrounding the Spanish economy have made it imperative for the new government to start its mission in a convincing manner. Some characteristic changes became visible from the start: 1. reduced government size, 2. concentration of functions in fewer hands. Rajoy's first signal a few days before revealing his new team was that there would be cuts in every governmental sector except for pensions.

Indeed, according to many commentators a concentration of official power is taking place which is unprecedented in the recent democratic period. First, economic policy is shifted towards the Prime Minister (“President of the Government” in Spain's official parlance). The cabinet's interministerial council for economic policy (Comisión Delegada de Asuntos Económicos) is normally chaired by the Minister of Finance. Rajoy has decided to chair it himself. Second, the Spanish intelligence service is normally part of the Ministry of Defence. Rajoy has decided to move it to the Presidency of the Government, the cabinet secretariat, under the direct oversight of his chief of cabinet, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria (40), who is also a ministerial appointment and Rajoy's deputy (Vice President of the Government).

Finally, adding to the above is the fact that this is not a government of independent-minded technocrats (unlike the new governments of Italy and Greece). The new Ministers are highly competent and experienced, but they are PP loyalists. They are Rajoy's close collaborators from many years before. The facts seem to bode for a tight-knit, centrally steered operation, with one possible exception: The all-important Ministry of Finance.

The Ministry of Finance has now been split in two, an “externally oriented” Ministry of the Economy and Competitiveness, with Luís de Guindos as the new minister, and an “internally oriented” Ministry of Finance and Public Administration – where the new appointee is Cristobal Montoro. In its long history the Spanish ministry of finance has several times and for considerable periods actually been two units, most recently with the José Maria Aznar government of 1996-2004, so the split may be in line both with historical precedent and with a preference of the Partido Popular. But why? And are two heads better than one?

My speculation is only that, but I believe Rajoy has made the best of a difficult situation where the judgement of the markets and the international community were primary: he had one fully capable man (Montoro) who could well have filled the job alone, but had inadequate foreign language skills, and a somewhat academic profile. Then he had another (de Guindos) who had the requisite skills for (at least) part of the job, an image of investment banking experience (Lehman Brothers in Iberia, no less!) and the language abilities to go with it. So the ministry was divided to fit the needs of the situation and the capabilities of the two men, while Rajoy in doing so also ensured that he would put himself in a stronger leadership position, which was further underlined by his taking the reins of the economic policy council into his own hands.

The question then is: Can the cabinet center manage it all? There is no doubt about Rajoy's motivation, nor about the clarity of his goals. He intends to drag his country out of this crisis no matter what. However, what we know of the new Prime Minister so far is that he is not given to Reaganesque free reins and lofty thinking. His performance in parliamentary debates of the past four years – as well as in the previous election debate with Zapatero of 2008 – shows a man who is polemic and does not hesitate to dive into detail. My suspicion is that here we may have a man of pedantic leadership, a nitpicking micromanager.

Possibly to compensate for this tendency, the Vice-President of the Government has been charged with the top managerial position. She certainly has both formal competence and experience, and she has worked for ten years with Rajoy. But with all these diverse responsibilities thrust upon her, one may well ask: Is Soraya up to it? As I see it, this can only work well if Rajoy comes out as a stronger visionary than he has appeared to be in the past.

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