Should Violence against a Government Be Permissible in Democracies?

Charles Blow writes in the Sunday New York Times (21/8) on whether «violence against the government can sometimes be justified» and cites worrying polls that show increasing numbers of Americans think so. I share his worry, but the case in question apparently is the US in its present form - a democracy. What about the US under a renewed Trump administration? The aspect missing here is what kind of government is in power? I support those of my forefathers in Norway who fought violently against the Nazi regime of Vidkun Quisling. The government of Vladimir Putin deserves violent opposition. Violence should be permissible in the case of autocracies. 

A New Way forward for Catalonia?

Pedro Sanchez, Prime Minister of Spain since June 2018, has had a few months to form his views of the Catalan independence case from his new lookout point. During the long Catalonian crisis of 2017-18 Sanchez as leader of the opposition had been fully supportive of the PP Government's introduction of central rule (article 155), even demanding tougher action before the government did. But now Sanchez heads a weak minority government. To move the conflict out of the deadlocked position it is in he needs to show a more constructive attitude and distinguish himself from the unyielding stances of Mariano Rajoy, his predecessor, and Quim Torra, the new Catalonian PM since May.

An early signal of motion came this summer when Sanchez had a skirmish in the Congress of Deputies with ERC representatives of Catalonia. The independentistas were demanding another referendum on independence. To that Sanchez responded – showing some sympathy – that "Catalonia has self-government statutes which they did not vote for, but which were the product of a Constitutional Court judgement [in 2010], therefore the crisis can only be put right by voting. But the fundamental difference between us," he emphasized, "is that we want to vote an agreement, whereas you are aiming to vote for a rupture." (La Vanguardia 2018/07/17)

By referring to the sore point of the autonomy statutes voted by Catalonia in 2006 but rejected by the Constitutional Court in 2010, Sanchez put himself for a moment on the side of the separatistas – not because he shared their goal, but because the Court's handling of the statutes had been a PP (conservative) project not shared by the social democratic PSOE.

Later (September 3) Pedro Sanchez gave a long interview with Cadena Ser. Since this was his first in-depth commentary on the conflict after taking over as head of government, it may be worth having a look at what he said, as reported by El Pais. Sanchez started by emphasizing the basics of the government's position: "Law and dialogue". To an outside observer this seems appropriate, to say the least. Both law and dialogue have suffered in Catalonia for years. A rogue minority has grabbed for itself 100% of the power that it has only 47% of the voters' support for. Dialogue has been professed as a goal, but only if the outcome is given at the outset as independence. As Sanchez emphasized in the interview, "It is not independence that is at risk in Catalonia, it is civic coexistence within Catalonia." Dialogue in this case has two dimensions – dialogue with Madrid, and dialogue within Catalonia.

In other words, the need for Catalans to talk with their opponents at home was a central theme for Sanchez. "The first that needs to be done is to set the foundations for an institutionalized dialogue." Sanchez' words recall the East European processes of round-table dialogue in the early 1990s, where opposing groups with fundamentally different views would meet regularly to seek consensus on ways forward. The Catalan separatists seem to be unaware of recent European history. In Sanchez' words, "The independence movement needs to become self-critical."

In an aside the Prime Minister touched on an issue especially sensitive this summer, the yellow ribbons worn to remind separatist sympathizers of so-called 'political prisoners', those Catalan activists and politicians who were jailed and are awaiting trial for organizing the illegal October 1^st referendum of 2017. Even buildings have been adorned with these symbols, and loyalists have been arrested or attacked for trying to remove them. - "I am against all the symbols that separate," says Sanchez. "The only way to solve the crisis is to overcome bloc politics."

I believe Sanchez, if he sticks to the points made in this interview, has found a few elements of wisdom that could nudge Catalonia towards healing. But they need to be picked up by the separatists as well. Their stance continues to be irreconcilable. 

Catalonia dèjà vu - or maybe not?

The elections of 21 December came and went, orderly and quietly, and the results - in spite of all the hue and cry over the unilateral declaration of independence - made it appear as if time had stood still since 2015. The separatists got almost exactly the same share of the votes they had two years ago (47%). The main difference was that the loyalist opposition mobilized the greatest number of votes for their main party, so that Ciudadanos / Ciutadans became the biggest party in Catalonia. But not big enough to form a new anti-separatist government. 

Among the separatists the headaches are equally bad. With the separatist ex-president, Carles Puigdemont, still in flight in Brussels, and his ex-Vice President, Oriol Junqueras still in jail in Madrid, now the three parties no longer agree on basics. The centrist  Puigdemont still wants to be president, but socialist Junqueras thinks him a coward for not returning from exile and wants to be president himself. Either way, they are both likely to be disappointed since they are both wanted by the Spanish authorities for sedition and rebellion. The third separatist party CUP (anti-capitalist anarchists) are mainly concerned to complete the road towards independence. Their votes in the new parliament are required for the separatists to create a majority coalition. 

Some have urged Inés Arrimadas, the leader of the winning party, Ciutadans, to try forming a government without a secure majority, but she has so far rejected that call. 

As part of his management of the Article 155 regime for Catalonia, Prime Minister Rajoy has imposed a deadline of January 17 for the new government to be formed. With the situation as described above, and court cases waiting for a number of those just elected, the future of Catalonia seems less orderly than ever.

Reverberations from the Catalonian case seem unavoidable. Already a national debate is gradually getting underway about reforming the Constitution of 1978, and various models for recognizing - somehow - the national consciousness in other Spanish regions are being floated. Even if Catalonia never gets its independence, it is about to shake Spain to its foundations. 

Will Catalonia Come to Its Senses?

Secession is dynamite. And the Catalonian separatists are playing with fire. Other Spanish regions may want to take on the challenge to go it alone, and not only the Basque country. In France there is the Catalonian region of Languedoc, just across the border from Spanish Catalonia. There is unrest in Corsica. Italy struggles with numerous calls for a referendum on devolution. Several other European countries have latent nationalisms to cope with, the Belgian case possibly beyond repair. All have the potential to shake the present European interstate order, which rests on the assumption that borders are sacred and not to be altered, except by negotiation and mutual agreement. That is why the separation of Czechia and Slovakia was no problem, nor was the Scottish case, since that referendum was previously agreed with the UK government. Northern Ireland and former Yugoslavia illustrate the complexities.

The Catalonian parliament unilaterally declared independence for Catalonia in late October. Early regional elections for Catalonia are now taking place on December 21, ordered by the central government in Madrid as part of their response to the Catalonian rebellion. The central government has taken a moderate approach, after the unfortunate turn of events on October 1^st. Although court cases are underway against the leaders of that movement, the independence parties will participate in the elections again this time around. After three weeks of campaigning, with some of the leading figures in jail, others in self-imposed exile, the two sides, pro- and anti-secession, appear – incredibly - to be as before, neck and neck. Note that I am not counting the illegal referendum results, which were utterly unreliable, since voters knew far ahead of time that they would be breaking the law by trying to vote, and the conditions surrounding the vote were marked by unruly mobs and nervous police. The results to compare with are rather those of the regional elections in Catalonia in 2015, when the separatist parties gained 47% of the vote and got the slimmest of majorities (just one seat) in the parliament. On that shaky basis they formed the government which forged ahead to create an independent state, with or without the blessing of Madrid.

At this very sensitive moment, the first hurdle once the polls close is to have the results verified and legitimated. Any reduced support for the separatists will meet another test in the streets, with demands that votes be recounted by "neutral parties", in other words not by Madrid.

The second hurdle is to establish a government with a majority in parliament. Should the unionists win, their problem will be how to reintegrate the region, psychologically, socially and emotionally. Years of indoctrination by nationalists, entering all corners of daily life, will make this a chore more for generations than for electoral periods. Should the separatists win, we must brace ourselves for a continuation of the previous process of demanding independence. Some smartness might help the secessionists if they refrain from going it alone and open the door for dialogue. Madrid's most difficult challenge in this case will be to talk them back from the ultimate move and settle for something less. Use of force is not always avoidable in Spain, but the government in Madrid appear to have understood the seriousness of international reactions to October 1^st, regardless of how ill informed those reactions may have been.

That leads me to the third challenge, which is for all of the media observers to learn more about the basics of the Catalonian conflict and not jump to conclusions about who is to blame. The level of tendentious reporting in leading western news media outside Spain this fall has been baffling. Several international media have apparently decided to side with the rebels. The Guardian has had several very biased stories, but rectified that with a few recent inputs, excellent among them Peter Preston's lament on the difficulty of reporting fairly. (Peter Preston, the Guardian Dec. 10, 2017) The New York Times ran an editorial that fell for the claimed 92% for independence in the October 1^st illegal referendum, arguing that with such support one would have to take the separatists seriously, thus forgetting the other half of the electorate who did not vote. The Washington Post more recently published an op-ed with a poisonous rendering of the role of Madrid. Politico gave the jailed vice president of the defunct government, Oriol Junqueras, a front page article with a blazing headline (in politico.eu, the European edition of the US web journal Politico). Screaming at the reader, the imprisoned vice-president signals his approach to democracy: “We can’t trust Madrid to oversee Catalonia’s election — the EU must step in”.

In assessing this situation, some degree of reasonableness needs to enter into the evaluation. I close by recommending a rare and concise assessment by Quartz Media. 

No, Catalonia won't go away just yet. And secession is not a "right". (See my previous blogs.)

Catalonia Must Return to the Fold

The Spanish Government under Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has just announced the way it intends to bring Catalonia back to a normal legal status. Invoking the constitution's article 155, the Government asks the Senate's permission to intervene in the government of Catalonia with steps to remove the Catalonian leadership and restrict its decision-making powers until elections can be held. The measures are moderate and clearly aim to bring down the temperature and allow the resumption of democratic order. 

Here (once more, for those who have read my previous blogs on Catalonia) are the main reasons why Catalonia cannot rightfully claim independence: 

1. One cannot make such a drastic claim without a clear majority backing. This is not the case in Catalonia. The government of Catalonia is based on a parliamentary minority, 47% of the voters in the 2015 elections. The remaining 52 % have not asked for independence. All opinion polls in recent years have shown separatists to be in the minority. The conduct and results of the October 1^st referendum are in serious doubt due to the turbulent circumstances under which it was held and the disregard shown for internationally accepted procedures, considered inacceptable by international observers, as well as being deemed illegal by the Spanish Constitutional Court.
2. Catalonia has never suffered acts of repression by the Spanish state in the democratic era since Franco's death.
3. Catalonia voted by over 90% in the 1978 referendum to accept the Spanish constitution.
4. Catalonia has a high degree of autonomy by international standards, including its own official language. 
5. The Catalonian government used its parliament to knowingly break the law by passing two measures on September 6 and 7 intended to guide the implementation of the independence process, taking for granted that the planned referendum was legal in spite of the high court's decision to the contrary many months before.

Post-inauguration - Falling into Line

In your mind you can see the image of a policeman dispersing the crowd after an accident: “Okay folks, it's over. Time to go home.” Disaster complete, Trump now occupies the White House. No need for further drama. Normalcy descends on Washington. No cause for alarm. Dictatorship is elsewhere. It can't happen here.

Perhaps. New York Times blogger Charles Blow recently asked if we are not alarmed (New York Times, Jan 19). For sure I am alarmed, but I am not an American, not a US citizen. Americans are proud of their democracy. They also seem to expect a few hiccups to occur in the process without getting overly excited about it. Having objections becomes akin to extremism, crying wolf. Don't rock the boat. 

So if I have held my tongue since November it has also been to avoid stepping on toes in expressing my concerns. I remember how it was talking to colleagues in Washington in early 2003 - hardly a single voice dared challenge the rush to war. I thought, this is America, the land of freedom, of free speech, of devil-may-care opposition to "the establishment". Why this silence? The best explanation I heard, from a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, was that in his reading of the prevailing consensus, it 'would be seen to be unpatriotic' to object. He did not appear to be a Republican. I remember thinking, "this must be how the Nazis got ordinary Germans to support their cause." But I kept this thought to myself, as it seemed exaggerated. Now I'm less sure. The election of the new president in 2016 shows US democracy going off the rails.

What else do I see? Large numbers of people who refuse to view governing as necessarily a complicated thing. It's simple, easy as abc. Trump reassured them. Breaking the stifling binds of political correctness was enough for many to flock to him. The few who supported him out of a concern with issues must have thought the flaws of the candidate would be rectified by the system.

That is now our only hope. And I say "our", because the way the world works these days a US president is also the unofficial leader of the industrialized world. Not "leader of the free world" the way US presidents and many Americans take that label for granted, because such arrogance has never been accepted outside the US. Rather, what we outsiders want is an elected US leader which even a majority of Europeans, Aussies, Canadians and Japanese could have wanted and would accept. When the US electoral system shows its dysfunctionality the way it did in 2016, that worldwide legitimacy goes out the window. The overall US system of checks and balances is presently faced with, historically, its most serious test.

A friend just made me aware of a prediction made as much as a century ago: “On some great and glorious day the plain folks of the land will reach their heart's desire at last, and the White House will be adorned by a downright moron." (H.L. Mencken, writer, editor, and critic, 1880-1956 – thanks, John!). That day has arrived. The ignorance of this man is dangerous. His mind is somewhere else, totally consumed by his own person.

Most dangerously, as emphasized by Blow, is the military aspect. Military power is presently a part of his ego. War by accident or by sheer shortsighted stupidity is suddenly on the horizon. Much responsibility, informal and unprecedented, will henceforth end up on the shoulders of military commanders in the field, to avoid needless clashes by correcting or holding back adventurous schemes espoused at the top. Dr. Strangelove is now in office.

Trump - a would-be president without precedent?

Once upon a time there was a US presidential candidate who scared the wits out of his opponents by being a champion of the common man, vowing in his campaign to get rid of the corrupt elites in Washington. A famous hero, he at first won the election by the slimmest of margins, and yet was cheated (according to some) out of the prize by a decision in Congress staged by his enemies.

No, this fairy tale is not about the man you may have been thinking of.

It wasn't Al Gore either, he lost his presidency in the US Supreme Court. The man I am referring to went on to win the US presidency twice more - and no, it wasn't FDR either (he won four times). After the Inauguration of the hero of this story, the White House held an open-house reception, to which a huge crowd arrived, celebrating Andrew Jackson's victory. The drunken crowd overflowed the building and brought general chaos, to the point where furniture was broken and porcelain smashed, and the newly elected President had to escape by a side exit. That was the election of 1828. The victor, the 7^th US President, was also the founder of the Democratic party.

Hence, despite the disparate party labels, Andrew Jackson and Donald Trump could in some respects be said to be parallel cases, especially in their appeal to people who have felt «betrayed by the system», in the rough crowds both have had supporting them, and in the uncompromising way they both have related to minorities. Jackson pursued the policy of moving entire nations of Native Americans beyond the Mississippi; Trump has promised to ship 11 million illegal immigrants out of the country.

As for party labels, Trump's link to the Republican party is pretty tenuous and not very convincing to many Republicans of longer standing. Is he, then, a closet «populist»? The question is rather tricky, partly due to Trump's inconsistent statements over time, partly because populism is not a consensual term, which also has its special, more concrete meaning in the US, linked to the Populist Party of a century or so ago. The Economist considered the question in an article this summer and concluded Trump's politics was not populism, but rather «[a]n unpleasant but often politically successful mix of populism, nativism and xenophobia, delivered with a dollop of cynicism.” (The Economist, July 4th, 2016) (Nativism, in the sense of giving preference to those born in the country as against foreigners.)

All told, it may be an insult to Andrew Jackson, who at his election was already an experienced politician, a lawyer and a general – a proven military hero - to compare him to a TV personality and real-estate mogul like Donald Trump, an unproven politician who has repeatedly demonstrated himself to be simply a self-obsessed braggard.

A Spanish Government - Now?

Wake up, folks. The sleepy, drawn-out process of forming a government in Spain is coming to a climax - sort of – mañana! By October 31 Spain must either have a new government, or another general election will be called to take place in two months' time. It will be the unprecedented third election in a row, so far two of them without a government being formed.

Two parliamentary elections (December 2015 and June 2016) have led to no government at all. Spaniards are known to be stubborn, if not mulish, but there is more to it than that. (See also my blog this spring, “A Spaniard is never wrong”.) The previous government of the conservative Partido Popular under Mariano Rajoy (2011-2015) has continued to serve as caretaker government. Two failed attempts to form a government during the year have instead led to the internal collapse of the main opposition party, the Socialist and Workers' Party (PSOE).

After 300 days without an elected government, having a government seems to make little difference. But in reality the Spanish political system has been going through a deep crisis. Barely visible before this year, it has only shown up for real since the last ordinary election. The crisis is due to changes in the main systemic features. Since 1996 Spain has usually been considered a two-party system, alternating between governments of the socialists and the conservatives. Now this picture is fading.

What has buttressed the two main parties' position has been corruption, at all levels of government. (See my blog in July 2013.) Funds siphoned by way of kickbacks from the national government, from the regional and provincial governments and from the municipal governments have kept large numbers of people in a comfortable situation, tying their fate for the long term to that of the party, even if only as sympathizers. Apparently the PP is the grandest culprit, judging from the number of court cases completed or currently underway, but the PSOE is also in the game. Since Spanish politics, the banks and the courts are also intertwined through political appointments, the system is very difficult to uproot.

On top of this, Spain has an extensive regime of immunity from prosecution for elected and publicly appointed officials. This system of keeping politicos free from prosecution has reached a scale apparently unknown in the rest of Europe. We are talking about thousands of public servants. Any thought of combatting corruption and reforming the system will therefore run into massive resistance. Hence the core of each of the two main parties is unlikely to collapse or yield to reform.

The consequences have come out during this year's skirmishing for a new government. On the left the PSOE saw its ranks decimated by the departure of its left wing, which went on to form a new party, Podemos. With its base in protest movements against the government's austerity program, Podemos now even surpasses the mother party in certain polls. One of its key demands is the conduct of referenda on independence for Catalonia and whatever other region demands it. This, of course, is anathema to most other Spanish political parties outside Catalonia.

On the center-right the country's leading party since 2011, the Partido Popular, failed to gain a majority in the elections last December and June, though it was the biggest party both times. The PP has been suffering from a serious loss of support, much due to its entanglement in corruption. The conservatives have also been hurt by the formation of a new center-liberal party, Ciudadanos, which demands “clean hands” in government.

These two new breakaway parties (Podemos and Ciudadanos) have created a situation where their closest political kin are at the same time their bitterest rivals, perhaps most obvious in the case of the PSOE. This has made coalition-building exceedingly difficult. Hard feelings have also led to unwise and endless emotional sparrings in public instead of sitting down in private for serious talks. When negotiations have taken place, a main feature has been the internal debates in the PSOE about what positions to take. The party leader until October 1st, Pedro Sanchez, has had to negotiate – more or less in public - both inward and outward.

Sanchez insisted on neither supporting Rajoy's attempts at forming a government, nor facilitating them by abstaining in Congress. His stance on these points was so unyielding that it earned him the nick-name “Pedro no-no”. As PSOE failed itself at their only attempt to form a government (in March), the sensible way forward to at least get some government in place, would be to yield to Rajoy and abstain. Even the grand old man of Spanish socialism, Felipe Gonzalez, said so publicly later in the spring. But Pedro no-no never yielded, and this may have become his bane. Presiding over two electoral losses and seeing his polls declining, he was increasingly ripe for his critics to harvest. That happened on October 1^st. It was an astounding political event, for a major political party to oust its leader in the midst of a coalition-forming process.

The PSOE “abstentionists“ (centrists) appear to have taken command of the party for now, presumably to be confirmed in a top party meeting on Sunday October 23^rd. Internal party resistance is still evident in some quarters. Voting in the Congress will then take place on the [26^th and] 27^th, and should Mr. Rajoy fail again at that time the King will announce new elections on Saturday October 29^th.

In a hopeful sign Ciudadanos has managed to make a deal with PP on fighting corruption, to support it in the next attempt to form a government. That deal was made on the occasion of Rajoy's most recent attempt to govern (in August), and is likely to stand in the next attempt as well.

If Rajoy and PP pass the investiture vote, they will be living from hand to mouth thereafter. The budget will have to be passed and all manner of cabinet appointments will need support from the enemies on the other side. Support from Ciudadanos will not be enough. Spain has had minority governments before, but never as weak as this.

Brexit - An Earthshaking Geopolitical Change in Europe

The decision of the British voters by 52 to 48 per cent to leave the European Union must be rated the biggest change in European affairs since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the reunification of Germany. Over the course of the next two years Britain and the EU will thrash out an agreement over the terms of the British departure. Until then Britain will continue to be a member of the EU just as before, except with the consequences of the knowledge that this will all soon come to an end.

The reason this decision is so momentous is of course the political weight of Britain, owing to her financial and economic strength, her historical role as a leading European champion of freedom, and her achievement over the past 50 years of turning her global empire of yesterday, via a sometimes shaky process of retraction, into a liberal, multicultural showcase of working democracy. In European trade the UK has long been a leader for countries previously joined with Britain in EFTA, several of which followed her into the European Community and later the EU. In security affairs the UK is the European anchor of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Taken together these factors all mean that subtracting the UK from the EU makes the remaining 27 union members that much weaker, both economically and strategically. In geopolitical terms, there will - in sum - be that much less determination from the European side facing Russia under Mr. Putin's provocative leadership, and also less clout for the EU in global trade negotiations, such as the transatlantic negotiations ongoing.

 There is all the more reason to follow closely the way the coming process of divorce is carried out, as mismanagement can easily lead to worse consequences. One of the most serious of such possibilities is the dislodgement of Scotland from the UK in a renewed referendum for independence, since both Scotland and Northern Ireland voted heavily in the Brexit referendum to remain in the EU. Such exits would leave the UK drastically weakened, as the game of British dominoes could play itself out in amazing ways.

Electoral season 2016

What an electoral season! With Trump and Brexit all over the news, who would have noticed that the Spanish parliamentary elections of last December utterly failed to produce a government? Only the Spaniards. As I predicted in my previous blog, an inbred cultural blinder to the role of mutual concessions would hamper coalition formation. And it certainly did. New elections had to be called. Now one can already see the signs of another failure in the campaign for the repeat elections on June 26, as party leaders hammer each other with insults that will be hard to retract, once the voters have had their say. As in last December, no party is likely to be even near a majority in Spain.

Of course, while the Spanish will be forced to compromise, in the US there is no need to. At least this is Donald Trump’s obvious bet. As outside observers, we Europeans have been watching with fascination how nearly half of the US electorate appear to have gone collectively mad in the Republican primaries. Trumpomania rules. What we have seen in the US this spring demonstrates why the ancient Greeks were so sceptical of democracy. It even gives the resistance to democracy of today’s Chinese government a sheen of respectability. Mr Putin and Mr. Erdogan could equally claim to be in good company, as is Mr. Urban and his Polish colleagues. Trumpism is populism at its most incoherent, demagogic and dangerous.

At this point the obligatory re-run of the Spanish elections on June 26 is pushed aside even in the Spanish news by the Brexit thriller, to take place three days before. In the British case, as in the US and Spanish ones, the preferred strategy seems to be to go all out with over-the-top argumentation.

Going for the extreme has been this spring’s theme whether in the US primaries, the Spanish parliamentaries or the British referendum. Exaggeration works! We have now seen how this entices a mentally deranged person to stab and shoot to death a parliamentarian he disagrees with. Another crucial limit has been breached.

We can see the politics of a hundred years ago in the mirror.

A Spaniard is Never Wrong

When I first arrived in Spain to live, I soon encountered an unexpected phenomenon in public offices and many shops: a disinterest in customers or clients and a stubborn refusal to admit error, both of which are clearly dysfunctional to the conduct of daily business. One of my first sketches for a blog had the headline you see above. But then I thought, let's cool it. We all have our quirks. And many foreigners coming to Spain are quite overbearing. I laid that blog on ice.

Still, these impressions on my part assumed that those Spanish habits were only directed at foreigners. Later I realized I was wrong. The post-election circus of January-February surrounding the formation of a new national government is revealing of just these tendencies. The insistence on being right and holding their own line is not just a way of facing foreigners; it is how Spaniards treat each other, at least in public affairs.

Two words in Spanish may illustrate. First, equivocarse, "being wrong". Spanish is a language kind to people in the wrong. It assumes that a person who acts contrary to rules or logic is not wrong, he or she only mistakes one thing for another, or does something poorly, or misunderstands. To be wrong in a more direct sense is not part of the picture. If a Spaniard acts contrary to rules or logic, it is not because he fails to grasp, to understand things, or because he intentionally breaks the rules. Doing so would assume he is either stupid or criminal. The prevalence of this kind of attitude smooths relations at all social levels, at least for those who understand what's going on. It may also serve to hide the truth from others, who don't really get it.

Not surprisingly, therefore, there is no direct translation. The Spanish word for being wrong is «equivocarse», quite close to the English word equivocate. You know what that word means in English; it signals ambiguity, to speak with double meaning. In French it connotes uncertainty, dubiousness, misunderstanding. In the Spanish language «equivocarse» is the nearest one can come to saying someone is in error. In my Spanish-Spanish Diccionario de Bolsillo the verb «errar» (Eng.: to err) is defined as «equivocarse». But there can be no doubt the etymology is about "two or more equal calls", two voices, two meanings. Nothing about error.

What is the broader significance of this? It shows a cultural reluctance to admit error, to refuse to take the bull by the horns (sic!), or to confront error with a correction. Errors are not really errors, just mishaps. Corruption is not really corruption, it is rather just something that oils the machinery of public affairs. Nothing wrong with that, is there? In general the soft tone of equivocarse may be irritating, or sometimes even charming. Nevertheless, in public administration and politics it can cause complications.

Next word: «compromiso». Unless you know the language you might think it means compromise, but in a timely article in El Pais, John Carlin points out that the idea of arriving at agreement by making mutual concessions is foreign to Spanish political culture. The word compromise evidently has no direct translation into Spanish.

(See "Una palabra elemental que no existe en español", El Pais, January18, 2016.).

Now, clearly there are other expressions in Spanish that convey that meaning, for example "transigir" (to make concessions). That goes as well for being wrong, "equivocarse". My point is, though, that compromise and equivocate are words familiar in the political discourse of other European languages, but their meaning in Spanish is shifted to something else. The underlying tendency in their Spanish sense is to avoid losing face if you fail. Barring that, stick to your guns and press others to concede.

This tendency of inflexibility is reflected in the actions of the major party leaders in Spanish politics after the elections of December 20. They stick to their "red lines" (irrevocable positions) despite knowing well that nobody else will accept them. With open eyes, and the deadline fast approaching for deciding on new elections, they are heading for the precipice. New elections. As if that will save them.

Catalonia: The End of Artur Mas, but Hardly the End of the Independence Movement

(Updated after new developments late on January 9.)

Spain still has no government after the elections on December 20, only a caretaker cabinet awaiting a difficult coalition formation. That is nothing. Catalonia has not had a government since the regional elections on September 27, only a caretaker one led by Artur Mas, with 47% in his favor the presumptive winner of those elections. Three months after the elections Mr. Mas has been unable to find sufficient support for his investiture.  Parties supporting his pet cause of independence for Catalonia have won a majority of seats in the Catalonian assembly. So why has Mr. Mas not been installed as president?

The reason clearly is the person of Artur Mas himself, whose candidacy for another term (his third) as President of Catalonia is divisive, and not at all accepted by a small group of "independentistas" on the left, whose votes are needed to confirm him. Not to forget, Mas is not acceptable either to the remaining half of the Catalonian assembly, who also reject the goal of independence. Autonomy, yes, but not sovereignty.

The persistent failure of Mr. Mas to garner more convincing support for his independence project is visible in his election results. Not that 50% in 2010, or 47% in 2015, is trifling. But an earthshaking change like independence, to break loose from a democratic country like Spain, which has granted a wide range of autonomy privileges to Catalonia and other regions, would seem to require a much stronger basis than just 50% popular support. It might also require a wiser leader, one able to see that his own person has become a stumbling block for the broader political goal.

As you read this, on Sunday, January 10 the deadline arrived for presenting a candidate for President and a government for Catalonia. At the very last moment, on the eve of the deadline, Artur Mas finally stepped aside, so that - according to his statement - new elections would not have to be called. The replacement candidate for the office of President, Carles Puigdemont, mayor of Girona, was subsequently elected at the inaugural session on January 10.

At long last, a small sign of stabilization for Catalonia, whose future has also become a serious snag in the talks for a new national governing coalition. Still, not too much can be expected even with a new Catalonian president. The same push for Catalonian independence will continue. 

Its support is perniciously entrenched among the new socialists in Podemos, whose 69 representatives in the new national Congress of Deputies number more than 20 who are not elected on the pure Podemos ticket, but on regional joint lists between Podemos and local, smaller independentista parties, most of them in Catalonia, but several seats also in Valencia and Galicia. These splinter parties are literally "blackmailing" Podemos at the national level into supporting their demand for a Catalonian referendum. Implicitly the Galicians and Valencians also have independence for their own region as their goal. This way the secessionist movement in Spain is becoming like a network of cells spreading from a center in Catalonia to the national level where the demand for referenda on independence is currently choking every attempted coalition.

Spanish politics has seen trouble brewing over several years, though the absolute majority of the Partido Popular made the unrest seem inconsequential. Now stability suddenly seems far off. 

Spanish Elections: Punishment for Rajoy

The mood ahead of the elections was morose, in some quarters tending towards the rebellious. It shows in the results. The Spanish political system, for years dominated by two political parties, is now in splinters. Since 1996 the country has had alternating governments by conservative PP (Partido Popular) and socialist PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español), most recently four years in majority led by PP's Mariano Rajoy, following an eight year stint (one period in majority, one in minority) by the socialist party under José Luis Zapatero, and eight years before that under PP with José Maria Aznar.

The latest poll by Sigma Dos for El Mundo (December 14) indicated only 27% for PP (they got 28%, a severe loss since 2011 when they won 45% and an absolute majority of seats). The socialist PSOE garnered 22%, also a significant loss, down from 29% in 2011. The real winners were the two new challenger parties offering themselves as alternatives to the two old majors: Podemos (“We can”, socialist-left) now nearly as big as the old PSOE, and Ciudadanos ("Citizens") eating into the support for the old PP. Both will now be key partners in the coalition talks ahead.


Rajoy’s tumble from an absolute majority to less than a third reflects the trouble he has had, though many would say he put himself into it. On the one hand, his great victory in November 2011 was more due to the severity of the economic crisis and the apparent inability of the Socialists to do anything about it than to any overwhelming charm or political skill on the part of the winner. On the other hand, the challenge of the Catalonian independence movement came like a hurricane with little warning, along with the Spanish banking crisis in 2012.


The banking crisis followed on the collapse of the real estate market, beginning in 2008, which then PM Zapatero refused to call a crisis. That opened the way for PP to demand a true austerity program, including reform of the labor market, which ultimately led to PP’s victory in 2011. The banking crisis started as a bad loans crisis as in many other countries, but the tight relations between the banking and political sectors in Spain made everything worse. It tied into the extraordinary public debt level in the country that qualified it for inclusion in the PIGS acronym.


One of the first things Rajoy actually pushed for after coming to power was the public debt issue. In particular the debt of the autonomous regions had been ballooning without any clear regime to contain it, partly due to the absence of any constitutional division of powers in this regard. Economics Minister Montoro put his hand to institutionalizing an improvised, concerted co-management of the regional debt and gradually brought it under control. Hence Rajoy felt he had it in line, and was clearly annoyed when European and US players began demanding more external aid for Spain. In August 2012 the Wall Street Journal made waves by noting that American investors and the New York stock exchange were getting nervous because Rajoy refused to accept an EU bailout for Spain. He preferred to maintain the austerity programs already in place. Ultimately a bailout came forth, but Rajoy insisted it was not a bailout like those for Greece, Portugal and Ireland, since it was merely for the private banking sector.


The labor market reform was perhaps less noted among Rajoy’s controversies, probably because even the socialists knew that something had to be done to rein in the over-generous severance pay system, though they hated it. PP’s labor reform has led to a system where most jobs are temporary, which is the main complaint against it. Other industrialized countries’ labor markets function well with this kind of system. Permanent employment is a thing of the past. As with the debt problem, the labor market is among Rajoy’s successes, in my view.


On the downside of the austerity success, Rajoy has been blamed for the fact that 110,000 patients have died while waiting for an operation in his term of office, many more than in the preceding period. A tough charge, not lightly dismissed, but at the same time a tragic systemic effect, not a personal decision.


Rajoy has also been severely criticized for his handling of the Catalonian challenge. Especially his anti-catalonian rhetoric has been questioned. Opposition party leader Pedro Sanchez of PSOE charges Catalonian president Artur Más as the one responsible for this fracas (as he certainly is), while he simultaneously points to Rajoy as the one “guilty”, that is, of being too passive in the case. But when he has to tell the truth, Sanchez is as critical of the Catalonian independence project as nearly everyone else in the Madrid political universe. That is as it should be. My view is that as compared to the rabid antics of Artur Más, Rajoy is an example of patience and reasonableness. (See my several blogs on the Catalonian independence demands since 2011.)


Finally, there is the revelation by PP party treasurer Bárcenas of the secret funds in Swiss bank accounts he had been managing for his party, sensationally published by the two leading newspapers El Mundo and El Pais in January 2013. Secret payments had been made for decades as (extra) PP salaries and to cover expenses for party officials, including Rajoy. Resisting insistent calls for his demission, the Prime Minister explained to the Parliament that he himself had done nothing illegal and that without knowing what was going on he had trusted Bárcenas - as he would have trusted anyone he did not have reason to disbelieve or suspect of wrongdoing. Clearly this implied declaration of distance from the secret funding is less than convincing, even more so considering that Rajoy is famous for his micromanagement of both the government and his party. (See my blog in the summer of 2013, comparing Rajoy and Helmuth Kohl.)

A more straightforward political failure is the disastrous PP loss in the Andalucian elections spring 2015 in which Rajoy and the PP national leadership involved themselves deeply, in support of a weak candidate. This was a case of severe prestige loss more than anything. It was the worst result for PP in Andalucia in 25 years, down ⅓, after recently gaining the prize of becoming the biggest party in the 2012 elections. Andalucia, the most populous region in Spain, is a socialist stronghold and losing in 2015 the top position gained in 2012 was a major setback.

Ultimately, despite the loss for Rajoy, he will remain a leading player in the post-election game of constructing a workable government. It will not be easy. The outcome is deeply fragmented.

Why these killings?

This space is open to all muslims who are willing to explain why it is necessary to kill innocent, unarmed people. Of course, I do understand that from a muslim perspective those killed are not in fact innocent. They are infidels. And therefore they must die. The killers, on the other hand, are muslim heros. They must also die, apparently. 

Our children want to know why a religion that calls for so much killing is a good religion. 

If there are any muslims wishing to express regret for what happened in Paris on Nov 13, 2015, they can do it here. I welcome every single one. 

The Ultimate Test of European Liberal Immigration Policies

Various evidence indicates that 2/3 or more of all non-European migrants currently arriving are in search of a better life. That is nothing for them to be ashamed of, but also no reason to grant them asylum. On the other hand, our European challenge now is much greater than just bolstering the shaky asylum regime. It must be changed, reformed, and nobody dares.

A liberal border and asylum regime in the European Union worked as long as most people outside the EU were reasonably content with their condition. They stayed at home, and Europeans expected them to continue doing that. In return, European development aid was a way of paying off a perceived debt of guilt.

But now, that formula no longer works. When war and social turbulence rattle a whole region in Europe's southeastern vicinity, one should not be surprised to see civilians moving away from chaos. Syrians' closest neighbors outside of that chaos are Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. They have done more than could be expected of them. After years of shouldering the burden, their capacity to help was exhausted. There was only Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states left who had resources and space to aid refugees.

But these Arab Muslim brothers were brothers only in theory. In practice, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia has showed itself to be morally sick. High on sharia, low on humanity.

So turning to the West was the alternative left to the refugees from Syria, Iraq, Libya and beyond. Indeed, over the horizon Europe was beckoning, with generous governmental subsistence grants (see my blog of June 26) for those who gained asylum. The policy of northern EU countries offered a predictable monthly respite from poverty - but also from the need to work or learn the language of the host country. Information on the amount of the subsidies was easily available even outside Europe, and the flow of migration went "to the highest bidders", Sweden and Germany. 

It may be crass to say it like that, perhaps, but that is the pernicious outcome of a well-intentioned policy that was supposed to be more or less the same all across the EU. Member states - like Sweden - who felt able to offer a bit more than the sparse EU average subsidy - were of course free to do so. This competition among the generous few led to the ludicrous situation that asylum grantees in Sweden receive more than the average income of Swedish citizens, and are not required to pay taxes on this income. Why seek a job under such circumstances?

Other Nordic countries, like Denmark and Norway, have recently changed their policies in a more sensible direction.

Of course, in the waiting period for a decision on their status, asylum seekers in Sweden are not as well provided for as those whose applications have already been accepted. Asylum seekers' per diem keeps them acceptably supported, and their lodging is free. Yet, if  their asylum application is denied, and they are due to be deported, Swedish authorities have not until now implemented their deportation immediately. Instead they have even continued to pay the same per diem as before, even though the recipients are (by now) illegals. Desperate to stay, these illegals do what most in their situation would - they hide. Some are stressed to the point of turning to violence, as recent cases in Sweden show.

Out of a desire to appear kinder than most, Sweden has also exceeded the EU advisory norms on other counts. The EU has advisory policies on most aspects of the treatment of non-European migrants. One of them is the special care to be taken to help unaccompanied children - defined as youngsters up to the age of 18. Now how do you tell the age of a person who has no reliable ID, or none at all? Using medical criteria is the obvious solution, as is done by most Nordic countries, and others. Except Sweden, where influential voices claim that such testing is a "breach of personal integrity".

So Sweden is now well stocked with "children" of normal adult stature, sporting beards, using drugs and showing rough behavior not exactly typical of children. Tests by migration authorities on hundreds of asylum seekers, conducted both in Denmark and Norway, have shown that between 3/4 and 9/10 of the asylum seekers who claimed to be children, are medically speaking over 18. Sweden accepts them on their word. Their acceptance as children in Sweden is jeopardizing the existence of the real child migrants who are housed separately and given special care. As I see it, those who lie about their age are not the kind to be welcomed as new residents of Europe.

Other statistics on the masses of non-European arrivals in 2015 indicate that a large number of them are young men, under 35, who are in search of a better life. Realistically, these young men have had the choice of either going to war for one of the fighting sides in Syria (or whatever country they are from), or get out, in search of a peaceful existence. Many of them have families. Of course they would not be safe if they should go back. So who can blame them for "choosing peace", which is actually what they do, even as they run away from deportation? Their situation illustrates the unsuitability of the entire asylum and immigration regimes for the kind of situation where a country's whole civilian population is on the run because of the conduct of a murderous few.

The true situation now, in which very large numbers of migrants will predictably see their asylum application rejected, is "how to move them back out of Europe", how to find "safe countries" to move them to. The impatient say, kick them out, send them back where they came from.

Will that work? Hardly. Large numbers of them are likely to run away, go underground. We Europeans have contributed - by a misconceived, excessively unconstrained policy - to creating a situation that is unsustainable. The consequences will now be fully upon us. We need to recognize that from now on, Europe has a large new contingent of prospective future citizens in our midst, a minority that we cannot simply treat as criminals. 

The massive numbers of present migrants are far beyond the capacity of EU member states to offer meaningful welfare. A completely revised legal regime is required. The prohibition on returning deported persons to unsafe countries of origin is idealistic, but unsustainable. It must end. 

At the same time, immigration on normal (non-asylum) grounds must become much more open, much more available to people from non-European backgrounds. Immigration for work is the only solution. EU labor unions hold the key to resolving this conundrum. If they do not see their current blocking position for what it is, we are headed for a spate of ugly conflicts all across our continent. In fact, they have already begun.

Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet

Unexpected by most people, the award has a sound logic: Middle Eastern countries have shown, with the Arab Spring rebellions and their aftermath, that what Weber called a “sultanistic regime”, an unlimited despotism, is deeply entrenched in the region (see my blog "Arab Democracy" of April 14, 2011). Most outside observers agree that this must change, and many have argued that the failed Arab Spring movements prove that change can only come from above, under strictly controlled circumstances. Egypt under President Sisi is their model.

The Nobel Peace Prize for 2015, however, underlines the need for long-term stable change to come from below and to involve all segments of society, not just some who claim ascendancy over all others. The danger of civil war when this line of thinking is ignored is obviously most clearly illustrated by Syria.

The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet includes the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers (Ordre National des Avocats de Tunisie). The Norwegian Nobel Committee states its motivation in these words:

"The Quartet was formed in the summer of 2013 when the democratization process was in danger of collapsing as a result of political assassinations and widespread social unrest. It established an alternative, peaceful political process at a time when the country was on the brink of civil war. It was thus instrumental in enabling Tunisia, in the space of a few years, to establish a constitutional system of government guaranteeing fundamental rights for the entire population, irrespective of gender, political conviction or religious belief."

With this fortunate award, the Norwegian Nobel Committee - appointed by the Norwegian Parliament - comes out of the shadows of a period of bad press and public infighting. The Committee's former secretary for 25 years, Geir Lundestad, recently (Sept. 17) published a volume of scandal-tinged memoirs, in which he sharply criticized the former Committee chairman, ex-premier and current Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Torbjørn Jagland, for poor leadership and bad decisions.

While the 2009 award to President Obama certainly raised eyebrows in most quarters, and the EU award in 2012 also was questioned by many, the attention of Mr. Lundestad's book was focused more on personal relations within the Committee. The "open-hearted" ad-hominem style of its author - a respected diplomatic historian - led to an acrimonious media debate in which Mr. Lundestad had to face his former employers and former admirers head on. He found his book less than well received. The Nobel Committee accused him of breach of the Foundation's pledge of secrecy, and ultimately expelled him from his office in the Nobel Foundation's building.

After this debacle, a late summer soap opera, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has marked itself with the award for 2015 as a change of course for the better, well reasoned and fortunate in its underlying evaluations. The Committee has no new members since last year, only a change of Chair and Secretary. Some of the credit for this whiff of change undoubtedly belongs here. The new leadership of Ms. Kaci Kullmann Five (Cons.) as Chair and Dr. Olav Njølstad as Secretary indicate that the Committee is in good health and on course to tackle more of these difficult decisions in the future.

European Xenophobia

Migrant smugglers have produced another hideous record number of victims in their detestable trade this week, in Austria and Hungary and in the Mediterranean off the Libyan coast. Smuggling refugees for money and then knowingly setting them up to die reveals a degree of inhumanity rarely seen. These smugglers are not just Africans or Middle Easterners. They are apparently also Europeans - as in the case of the truckload of dead bodies found in Austria this week. Other ugly anti-immigrant incidents and racist political tendencies have reappeared in Europe with the recent resurgent wave of refugees from Syria and other Mid-East war zones. I myself have long been sceptical of an open-arms policy for non-European immigration, given the proven lack of capacity for housing and decent living conditions in the countries most eager to receive non-European migrants - such as Sweden. But refugees from active war zones must be taken care of.

Here is where European Union countries fail, by their unwillingness to coordinate their policies and acting like a union, instead of like a flock of scared rabbits. Xenophobia - hatred and fear of strangers - is what it is about.

How widespread is this phenomenon? While reliable information is hard to come by for such a fleeting notion as xenophobia, one possibility to learn more is to have a look at asylum decisions made by the EU member governments. Are they equally strict, the way it is supposed to be according to EU policy? Or do some countries have much higher rejection rates than others? In that case one would suspect a bias in asylum seekers' disfavor.

The Eurostat figures on asylum seekers in 2014 published earlier this year make it possible to check and compare the rates of rejection of asylum applications in different EU countries. These rates are not published by Eurostat, but have instead been computed by this writer on the basis of the Eurostat figures for the number of applications and the number of rejections in each country.

One should note that these statistics are only from one year and so cannot tell whether the rate shown is a happenstance or part of a longer trend for the country in question. Comparing rejection rates for different countries also assumes that similar groups of migrants show up at all borders of the union. This may not necessarily be so. We know for instance that Germany for several years has had a considerable number of applicants from the former Yugoslavia, countries which do not give grounds for asylum now that they are at peace. Such applicants have not shown up in similar numbers elsewhere, and their applications naturally have (had) to be rejected.

But have a look at the figures. They span from 100% rejections down to 6.

                      Non-EU Asylum Rejection Rates 2014*

                     Pct rejected Total decisions Total accepted

Liechtenstein           100%                     10              0

Hungary                     91%                 5445          510

Croatia                      89%                   235            25

Luxembourg              86%                   885          120

Greece                       85%                13305        1970

France                       78%               68500       14815

Iceland                       75%                   120           120

Portugal                     74%                   155             40

Latvia                         74%                     95             25

Poland                       73%                 2700           720

Austria**                   70%               16610         4920

Czech Rep                  63%                 1000            375

Estonia                       63%                     55             20

Ireland                        62%                 1060          400

UK                             61%                25870       10050

Belgium                      60%                20335         8045

Lithuania                    59%                    185             70

Germany                    58%                97275        40560

Spain                           56%                 3620          1585

Romania                     53%                 1585            740

Slovenia                     53%                     95              45

Finland                        46%                 2340          1270

Italy                             42%               35180        20580

Slovakia                      39%                    280          170

Norway                       36%                  7640          4905

Netherlands                 33%                18790        12550

Denmark                      32%                  8055        5480

Switzerland                  29%                21800        15410

Malta                            27%                  1735        1260

Cyprus                         24%                  1305            995

Sweden                         23%                39905        30650

Bulgaria                          6%                  7435          7000

EU total**                   55%               357425      160070

*Computed from Eurostat, First Instance Decisions on (Non-EU) asylum Applications 2014.

** Austrian figures are from 2013. Hence, Austria is excluded from EU total.

First of all, note that the EU average is 55% rejections, a high figure if we can assume most of the arrivals are there for a legitimate reason. Next, to find Liechtenstein at the top with 100% rejections could be mainly a reflection of its tiny size. Then, on the other hand, among the highest ten we find a clear predominance of East-Central European countries. More significantly, France, Luxembourg and Iceland figure among the high scorers. Surprising, perhaps, but also disconcerting in the case of France, which is currently trying, along with Germany, to take a leading role in this field and set an example for others.

In contrast, one notes Italy with as low a rejection rate as 42%, amazing given their position as a first-line recipient country. Now, we know there are hidden aspects to these figures. Italy quietly encourages migrants to move north without registering in Italy, which gives these migrants a degree of choice and alternatives to the overflowing conditions of Italy. When some of them arrive in France, they are first held up at the border with Italy, and next, once they are on the French side most of them make a beeline for Calais, instead of stopping elsewhere in France, hoping to make it across to Britain somehow. That they are just passing through seems to suit the French fine.

The largest numbers find their way to Germany, where the generosity is great, while social pressures are also great. The old East of Germany reacts much like their reluctant eastern neighbors: "We just made it into prosperity, and now they come to take it away from us again!" Hungary is a notable case, clearly reflected in their high rejection rate. The Baltic states still have large numbers of Russian non-citizens living within their borders as relics of the Soviet past; they also are reluctant to open their doors any more, but their populations are so small it hardly affects the larger picture whatever they do.

The Swedish case, at the low end of the scale, is impressive. On a per capita basis Sweden tops all others in the EU and the EEA. The sheer number of asylum seekers accepted in 2014 by Sweden (30 thousand) is more than the total number combined accepted by France (14 000) and Britain (10 000). Only Germany took in a higher number.

Ultimately there is no way to decide with absolute certainty from these figures what is the state of xenophobia in Europe. But it does offer a glimpse. What one might more precisely call this attitude is a reluctance to share with those less-well off, and especially to share too close to home. "Take my foreign aid, but don't come here and mess up my doorstep." - Indeed, with the latest wave of refugees from the Syria of Assad and his Russian supporters, we may have reached the end of long-distance development aid - money from the wealthy north-west going to the poor south. As a BBC analyst recently expressed it, perhaps we shall have to restart the development process at home in the future. Why should we expect people to live under the brutal and corrupt regimes of the Middle East and Africa when they do not even get access to the foreign aid their rulers so gracefully cash in on their behalf? They are ultimately coming north. Perhaps we must accept that as the cost of having lived with such great global economic disparities for so long.

Nevertheless, the unsustainability case still stands. There is a limit to the capacity of Western welfare states to take in ever increasing numbers of refugees, as also the Danish historian Bo Lidegaard recently argued. How can we continue to also give 5 relatives permission to come after for family reunions for each asylum application granted? The standard levels of benefits must necessarily go down, protected job markets must open up, old privileges in the recipient countries must go, and emergency housing must be organized on an industrial scale.

This is also why the EU must share the burdens of the refugee situation in a better way, or face serious decline, perhaps collapse. The Schengen area is already in question. Under such tumultuous conditions on the old European borders as those we have seen this August, a serious shift in policy must come about. The challenge is on a par with the EU's task of taking in the former Soviet-controlled countries from 2004, nothing less.