I am not so sure this gets at the reality of their relationship, nor at their role in the wider European Union. In my view, one needs a different angle. I shall look into the nature of their role in Europe by using the naval metaphors of the headline: Are Germany and France the main supports of the good ship Europe - without whom all is in risk of failing, or are they two dangerous heavyweight power players only looking out for their own good, to the point of wrecking anything that comes in their way? (No, I'm not going to end up somewhere in the middle, so you can keep reading.)
Have a look in the rear view mirror. In early 1990 Germany was not yet united, but just about to. It was clear to everyone that merging the two Germanies would produce a new magnum power, a fear-inspiring European giant. France and Britain evidently tried to block the move, but were too late. Soon, at Germany's request, its four occupying powers (Britain, France, the US and the USSR) started unification talks with German representatives in Berlin. At the talks, the Soviet Union was pushing for united Germany to be neutral and demilitarized, while the US Bush-I Administration pulled in the other direction, to have all of Germany, the East included, as part of NATO. For their new-found harmony to endure, the two Cold War opponents had to agree. While the talks were going on I visited Moscow in March as junior company to Johan Jørgen Holst, former Minister of Defence and later Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway and at that time my boss. Lithuania had just declared its independence and everything in the USSR was floating around and hanging loose. Holst had a time-out from official duty and used the time to check up on (inter alia) the situation in the USSR. In all our meetings with Soviet officials and analysts Holst pushed his theme that a neutral united Germany would be the worst thinkable solution - “a loose cannon on the decks of Europe” as he put it, the strongest power in Europe with no compelling structures to tie it down. Mr. Holst was already well known and respected in Moscow. His line was that only NATO and the European Communities could keep a united Germany in check. By July 1990 the Soviet leadership finally came around to that way of looking at it. Mr. Gorbachev gave his assent to united Germany's membership in NATO.
Loose cannon aside, was the 1990 image of a dominant new Germany a realistic danger? Moscow, for sure, has later regretted allowing the NATO move, which has shifted Germany further out of reach of Russia's influence. The rest of Europe has probably benefitted. In retrospect it is indeed an open question whether it was necessary to tie united Germany down, because the task of absorbing East German lands into the existing structures of federal Western Germany took an unprecedented toll on the Federal Republic's resources, dragging its economy into the doldrums for more than a decade. Moreover, now that the German economy is back in high gear, it is reassuring to know that the attitude of most Germans towards Europe was and is (in my personal estimation) an ideal mix of caution, standard-setting stringency and optimism.
France saw its role in post-World War II Europe from the earliest time as building a strong European house to contain (West) Germany so that German militarism would never more be a threat. France was the architect and the master builder of the European institutions we have since come to know so well. Hand-in-hand with integration came the development of the special Franco-German relationship, which to the French always was about gently guiding the Germans along the path to peace and democracy. The Germans, from Adenauer on, played along wisely and always prioritized the Franco-German relationship, never letting on that they might be able to find their way alone. This fiction legitimized West Germany's place as free Europe's solid but boring number 2, always a step behind the shining example of its western neighbor. To Germany the cost was not excessive - partly a matter of foregone prestige, but mainly a patient indulgence of being left to pay the lion's share of the cost of France's excessive benefits from European integration. The Common Agricultural Policy was (and is) waste hole number one, and Germany the biggest contributor. Hence, as long as Germany was divided the French (and European collective) mission of containing Germany remained a credible one.
But that figleaf suddenly disappeared with German unification, which is also why the French instinctively opposed the project when it emerged after the fall of the Wall. When that failed, they grasped at the nearest straw, the notion of stepping up the European ambition to the federalist level with the 1991 Maastricht Treaty creating the European Union, thus ensuring Germany's continued entanglement in European institutions. Since this was most Germans' wish anyway, there was no conflict here.
The slow progress and immense cost of Germany's unification on the ground during the 1990s made the reality of the coming tilt in German favor harder to see. Hence, France continued to act as if the new world of the European Union and united Germany was pretty much the same as the one before 1989. Moreover, most of the attention of the EU was focused on the process of dealing with the new applicant states in East Central Europe. The first opportunity to test the new Franco-German relationship came in 2000 when votes were to be weighted in the new expanded union (Nice Treaty) according to population. The sudden addition of 11 million East Germans to Germany's count made the former equals at one go unequal. Germany with 82 million inhabitants was 25 million ahead of Britain and France and demanded a corresponding voting weight. France refused to budge and won, helped by the reluctance of Chancellor Schroeder to challenge President Chirac. All the four biggest countries (Italy as well) were weighted equally at the top. At the same crucial summit a long prepared and much-needed drawdown of the agricultural policy was postponed for 10 years, again due to French resistance.
Actually, France was soon (from 2002) also in trouble with the euro by exceeding the debt limit, but nobody dared to raise the issue. The euro had just been introduced at this time and several countries, France at the head, but Germany too, were soon above the limit. German embarrassment over exceeding its own external debt limit probably discouraged Schroeder from raising the problem. So France's sins were forgotten along with the rest. Dealing with the problem was postponed, and it grew bigger - and bigger - and is haunting us, with a vengeance, today.
At the same time, the willingness of Germany and the rest to indulge French excesses is probably the secret of what keeps France in line.
What has changed after Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy entered the scene? Have they twinned their control of Europe and set themselves up as the mainstays of the good ship? If you take a closer look at what has been happening during the euro crisis, you will see that with Merkel at the helm Germany does not let France make major statements alone, thus gaining a closer grip on French policy positions. Berlin strives all the time to ensure that the two agree (not always succeeding). Most of the time Germany has been pushing for tougher financial controls than France wants.
Indeed, looking at the French record in public finance since the euro was introduced, and its stance in agricultural policy matters, I for one suspect that leaving France unfettered would certainly be to have a loose cannon on the decks of Europe. With Britain now effectively defining itself out of Europe, Germany alone is the indispensable controlling agent, keeping France in line and mobilizing French support for the badly needed leadership of the euro zone.
Therefore, to talk about dominance begs the question of what Europe's and the euro-zone problem is: a long-term lack of responsible leadership and fiscal discipline.
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8 comments:
This one I understood. You are still too calm. While we have our probems, we have an economic machine that basically works (at least until we start printing money, for money's sake). How long can the Euro last? And what about the East European countries which were promised peace and prosperity in our time? They are getting royally screwed. What is the possible downside of just throwing Greece out of the EC and making it an example. Bring in Turkey. All of Europe is so PC that a Moslem country shouldn't make any difference and Turkey certainly looks like and acts like an economic success in these times of overspending, unrealistic juggernauts such as France. As an outsider, it certainly appears that history still controls how Europeans react to each other. But it seems you are still too polite. Take your American political science education and then take off your gloves and stick it to those who deserve it. Just an opinion. Gene
Obscurity is – at times - my refuge, Gene. Calm is advisable when you're trying to move glaciers. I think the euro will last quite a while yet and somehow survive because it's too costly to dismantle. The East Europeans are playing it cool (hardly any external debt) and doing well so far; I don't think they're getting screwed as bad as you say. Turkey is governable, Greece is not, that's how I'd put it. Getting Greece out of the EU is like separating Winnie the Pooh from his honey pot. This is not political science, but hopefully common sense.
Olav, Excellent piece. At the end of the day, one has to admire the way Merkel/Germany have exercised “collective” leadership with Sarkozy when he/France are in fact definitely “second fiddle.” Much of the criticism has been directed at the fact that last week’s moves (3% deficit to GDP ratio; 60% debt to GDP ratio; supranational “authority” over this; good bye, eventually, to Britain) did NOT solve the sovereign debt problem that still looms, but what has been achieved is still remarkable to me, and the acknowledgement of a true and growing community of interests. What I do worry about, longer term, is that if Europe were to slip into long term recession or worse – how Germany’s role and attitudes might evolve. What do you think? Bob
It certainly is remarkable, Bob, and at the same time it was unavoidable - those criteria were in place already ten years ago. It was the will to enforce them that was lacking and now that is in place (soon), only the impementation is missing. Is it credible? I'll believe it when I see France executing an order from the European Court to comply. As for Germany's willingness to tolerate and endure, I hope sufficient numbers of German voters as well as politicians accept this as their "European fate" - to rule Europe through subtle leadership. It is the patience of German voters who don't grasp this that is in doubt, of course.
Olav, thanks, your take on the establishment of the Monetary Union Europe and the East-west Germany unification is very instructive and enlightning. From a political angle you might be completely right.
I just lately came across a speech (1) of and an interview (2) with dr. Heiner Flassbeck with a more economical take on the tension between Germany and the rest of Europe.
- (1) http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=7693
- (2) http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=7694
Apart from tying Germany down in a political framework Flassbeck points at the practical benefits for the other nations: most of them had there currency already pegged to the D. Mark - drawing Germany into a union gave the others a seat and a voice in the system.
With the Maastricht-Treaty came the demand to keep the inflation within the margin of 2% and the debt below 60% of GDP. At that time only France was on target. Because of the economic burden of the unification Germany decided to cut wages and freeze them for more than a decade. The twoflold purpose of the exercise was to bring down unemployment and stimulate the economy. The first one failed and the domestic demand stayed flat. In the meantime the neighbouring wages stayed connected to productivity and were rising. Being above the inflation target is as bad as being far below: it gave Germany an unfair advantage over the rest of Europe. Flassbeck goes so far as to say that Germany's exportindustry caused the others to go bankrupt.
His thesis is that when wages are not in step with productivity, no economy can grow successfully.
Flassbeck's vision occurred to me to have some relevance to the discussion.Charles
Charles, thanks for rounding out my piece with viewpoints on the economic side.
The troubles begin again: as of today, it looks like many of the participants (Ireland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Sweden, Denmark, and others) will resist accepting supranational authority in enforcing the deficit and debt limitations OR will not be able to accept such authority without referenda or parliamentary approval. Should we expect a perpetual crisis? Bob
This must be from the FT article yesterday. My short answer is that crisis or not, the euro will continue to be in trouble for a long time, but not because of what the FT is saying. There is nothing really new in that article, all of these countries have in the past either had referenda about the euro and rejected it (Denmark and Sweden) or have constitutional requirements about ceding sovereignty that they cannot evade just like that (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic), or recently made strongly disputed decisions relevant to the euro (Slovakia) or the EU constitution (Ireland). Overall, I disagree with the FT article's emphasis on the non-euro countries, because they are not crucial to the future of the euro. The key requirement - as also pointed out by Merkel when she presented the "treaty" proposal before the weekend - is that the 17 euro countries accept without any stalling. Only Ireland and Slovakia among the countries mentioned are euro countries. The pressure on them will be enormous. This, the eurozone, is the big question - forget about the rest.
Next, one has to keep in mind that the euro crisis is more directly connected with the short term question of rolling over the debt in the overexposed “pigs” group, happening every week, than with the longer term issue of public fiscal and financial responsibility which are the topics of Merkel's proposal. The markets are the decisionmakers in the debt rollover, Merkel and her EU colleagues can do nothing there. They can only shore up the longer term stability.
The good thing for the long term is that with a new euro treaty in place separate from the EU treaty, the door will open wide for a “two-speed Europe”, something always until now considered anathema among EU enthusiasts, but in reality a heavy drag on the union's workability.
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