Is Russia a bunch of good guys
manipulated by a bad guy? Or is it more complicated than that? Let's
start at the simple level. Why is it that I get this feeling of
uneasiness whenever a Russian crosses my path? I tell myself it's
silly, there is no rational reason for this, but it keeps recurring.
Worse, too often my suspicions are confirmed. Let me give you an
example.
In my neighborhood, many houses are
just for vacation use, owners are absent for long periods, and
neighbors often use their parking spaces. So it happened one day a
year or two ago that a Russian-registered car, a nice new BMW X6 SUV,
turns up in this absent neighbor's car port. “Good going”, I
thought, “Russians doing well and establishing themselves in our
area. - Still,” I thought, “what a long drive!” But after a
couple of weeks, as I'd been walking my dog past the Russian car
every day, it occurred to me I hadn't seen any Russians, and the car
hadn't moved, it was just sitting there gathering dust, more by the
day. A month goes by, two months, no change, just more dust. So
finally I ask the German lady in the next house if she knows who owns
the car. “Someone I know,” she says vaguely, and leaves me
standing there. The next day the car is gone; I've never seen it
since. (It may be added that, as far as I know, there are no Russians
living in our neighborhood, only other expatriates and the odd
Spaniard, including this surly lady friend of the BMW “owner's”.
She now has an E-minus in my book.)
There has been a steady stream of
emigrants from Russia in recent years. Not merely to the
Greek-orthodox EU tax haven Cyprus (where they tend to bunch up), but
also to the US and Canada and parts of Western Europe (Britain,
France, Spain, and Greece among them). Of course, retirees seek the
sun more than anything. And they are welcome in the south, bringing
their money to the wobbling Mediterranean economies. But then there
is this curious fact about them: most of the recent Russian arrivals
seem to be young swingers, not exactly retirement age. And they are
always well supplied with cash. A local businessman tells me he has
more and more Russian customers - “--- they pay cash for
everything, leafing their bills out of big wads of money,” he says.
“And they gladly pay everything in advance.”
I am curious as to how it is that these
young folks are not back home in Russia helping Mr. Putin run his
(their?) country – or simply working at an ordinary job in the
roaring raw materials economy of the beloved Motherland, instead of
working at shipping money out of it. In the new post-Cold War
international environment in which Russians are free to do things
they never could before, they have a few favorite activities: foreign
investment (often in somewhat odd activities); bank accounts abroad;
freewheeling spending as they travel. Western financial commentators
are drawn by the money flow to pay attention to such facts, less to
asking where all this money comes from. I can only guess.
During a year I spent in Paris 1997-98
I always passed a Russian restaurant on my way to and from work, a
small bistro elegantly decorated, attractively lit. During that year
I never once saw a guest in that place, except for a Christmas party.
Obviously it was part of a money-laundering scheme. Of course, this
is just anecdotal. Yet, somehow I believe repeated random examples
are to some extent indicative of a larger phenomenon. Russian
business abroad is in no small measure about money-laundering.
Of course, I am biased. Because, if you
lift your glance from the personal-anecdotal to a broader view of
international politics, Russia is doing well, back in positions of
power, rebuilding its influence after the soviet breakdown. In its
own eyes, if not in those of others, Russia is playing the role of a
great power the way Russians always wanted and felt entitled to. The
once powerful soviet military – which turned out to be a potemkin
village of rusting equipment - is now being restored to a more usable (Russian) version of its former glory. The export of raw materials is obviously
what pays for this, but that extractive business is also what Putin
is using to bait his trading partners into long-term relationships of
supply and dependency.
Diplomacy is a central part of this
offensive. In the old days, Soviet negotiators were hard to beat,
brought up as chess players, able to sit for hours and hours without
a break, and - according to a Norwegian Russia expert of that period
- without saying a word either, if that was required. In Russian, he
said, the expression of approval was “steel ass”.
Today, with international law less
beholden to power plays, Russian negotiating skills and steel asses
are less productive. Also, Putin's government has little patience for
negotiations. The priority is for Russian gas and oil exports to get
to their markets without delay, and especially without the delays of
dealing with transit countries for pipelines or transshipment.
Trouble-making intermediaries (such as, especially, Belarus) have
been cut out without mercy. Old gas and oil pipelines from soviet
times have been carefully rerouted to escape bothersome transit
partners like Latvia, Belarus, Poland and Estonia. Oil shipments
through Latvia were quickly done away with when the Latvians faced
down angry Russian expat pensioners in Riga in 1997-98. By an
incredibly rapid effort the Russians built several large new oil
transshipment terminals near St Petersburg. After those started
operating from 2001, the Latvians were left sitting there with
nothing to show for their previous precious asset, the old soviet era
oil terminal at Ventspils, once the biggest on the Baltic.
The subsequent project to build a gas
pipeline along the seabed of the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany
(“Nord Stream”) was a stroke of geopolitical genius – all the
intermediaries, potentially 3-5 bothersome governments, were swept
aside at one go. Who could object to such a convenient routing
scheme? Of course, the neighbors did their best. When the Russians
asked permission (as they legally had to) for their pipeline to cross
the others' maritime exclusive economic zones, the neighbors pulled
out all the stops, throwing up legal objections to the best of their
ability. But if this “harassment” of the Russians had some
success, it was only passing. Eventually the Russians tackled the
obstacles, one by one. After that, when the pipeline had been built,
there was no longer anything to protest.
Elsewhere, there are projects for
Russian oil, and especially gas, moving both westward and eastward,
in several gigantic projects. Gas exports to China have been under
negotiation for a number of years, and the first major Russian oil
pipeline to China has been operating since 2011. (China is not
self-supplied with oil and gas.) To the west, the South Stream
project towards southwest Europe is a copy of the Nord Stream
pipeline, similarly stretching across the ocean floor, in this case
the Black Sea. The project is a competitor to the simultaneous
(non-Russian) Nabucco pipeline project, offering gas to Europe from
Azerbaijan piped via Turkey and Bulgaria. In geopolitical
perspective, Russia seeks to tie the EU to Russia for the long term,
while Nabucco is designed to relieve the EU of such Russian
dependency.
These projects show that Russian
policymakers have learned something important from the failures of
the Soviet system: Economic ties don't have to be kept in place by
military means; in fact, things work much better without the clumsy
tools of violence; economics has its own incentives and its own
sanctions.
Still, behind all of these projects is
the same old geopolitical thinking. Geopolitics is a Russian favorite
worldview, an idea that makes sense to them, more than to most other
nations, except perhaps the Chinese, who seem lately to have
discovered it too. Power is linked to territorial control, in
whatever way you can achieve it. Russia discovers, now that the
receding Arctic ice is opening a new, shorter sea route from the
Atlantic to the Pacific, there are new geopolitical advantages
becoming available to them all around. The Northern sea route
drastically shortens the maritime connection between Europe and East
Asia. Also, of necessity it passes close to the Russian coast all the
way from Northern Norway to the Bering Strait, close enough to check
or block transits on demand. The same goes for the Trans-Siberian
Railway, now functioning as a major cargo link between east and west.
Of course, you and I would never think
about trade in terms of control and blocking potential. But if you
think the Russians don't, you should think again. The thing is, it's
not just the blessed little father in the Kremlin who does all the
geopolitical thinking and scheming. It's a major bureaucratic
undertaking. And it's everyman's pipe dream. We are not talking
democracy here, it's not as if the State Duma invents these schemes
based on popular opinion of geopolicy. Rather, the public –
minus the still vigorous anti-Putin opposition (bless them) – are
the cheering spectators, loving every minute of the carousel ride Mr.
Putin offers them.
What Russian democracy under Boris
Yeltsin never achieved, a stable economy and regular payment of
pensions, has been achieved by Vladimir Putin, not because Mr. Putin
is more honest, but because he understands the risk of not performing
on these scores. Besides, he has much more efficient control of the
cleptocracy centered in the FSB that runs his regime than Mr. Yeltsin had of the cleptocracy that ran his.
So much for the country that many of us
had high hopes for in 1990 or thereabouts. We have learned, not just
from the Russian case but from others even more complex, the dangers
of thinking a deep culture of governance can be turned around just by
a snap of the fingers (say, an election), or just by helping them throw off existing
fetters.
The deep culture of voluntary
authoritarian government is well chained and anchored wherever it's found, and it is
widely spread around the globe. Hence, my anti-Russian bias is misdirected; it is too narrow. But Russia is a heck of an example of things that are wrong in the world. So I suspect my anti-Russian bias - like Russia itself - won't change in the foreseeable future.
9 comments:
Dear Olav,
Just one or two quick reflections upon your text. Regarding the first part of it, where you tell anecdotal stories about Russians, I might misunderstand you, but I don't think these stories tell us so much about "Russians". Rather, they tell us something about the state of Russia, and how badly it works nowadays. I think most people act rather rationally most of the time. They tend to adapt to the incentives they are facing. Seeing the young, wealthy Russians, cruising around the world, it is quite clear that they have adapted well! They were probably among the first in their country realizing that it was more lucrative to shuffle money abroad than to something productive. That's a society not working... I guess we have seen it in too many countries. People are (rationally) seeking ways to plunder the state, or each other, simply because this is a much easier way to make money than to actually create something. And the country suffer. So, don't blame Russians, blame the Russian society. Assume that Swedes, Norwegians, Americans or people from any other country were in the situation of young people in Russia today, I am quite convinced that they would respond to the existing incentives in pretty much the same way (remembering that most people in Russia are not wealthy, and definitely not thriving - they are still in Russia, because they have no money to go somewhere else).
Finally, regarding Russia and geopolitics. Is that so different from how the former colonial powers, the US or China behaved or behaves, would you say?
Best, Björn H
Björn, I see that I have failed to make my point clear. The anecdotes are certainly connected to the geopolitics part; the Russian people are unique in their support for national values and goals. The fact that the young movers and shakers siphon off money for personal use is not proof to the contrary. They simply feel entitled to a little extra for their continuing loyalty, and they know they will not be getting any if they sit around patiently waiting. That's where the cleptocracy comes in. As for the US, for example, many of the tendencies may be similar, but the political and economic environment is such that exposure in the short run is much more likely.
Da.
Somehow, I get the impression that my point came across to Bloggerbob. We may not necessarily be right, Bob, but we do have the same biases. Or as my old auntie used to say, we can't always be wrong, but we keep trying!
Björn, I forgot to respond on your point about the US and geopolitics. Like all great powers, the US is alert to the "dictates" of geopolitics, but in my impression, rarely to the extent that they will let that alone determine policy. If vital US interests are deemed to be at risk in a crisis situation, of course, there is not much hesitation in Washington. But otherwise, such power-focused planning is left to the strategists in the Pentagon and certain lobbyists, which have to compete anyway with other policymakers (the State Dept, for instance, which is usually not absolutely sold on geopolitics) and the President's National Security Advisor and his/her staff. Ultimately, the advocates of geopolitical schemes must persuade both the members of Congress and the President and his advisers. The interesting part about the US as an international actor is therefore that its government is not entirely free to ride rough on the world scene - even if it may sometimes look like it. The US political system is never unified like the present Russian system is. The Russian governmental system, moreover, is entirely steeped in geopolitical thinking, to the extent that they are eager to recruit other governments to share their perspective. In the geopolitical credo the great powers have certain rights that other, minor powers do not have. Which is why the staus of being a "great power" is so important for Russia to retain.
Dear Olav. I fully agree but I am afraid that your focus is too narrow. The problem you tackle is much bigger and it is broader then the Russian case. Milovan Dilas coined the concept of "Nomenklatura" referring to the group of people within the soviet union's communist party who held various key positions throughout the governmental system. The tentacles of this nomenklatura still control the political, economic, social and irreligious system in Russia. But is this reality different in our so/called western democratic system. Don't we have as well a political class of politicians who first establish themselves as ministers or acquire all kind of high governmental functions and then move their tentacles like an octopus to the private sector where their former political connections are used to benefit the companies they have joined. Does the way governments deal with the current economic crisis not illustrate the influence of members of the political class who have moved to top functions in the bank sector. While the crisis has been caused by the banks, the current politicians spend public money to uphold a corrupt banking system. It is the honest tax payer, not the corrupt bankers that pay the bill. I am afraid that this is a worldwide problem.
By the way Olav, the Ben you lost track of lives not far away from Alicante. However, I preferred to live among the Spanish people away from the Russians and other foreigners. Nevertheless i will be happy to join you for a coffe, or a drink with some tapas. You may contact me if you wish: bensoetendorp@gmail.com
Dear Ben - It only now occurred to me that you are actually wrong in attributing the term nomenklatura to Milovan Djilas. Djilas coined the term "the New Class" in the book by that name to draw attention to the fact that his native Yugoslavia, supposedly a classless society, had actually nourished a new privileged class that replaced the hated bourgeoisie. But his book was focused on Yugoslavia. The word "nomenklatura", on the other hand, is a fairly ordinary word in Russian, drawn from Latin and meaning a list of names. As you will see in many online dictionaries, it was popularized in the West by Soviet dissident Michael Voslenski, who in 1970 wrote a samizdat publication titled (as translated from the Russian) "Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class". Evidently (and obviously) Voslenski had been inspired by Djilas' "New Class", and when the first Russian-language book version was published in London in 1984 it had a preface by Djilas. The first publication in book form in a Western language was in German by Molden, Vienna, in 1980. The first French edition was also out in 1980, and the first Spanish edition in 1981. The English edition by Doubleday in 1984 was therefore rather late. The popularization of the term "nomenklatura" (as opposed to the idea) therefore undoubtedly was Voslenski's book as it appeared in the West a quarter century after Djilas' New Class.
Dear Olav. I see that you have not given up the academic habit of sticking to the exact facts. I was a very left minded student and was educated at the radical political science department in the University of Amsterdam, so I know of course all about Milovan Djilas and his definition of the new class in the perceived classless society of Tito's Yugoslavia. I may have used the term nomenklatura in a wrong way. I actually used it to refer to the nomenklatura method. The nomenklatura system is how a Leninist ruling party exercise organizational hegemony over appointments and dominates the political life of the country, as well as holding the control over functions in other sectors like industry, agriculture, and education. (some writers refer to it as state capitalism).
The point I waned to make was that what we see in Russia and in China is not limited to Communist or former Communist countries. In our western style political system we have also a political class who has made politics their profession. We are ruled by politicians who have made a career within a political party in order to acquire powerful political positions in government, and then move to very well paid top positions in various financial or industrial sectors.This kind of people have crossed the borderline between public interest and personal self-interest or corporate interest. Many former politicians rank very high in the national lists of the most influential persons in a country as they occupy vital positions as president or simply a member in many boards of directors in different big banks and firms or semi private organizations. They have the job not because of a professional skill or quality but because they are politically well connected. Moreover, some of them are not ashamed to return to the official political arena as senators while holding at the same time functions in the private sector. This form of institutionalized corruption is the harmful disease which ravage our societies worldwide everyday. Although I can understand your anti-Russian bias, I suffer more from an anti-politician bias. It makes me almost sick when l hear politicians blaming not themselves but an unidentified crisis for all the troubles we honest citizens experience every day. - Ben
I understand, Ben, that as an old Marxist-Leninist you would be supremely qualified to comment on this subject. (By the way, nomenklatura was your angle, not mine, so let us leave that aside.) The key point, of course, is whether the Russian ruling class of today is just another case of the professional political class such as it has developed in (especially) Western Europe, with politicians grown up and groomed from their teens inside political parties, getting to the top with only minimal experience and knowledge of the real world, and once inside being nearly impossible to eject.
While I buy your sketch of the general problem and your sense of frustration at it as well, I think you are vastly underestimating the danger posed to – and the continuing oppression imposed upon – the Russian population by the Putin regime. Just consider the life and death of Anna Politovskaya, and read her book. Moreover, the parties in Russia are not at this stage, as I understand it, a breeding ground for young, future politicians. Hence, we disagree on the conflation of current Russian politics with mature democratic politics in the West.
Otherwise, your description of the professional political class is true for many countries around the world, though perhaps not universal. This is first of all a typical and destructive West European trend; sustained by the all-too generous governmental financing of political parties. In the US I think the situation is somewhat different. Generally, (C. Wright Mills to the contrary) the US system these days is much more demanding and more dangerous for a politician than the West European cases. Recruitment to the system there depends on finding money support for your candidacy, not party work. A lost election in the US is in my judgement a much more serious situation for a politician than a similar failure in Europe.
The fact that rotten politics is found everywhere does, of course, make it harder to recognize an exceptional case when you see it.
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