The past two years the news out of Syria have been so dismal that I have not been able to face it, even in the minimal sense of writing about it. One reason: There can be no quibble about what the great powers have decided to do - they are wisely staying out of the fray. All of them. Their motives may differ considerably. But in such a situation there is nothing much anybody can do from the outside. This is another reason why there is not much to say - it only proves the old, tough lesson that a people must gain its freedom - and preserve it - on its own.
Libya may have proven the opposite, acording to some. That is to say, that the West saved Libya from the Gaddafi clan. The Nato intervention was fairly clearcut, to me an action as legitimate and well-founded as anybody might wish. Beyond that, I believe Libya was sufficiently chaotic to prove nothing about such matters. There were interventions from a number of different parties, actors, or sides, whatever you prefer to call them. Some were invited. Others not. There was strong action from inside. Nevertheless, the main thing in Libya was - and is - that there was no real inner core, no cohesive group big and strong enough to gather a force transcending the clans and tribes, which is why the instability continues. Is it much different elsewhere in the Middle East?
The collapse of the Arab spring should not be over-interpreted. Granted, Tunisia has advanced farther along the way, yet has its own troubles. Egypt even more so. There can be little doubt that attitudes inculcated by Islam is the main source. As long as no strong voice is courageous enough to take whatever there is of humanity in Islam and merge it with some sense of moderation, the Middle East mess will continue, and be even worse than it was before Tunisia took to the streets and Mubarak fell. One strong, courageous voice can do much. We have not heard that voice yet.
So where is the glimmer of hope in all this?
Most of the governments of the Middle East are against Assad. Still, they cannot do much more about it than the great powers. Except prepare their own nation for a better fate. In the meantime, we can all watch - as we no doubt are doing - while Assad and Syria self-destruct. The only further hope I can see is the lesson that Syria must be the last Arab nation to go to the dogs like this. Those dogs, unfortunately, are home bred.
3 comments:
Well spoken, what a sad future for that region, at least for a while and what will happen when only Europe will need their oil??
Olav, it all sounds very reasonable, wearing our western (sun)glasses. However, there is a big BUT...
When I lectured military officers before they went on a UN Middle East Mission about Middle East politics, I always asked them to take in their bag at least one book: From Beirut to Jerusalem written by Thomas Friedman, and to read several times one chapter: "Hama Rules" in order to understand the rules of the game as they are played in the Middle East. The first two rules: tribalism and authoritarianism are most important. In 1982 Hafez Assad, the father of the current president, did not hesitate to murder about 20.000 Suni Muslims in Hama and to destruct large parts of the city in a military operation aimed at destroying the rebellious Muslim Brotherhood stronghold in the city. Friedman argues that Assad as a member of the ruling Alawite sect, a minority that seized power in a coup d´etat in 1970, did not see the Suni Muslims of Hama as fellow citizens but as members of an alien tribe, strangers that tried to take over control of the government. Friedman also explains that in a highly fragmented society like Syria where Assad did not enjoy much legitimacy, he felt that he had to respond by employing brutal power. In essence the Hama history repeat itself now in Syria, but on a national scale.
We saw the application of the Hama Rules by Saddam Hussein and Qaddafi as well. Egypt and Tunisia are more homogeneous societies where the Hama rules were exercised in a more relaxed way, that made a less brutal power transition possible. While Saddam in Iraq was a special case, Qaddafi would have still been in power if the Libyan rebels had not received western military help. In the Syrian case, a humanitarian military intervention would make sens as well, but we stick to limited humanitarian aid. We make a choice to deal with the effects of the disease, not the cause of the disease. This is not because we are afraid of another Iraq or the lack of consensus in the Security Council. It is simply because the costs of a military intervention outweigh the benefits. Syria is not an oil rich country like Libya or Kuwait.
Olav, I know it is an open door, but with all respect for the resistance movement in Europe, think what would have been the fate of Europe if the Americans, the British and the Canadians would have not liberated as from the Nazi sect that ruled Germany and occupied Europe.
Ben, you are right and you are wrong. I am fully aware of the tribalist foundations of the area. But explanation must not be conflated with acceptance. You seem to do just that. This is where social anthropologists have me up in arms: Observing and noting the facts on the ground regarding human practices (see e.g. Geertz on "Anti-anti Relativism") does not oblige me to accept those same practices as right and good. If the practices in question seem to me (with my Western blinds) to be inhumane, I will never do that.
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